Seminar 16 September, 2013

Micael Castanheira de Moura, Université Libre de Bruxelles-ECARES

 
Monday, September 16, 2013 - 13:00 to 14:00

Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment

 

Abstract

This paper studies theoretically and experimentally the properties of plurality and approval voting when a majority gets divided by information imperfections. The majority faces two challenges: aggregating information to select the best majority candidate and coordinating to defeat the minority candidate. Under plurality, the majority cannot achieve both goals at once. Under approval voting, it can: welfare is strictly higher because some voters approve of both majority alternatives. In the laboratory, we find (i) strong evidence of strategic voting, and (ii) superiority of approval voting over plurality. Finally, subject behavior suggests the need to study equilibria in asymmetric strategies.

 

Contact:

Battista Severgnini
Cédric Schneider

The page was last edited by: Department of Economics // 12/17/2017