Department of International Economics, Government and Business
My research interests revolve around understanding managerial choices. In one of my projects, I elicit risk preferences of U.S. executives from their option exercising behavior and use these data to explain sorting into certain economic environments and risk-taking decisions. I am also interested in the social and moral constraints of top executives pay that result from the institutional and individual environment to which the manager is exposed to. More recently, I became interested in the drivers and consequences of population aging and economic inequality in the context of corporate governance and top decision making.
- Managerial behavior
- Top executive wages
- CEO popularity
- Social online networks
Corporate Governance (Advanced Finance & Economics)
Corporate Governance (Master's and BA levels)
Various topics in corporate finance, behavioral finance, industrial organization and strategic management
JP Vergne, Georg Wernicke, Steffen Brenner (2018) Signal Incongruence and Its Consequences: A Study of Media Disapproval and CEO Overcompensation. Organization Science 29(5):796-817.
Steffen Brenner / The Risk Preferences of U.S. Executives In: Management Science, Vol. 61, No. 6, 2015, p. 1344-1361
Self-disclosure at international cartels, Journal of International Business Studies, 2011, 42, 221-234.
On the irrelevance of insider trading for managerial compensation, European Economic Review, 2011, 55(2), 293-303.
In: Organization Science, Vol. 29, No. 5, 9.2018, p. 796-817
Paper presented at The 15th European Academy of Management Conference (EURAM) 2015, 2015
In: Management Science, Vol. 61, No. 6, 2015, p. 1344-1361
In: Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science. ed. /James J. Cochran; Louis Anthony Cox Jr.; Pinar Keskinocak; Jeffrey P. Kharoufeh; J. Cole Smith . : Wiley 2011
In: European Economic Review, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2011, p. 293-303
In: Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2011, p. 221-234
In: Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2010, p. 275-291