Europe risks new dependence on the US for raw materials
Europe is trying to secure access to the minerals needed for electric vehicles, wind turbines and the defence industry, among other things. But according to CBS researcher Raphael Deberdt, Europe risks becoming dependent on another major power.
European countries seeking alternatives to Chinese raw materials need to consider who they may become dependent on instead. That is the assessment of Raphael Deberdt, postdoc at the Department of Management, Society and Communication at CBS.
“Europe needs to be very careful not to exchange one dependency for another. Today we are dependent on China, but the US is making great progress in developing its mining and processing sectors and buying mineral deposits and companies in other countries,” he says.
His warning comes as Europe seeks new partners. In April 2026, the EU and the US entered into a partnership on critical raw materials. The aim is to secure more reliable supplies and access to a wider range of suppliers. The partnership covers areas including the extraction, processing and recycling of critical minerals, according to the EU Commission.
According to Raphael Deberdt, the goal is for Europe to become less dependent on both major powers.
In a new study, he and co-authors Philippe Le Billon and Jessica DiCarlo examine how control over mineral processing gives states and companies power over other countries’ industries.
Power also lies between the mine and the factory
The researchers focus on the stage of production they call the midstream. This is where minerals from mines are turned into materials and components that the manufacturing industry can use. This takes place, for example, at refineries, smelters and processing plants.
A country that controls processing can also influence other countries’ access to these materials, the researchers point out. If it restricts supplies, manufacturers of electric vehicles, wind turbines, military hardware, and AI chips, for example, may face component shortages and have to cut production.
“We look at what happens after extraction: processing the minerals into a semi-finished product that can be used in industry. For us, this is the bottleneck in global supply chains. Extraction largely depends on where the minerals are found,” says Raphael Deberdt.
A mine in a new supplier country may therefore still depend on China because its minerals often have to pass through Chinese facilities for processing, the researchers explain.
Rare earth elements are used in products such as powerful magnets for electric vehicles and wind turbines. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China accounted for 85 per cent of global refining of the rare earth elements used in magnets in 2025.
This dependence can also affect Danish companies, even if they do not buy minerals themselves, Raphael Deberdt stresses. They may, for example, rely on supplies of magnets containing the processed raw materials.
Researcher points to Europe’s own strengths
Raphael Deberdt argues that Europe should build on the areas in which it is already strong. At the same time, countries need to choose which minerals to prioritise for extraction and processing.
“When we talk about geopolitics and dependencies, I think we need to develop what we are already good at and prevent it from moving to China in 15 years. That is very important. It requires political leadership that takes the initiative and is willing to act. I think that is a little hard to find in Europe right now,” he says.
Economics poses a challenge. According to Raphael Deberdt, new European mines and processing facilities may struggle to compete with Chinese producers on price. He believes Europe can learn from the US in this respect.
In July 2025, the US Department of Defense signed an agreement with MP Materials that, among other things, guarantees the company a minimum price for certain rare earth products for ten years. The agreement also includes investments and a guarantee that the magnets from a planned factory will be purchased.
“This is something that needs to be discussed in Europe. It means that, to some extent, we have to depart from free-market principles and recognise that some strategic industries may need to be shielded from market forces. And I think that is crucial. Many of the economic problems we see with mining in Europe come down to companies being unable to make production profitable and therefore having to give up,” he says.
Mineral consumption can also be reduced
Raphael Deberdt also believes that Europe should consider how many minerals it needs. Demand could, for example, be reduced by changing how people travel, he points out.
“How many of these minerals do we actually need? Would it not be better, for example, to expand bus and rail services instead of all of us having a car? This is something we need to consider, and it would make a real difference to the amount of minerals we end up needing,” he says.
New mines must also be developed in ways that local communities can accept, he stresses. This means considering local residents and whether the mines can operate in the long term.
Nine ways to influence supplies
The researchers describe nine ways in which states can influence mineral supplies. One example is export controls: requirements for permits or bans on selling certain minerals, products or technologies abroad.
Such restrictions can prompt other countries to build up production at home or in allied countries. These measures influence one another, but the study does not assess which work best.
“I do not think any one of the dynamics is the most important. They work together. I think export controls, for example, are among the most visible and most widely discussed. They help create the conditions that set the other dynamics in motion,” says Raphael Deberdt.
Offshoring has led to a loss of expertise
In the study’s conclusion, the researchers point out that policymakers still underestimate the importance of processing. At the same time, rebuilding production is costly and time-consuming.
Raphael Deberdt explains that, over several decades, Europe has closed mines and moved parts of its production to countries including China. This has also led to a loss of practical expertise in extracting and processing minerals.
“You cannot develop a mine if you do not have electricians who specialise in mining, mining engineers and process engineers. That is why European governments also need to focus on training the workforce,” he says.
The study’s central point is that access to minerals in the ground does not in itself ensure that industry can use them. It also depends on who can process them and on the social and environmental costs involved. The authors therefore emphasise the need for long-term investment in facilities, technology and the people who can keep production running.
The nine dynamics
The study describes nine ways in which states seek to influence mineral supplies. They can be used together and influence one another. The list is an overview, not a set of nine recommendations for Europe.
1. Decoupling. A country reduces its ties to another country by changing trade, investment and production.
2. Risk reduction or de-risking. A country reduces specific risks, such as dependence on a single supplier, while trade and cooperation continue.
3. Export controls. A country requires permits for, or restricts, the sale of certain minerals, products or technologies abroad.
4. Production in allied countries or friendshoring. A country seeks to locate production and source supplies from political allies or countries with shared interests.
5. Market-based geoeconomics. A country uses its influence over prices and markets to, for example, make it harder for competitors to profit from new mines or facilities.
6. Domestic production or onshoring and reshoring. A country builds up production at home or brings back production that was previously moved abroad.
7. Resource nationalism. A country seeks greater control over and income from its own raw materials, for example by requiring them to be processed locally.
8. Techno-nationalism. A country develops and protects technology and knowledge that can give it an advantage over other countries, for example in mineral processing.
9. Strategic stockpiles. A country builds up stocks of minerals that can be used if supplies are disrupted or prices rise.
About the study
‘Midstream geopolitics: Processing power in critical mineral supply chains’ is written by Raphael Deberdt, Philippe Le Billon and Jessica DiCarlo and published online in Political Geography on 17 July 2026.
The researchers analysed sources including policy documents, trade data, company reports and research literature and drew on their fieldwork. The study explains how mineral processing can confer geopolitical power. It does not measure the effects of individual measures.