Guest lecture by Jacint Jordana

Financial Governance, Banking Crises, and the Institutional Varieties of Regulation

Do political and regulatory institutions affect the odds that countries will suffer crippling banking crises? In his talk, Jacint Jordana will investigate the different institutional setups to predict episodes of economic instability and banking crises. He bases his talk on a set of 80+ countries observed through 1971-2009 and on the premise that key characteristics of political systems interact with different regulatory designs. This interaction provides decision-makers with varying incentives to prevent episodes of generalized bank insolvency. Jacint Jordana hence argues that independent agencies involved in financial governance can be effective in reducing the risk of banking crisis only under certain contextual conditions.

Jacint Jordana is professor of Political Science and Public Administration at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF). He has a PhD in Economics (Universitat de Barcelona, 1992) and has held a number of leading positions at UPF. He has a PhD in Economics (Universitat de Barcelona, 1992) and has held a number of leading positions at UPF. Next to several visiting fellowships in Australia, Germany and the USA, he was co-chair of the ECPR standing group on Regulatiry Governance from 2005 to 2010.  Currently, he is director of the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI), an inter-university research institute devoted to international studies.  His main research area is focused to the analysis of public policies, with special emphasis being laid on regulatory policy and regulatory governance.

Registration:

 Sign up until August 26, 2011, at coe.dbp@cbs.dk

Organized by: 

The guest lecture is organized by Department of Business and Politics

The Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence at CBS