Google 15 Years On – Key Learnings, Antitrust Challenges, and the Road Ahead

10:00–10:15

Welcome and Introduction

Fifteen years have passed since the formal opening of Google Shopping in 2010. Besides introducing the event and some house rules, Dr. Landman will outline how the day is dedicated to exploring what we have learned since and where we are now concerning Google. Google Shopping has been closed at the EU-level, but claims for damages are pending, and many other cases and issues can trace their lineage back to Google Shopping. Not only in the EU, but globally.

Lawrence B. Landman, Senior Vice President of Lateral Link’s Bridgeline Solutions and Director, Antitrust Division

10:15–10:45

Looking back at a long, winding road

It took several years for the EU to render its Google Shopping Decision (2017), and not until several rounds of settlement attempts, the arrival of a new chief enforcer, and an overhaul of the theories of harm. The EU has already opened its investigations in 2010; so why did it take so many years to address Google's issues?”

Paul Csiszár, Senior Advisor at Brunswick, former director of DG Competition

10:45–11:15

The World Against Google - Taking stock

Almost 200 investigations have been opened against Google globally, but most fall into eight key groups/issues. The most prominent are Google Search, Google Android, Google AdTech, and claims for damages utilizing these. Across most jurisdictions, Google’s desire to remain the internet gatekeeper is a recurring theme, and the late understanding of this probably explains why enforcers were slow to react.

Christian Bergqvist, Associate Professor at Copenhagen University

11:15-11:30

Short break (coffee and cake)

11:30-12:00

The Asian Way

Several Asian countries supplement their provisions on abusive actions with Unfair Trading Practices clauses. These allow countries like Japan to police the tech sector similarly to what is now done with the EU’s Digital Markets Act. Is this a superior solution, and what is the experience of having several overlapping enforcement options?

Yuka AOYAGI, Professor, Hosei University, Tokyo

12:00-12:30

Did the US Finally Manage to Crack the Nut?

In 2013, the FTC decided not to advance a case against Google after an extensive investigation, as the FTC largely concluded that the design changes on Google Search were procompetitive and preferred by users. Thus, the FTC saw little support for finding that self-preferencing was anticompetitive. In 2020, an alliance of the DOJ and several state AGs opened a series of federal cases. What has changed, why does the DOJ think they will succeed where the FTC failed, and where are we now?

John M. Yun, Professor at George Mason University, USA

12:30-13:00

From Google Search to Google Shopping – Abusive Self-Favoring?

Several jurisdictions have investigated Google for favouring its services in generic search results. In almost all cases, Google has been exonerated for any wrongdoing, and while DG COMP initially investigated Google Shopping for abusive self-favouring, the 2017 Decision does not stand for this directly.

Lena Hornkohl, Assistant Professor at Vienna University

13:00-13:30

Lunch (sandwich)

13:30-14:00

Google Android – On context, causality and the meaning of exclusionary effects

Google offers the open source Android Operating System (OS) to smartphones manufacturers, contributing to the fast and successful rollout of these devices. Unlike other OS providers, Google licenses Android for free, subject only to the non-exclusive pre-installation of certain Google offerings. The European Commission sanctioned this conduct with the largest competition fine ever imposed in the EU. The General Court only partially annulled the Commission’s decision. The pending appeal before the CJEU raises fundamental questions that will shape EU law on abuse of dominance for years to come

14:00-14:30

Google AdTech – When Google Trades with Itself

In the AdTech sector, Google represents both buyers and sellers of online advertising space and owns the marketplace where they meet. Several enforcers, including DG COMP and DOJ, see an inherent conflict of interest, but so far only the French NCA has identified an infringement. Based on this, several damage claims have been filed.

Jorge Padilla, partner, Compass Lexecon

14:30-15:00

Google Auto – the death of Bronner

In Google Auto, Google had declined to invest resources into linking a third-party app with its auto screen, prompting the Italian NCA to open an Article 102 case. The matter ultimately came before the Court of Justice, which rephrased the facts and questions to provide a clear ruling on the non-applicability of the restrictive Bronner criteria to the issue of interoperability between technical devices.

Fernando Castillo de la Torre, European Commission, Legal Service

15:00-15:15

Short break (coffee and cake)

15:15-15:45

Compensation for the damages caused by Google - Private enforcement in the national courts

Following the antitrust decisions that held Google in violation of Article 102 (e.g. EU's Google Shopping, EU Google Android or the French AdTech Decision), claims for damages have been filed across various jurisdictions in Europe. This includes cases in the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands. While claimants can rely on the binding effect of the antitrust decisions, private enforcement raises complex procedural and strategic considerations. These include litigation costs, mechanisms for claim aggregation, or divergent approaches to determining — all of which may influence the choice of forum and the prospects for effective redress.

Johannes Wick, Counsel Geradin Partner

15:45-16:15

Google and IP rights

Google is subject to several IP cases involving the “use” of third-party information. Google includes this information in its search results but also relies on it to develop its chatbots. This might infringe upon IP rights, but is there also an antitrust angle to the matter?

Stijn Huijts, partner Geradin Partners 

16:15-16:45

How do we stop Google's (alleged) crime spree

While many of the antitrust investigations are open or pending appeals, it remains that Google's business model persistently clashes with competition law. This raises the question of how we can stop this, assuming we don’t simply exonerate Google of all charges. Can the DMA or other ex ante interventions do what competition law cannot?

Giorgio Monti, Professor at Tilburg Law School, Netherlands

16:45-17:00

Thanks for Today!

Kathrine Søs Jacobsen Cesko, Assistant Professor at Copenhagen Business School