

Mandatory pension saving and homeownership*

Marcel Fischer[†] Bjarne Astrup Jensen[‡] Marlene Koch[§]

This version: September 10, 2021

*We are grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from Jens Jackwerth, Lasse Petersen, and seminar participants at the University of Konstanz, the University of Regensburg, and Copenhagen Business School. This research has been supported by PeRCent, which receives base funding from the Danish pension funds and Copenhagen Business School.

[†]Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance, Solbjerg Plads 3, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark and University of Konstanz, Department of Economics, Postbox 147, D-78457 Konstanz, Germany, phone: +49 7531 88 2645, e-mail: marcel.fischer@uni.kn.

[‡]Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance, Solbjerg Plads 3, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark and Danish Finance Institute, phone: +45 3815 3614, e-mail: ba.fi@cbs.dk.

[§]University of Konstanz, Department of Economics, Postbox 147, D-78457 Konstanz, Germany, phone: +49 7531 88 3620, e-mail: marlene.koch@uni.kn.

Abstract

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We explore the implications of mandatory minimum contributions to retirement accounts over the life cycle. These contributions alter housing market entry and have substantial welfare effects. We propose a flexible retirement saving scheme that only requires individuals to contribute to retirement accounts if they have not built up sufficient savings. This flexible retirement saving scheme partly alleviates the unintended side effects of mandatory minimum contributions and simultaneously ensures that individuals build up sufficient retirement savings.

Key Words: retirement saving, homeownership, pension system design

JEL Classification Codes: E21, G11, H23

1 Introduction

Saving for retirement is among the most important financial challenges individuals face throughout their lives. At present, increasing life expectancies combined with decreasing birth rates and low interest rates impose huge challenges on finding suitable ways to sustain a reasonable level of retirement benefits for individuals. To allow individuals to nevertheless reach financial security during retirement, most countries around the world impose some form of mandatory retirement saving scheme on their citizens, often financed via a constant share of labor income used to fund the system, such as under the current U.S. Social Security system.

In an empirical paper, Beshears, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Skimmyhorn (2021) find that automatic enrollment in a retirement plan increases mortgage debt. Our realistically calibrated life cycle model can explain this result via a liquidity constraint: individuals faced with contributing to a retirement account can only repay their mortgages at a slower rate. Extending beyond the work of the aforementioned, our model predicts that mandatory retirement saving not only affects mortgage debt, but also the timing of homeownership. More specifically, mandatory retirement saving delays homeownership, because it renders building up sufficient savings for the down payment more challenging. Mandatory retirement saving also has substantial welfare effects.

Our realistically calibrated life cycle model incorporates many important features of models from the literature, including stochastic labor income (e.g., Cocco et al. (2005)), a rent-versus-own decision (e.g., Cocco (2005); Yao and Zhang (2005)), and taxable as well as tax-deferred retirement accounts (e.g., Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang (2004); Fischer and Gallmeyer (2017)). In our model, individuals must make informed decisions about their preferred consumption, their homeownership status, the size of the home they want to live in, the contribution to or, after attaining retirement age, withdrawal from the retirement account, and about the shares of wealth invested into stocks and bonds in both the regular and the retirement account.

Existing pension systems of the defined benefit type, in which participants are promised fixed annual benefits for their contributions, face increasing funding problems. As a result, this study focuses on pension systems of the defined contribution type, to which individuals contribute according to a pre-determined schedule, while benefits depend on the amounts of contributions made and their profits earned. Currently, such pension systems already cover large shares of the population's pensions in, e.g., Denmark, Netherlands and Sweden.

Retirement accounts are typically set up as tax-deferred accounts. Contributions to

these accounts are (within certain limits) deductible from taxable income, and profits earned from them are generally tax-exempt, while withdrawals during retirement age are subject to income taxation.¹ Withdrawals prior to retirement age are generally not possible or subject to substantial penalty taxes, thus rendering early withdrawals highly undesirable. Hence, an important difference between regular taxable accounts and tax-deferred retirement accounts is the illiquidity of the latter.

Whereas existing funded retirement saving schemes typically provide individuals with a degree of freedom in their asset allocation, they usually impose harsh restrictions on minimum contributions. In practice, individuals are often required to contribute a constant minimum share of their labor income to a retirement saving scheme. To explore the implications of such minimum contribution requirements for tax-deferred retirement accounts, we compare a setting with a minimum contribution of 12.4% of labor income (the current U.S. Social Security payroll tax) with a setting without mandatory contributions.

Intuitively, mandatory minimum contributions could delay housing market entry, because they render it more challenging for young adults, who are typically severely liquidity constrained, to build up sufficient liquid savings for a down payment. Consistent with this intuition, our model predicts that the minimum contribution rate of 12.4% delays the average age of first home buyers by more than two years. Simultaneously, individuals facing minimum contribution requirements face higher loan-to-value ratios. In essence, these individuals incur the cost of the interest margin by borrowing their own money.

In line with Gourinchas and Parker (2002), young adults face strong labor income growth, thus rendering it desirable to consume larger parts of their wealth early in their life cycle and to postpone building up larger retirement savings to a later point in time, when they are less liquidity constrained. Overall, our model predicts that mandatory minimum contributions lead to welfare costs of 7.7%. That is, individuals subject to the minimum contribution requirement need an increase in present wealth and lifetime labor income of 7.7% to attain the same level of expected presently discounted lifetime utility as individuals not facing the constraint.

To counteract the high welfare costs of mandatory minimum contributions, we propose a flexible retirement saving scheme, which builds on the intuition that it is not important through which channels individuals save for retirement, if they build up sufficient savings. Intuitively, it may make sense to prioritize savings outside tax-deferred retirement accounts at

¹Few countries, including Denmark and Sweden, impose taxes on profits earned in tax-deferred accounts. However, the tax rate is low compared to that applicable in an ordinary taxable account.

a younger age to facilitate making the down payment required for the acquisition of a home. Our flexible retirement saving scheme builds on this intuition and only forces individuals to contribute to a retirement account, if they have not built up sufficient savings in either ordinary taxable accounts, as home equity, or through pre-existing retirement savings. More specifically, our scheme only requires individuals to make minimum contributions, if they have not saved as much as individuals facing mandatory minimum contributions.

Compared to the pension system with mandatory minimum contributions, our flexible retirement saving scheme, which ensures a similar build up of savings, has two key advantages. First, it allows individuals to repay their mortgages before building up savings in the retirement account, thus avoiding paying the interest differential between the borrowing rate and the investment rate. Second, it allows individuals to consume more at younger age, which is when they are most financially constrained. In sum the flexible retirement saving scheme leads to an increase in welfare by 2.5% compared to the pension system with mandatory minimum contributions while simultaneously ensuring a similar level of savings.

Our work contributes to a growing strand of literature investigating optimal retirement savings decisions over the life cycle. An important early contribution is the work of Carroll (1997), which studies the optimal life cycle profile of savings when individuals do not have access to retirement accounts. Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) extends this work by allowing for a stochastic labor income stream, which is calibrated to socio-demographic data. Studies examining optimal savings decisions with regular taxable and tax-deferred retirement accounts include: Amromin (2003); Shoven and Sialm (2003); Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang (2004); Garlappi and Huang (2006); Huang (2008); and Fischer and Gallmeyer (2017). We contribute to this line of literature by highlighting the undesirable side effects of minimum contribution requirements and by proposing a new flexible retirement saving scheme, that partly alleviates the unintended side effects, while simultaneously ensuring that individuals build up sufficient savings.

Our work is also related to a strand of literature exploring optimal pension system design (e.g., Dahlquist, Vestman, and Setty (2018)). Larsen and Munk (2021), whose study of mandatory pension savings is closest to our work, document that individuals who undersave or do not invest into stocks can benefit from mandatory pension saving. Our work has another focus and differs from theirs in several regards. First, we explicitly model a rent-versus-own decision and mortgages. Our results show that mandatory pension saving delays housing market entry and leads to higher loan-to-value ratios. Second, our work proposes a flexible retirement savings scheme that only requires mandatory pension savings

for individuals who have not built up sufficient savings. This flexible retirement saving system leads to lower loan-to-value ratios and higher welfare than the pension system with mandatory minimum contributions.

This paper proceeds as follows: section 2 outlines our life cycle model and present its calibration, while section 3 presents the model predictions. Next, section 4 introduces our flexible retirement saving scheme, and section 5 concludes.

2 The model

In this section, we outline our life cycle model of optimal consumption, savings, and housing decisions. In our model, individuals work from age 20 to 65 and build up savings for retirement (accumulation phase). At age 66, they are retired and use their accumulated savings during their remaining lifetime. In our model, individuals face a rent-versus-own decision. They can build up savings in both regular taxable and tax-deferred retirement accounts, and they can invest in a risk-free asset, a risky asset representing a stock market index, and an owner-occupied home. We let the Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) labor income process calibrated for high school graduates determine the individual's labor income during working age. That is, we allow for an age-dependent trend as well as stochastic income shocks.

Individuals are subject to mortality risk and make their decisions in order to achieve the objective of maximizing expected lifetime utility. The individual's preference function is given by recursive Epstein-Zin preferences (Epstein and Zin (1989)) to enable a separation between the individual's degree of relative risk aversion, γ , and its elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ψ .

2.1 Mandatory contributions

Our goal is to investigate the impact of mandatory minimum contributions to retirement accounts, irrespective of whether the accounts are run by a mandatory public pension system, such as the U.S. Social Security system, a mandatory occupational pension system, such as those widespread in Scandinavian countries, or a mandatory private pension system.

To investigate the impact of mandatory contributions, we compare two settings with each other. In our benchmark case, individuals are faced with a minimum contribution requirement to a retirement account, corresponding to a constant share, $\xi \in (0, 1]$, of the

individual's labor income, L_t , at time t during working age:

$$Z_t \geq \xi L_t, \quad t < t_{ret}, \quad (1)$$

in which Z_t denotes the individual's contribution to the tax-deferred account, and t_{ret} denotes the time at which the individual retires. Requiring minimum contributions, which are a constant share of labor income, is a widespread phenomenon in many pension systems around the world. Notable exceptions are mandatory occupational pension systems in Switzerland, for which the minimum contribution rate typically increases with age.

We compare this benchmark case with a setting, in which the minimum contribution during working age is zero, i.e.:

$$Z_t \geq 0, \quad t < t_{ret}. \quad (2)$$

We deliberately do not allow for early withdrawals from retirement accounts, because such withdrawals are either impossible or subject to substantial tax penalties, thus rendering early withdrawals undesirable.

Since contributions to retirement accounts during working age are typically tax-deductible, they are usually limited by an upper bound, $\phi \in (0, 1]$, of the individual's labor income:

$$Z_t \leq \phi L_t, \quad t < t_{ret}, \quad (3)$$

in which $\xi \leq \phi$.

2.2 Housing

In our model, individuals face a rent-versus-own decision, i.e., they can either live in a rented place or an owner-occupied home. The return on investments in owner-occupied homes, r_t^H , from time t to time $t + 1$ is lognormally distributed, with mean μ_H and standard deviation σ_H .

Owner-occupied homes serve a dual role as an asset and a durable consumption good. That is, when owning a home, individuals simultaneously derive utility from living in their home and expose themselves to changes in its value. Following earlier work with owner-occupied housing, such as Cocco (2005), Yao and Zhang (2005), Fischer and Stamos (2013), and Kraft, Munk, and Wagner (2018), we employ a Cobb-Douglas utility function, u , defined over consumption and housing.

Following Kiyotaki, Michaelides, and Nikolov (2011), we account for the preferences of

individuals to live in owner-occupied housing, by allowing for a higher utility per home unit when they own it. For that purpose, we multiply the size of the individual's residence, Q , by a factor $1 + \zeta h$, in which ζ determines the strength of the preference for living in an owner-occupied home, and h is an indicator variable, taking the value of one if the individual lives in an owner-occupied home, and zero otherwise. Hence:

$$u(C, Q) = C^{1-\theta} (Q(1 + \zeta h))^\theta, \quad (4)$$

in which C is the amount consumed, and θ is the relative preference over housing consumption.

Both owners and renters face costs for housing consumption. These costs can be divided into recurring and nonrecurring costs. The former depends on whether the individual lives in an owner-occupied home or a rented place. If H_t denotes the price per housing unit at time t , renters pay an annual rent, $m_r Q_t H_t$, that is assumed to be a constant share, m_r , of the value of their residence, $Q_t H_t$. Owners also face recurring costs, such as property taxes and maintenance costs of $m_o Q_t H_t$, in which m_o is a constant share of the value of their home. The rate of recurring housing costs, m , from time t to $t + 1$ can be expressed as

$$m(h_t) = h_t m_o + (1 - h_t) m_r. \quad (5)$$

Nonrecurring housing expenses, n , occur when the individual acquires a new home. In that case, the individual faces transaction costs of $f_p Q_t H_t$, in which f_p denotes the percentage cost of acquiring homeownership. This cost includes fees to be paid to a real estate agent and taxes. Individuals face these costs when changing homeownership status from renter to owner ($h_t (1 - h_{t-1}) = 1$) or when remaining a homeowner, but changing home size, i.e., when moving from one owner-occupied home to another ($h_t h_{t-1} \chi_{\{Q_t \neq Q_{t-1}\}} = 1$), in which $\chi_{\{Q_t \neq Q_{t-1}\}}$ is an indicator variable taking the value one, if $Q_t \neq Q_{t-1}$, and zero otherwise.² Nonrecurring transaction costs, n , from time t to $t + 1$ can then be summarized as follows:

$$n(Q_t, h_t, h_{t-1}) = f_p Q_t H_t (h_t (1 - h_{t-1}) + h_t h_{t-1} \chi_{\{Q_t \neq Q_{t-1}\}}). \quad (6)$$

These transaction costs result in no-trade regions, in which the costs from adjusting the home size outweigh the benefits. That is, trading costs render frequent changes in home size undesirable.

²In our model, no costs occur when selling a home, i.e., changing homeownership status from owner to renter is not associated with any costs to the seller. In our model, the buyer covers the costs.

2.3 Capital markets

Apart from investing in owner-occupied homes, individuals can invest into a representative stock market index where the pre-tax return, r_t^S , from time t to $t+1$ is lognormally distributed with mean μ_S and standard deviation σ_S . Returns on investments into the stock market index and owner-occupied homes may be correlated, reflecting that they may depend on common risk factors, such as the evolution of the economy. When τ_g denotes the tax rate applicable to returns on equity investments in the taxable account, the gross returns on an investment in the stock market index in the regular taxable and tax-deferred retirement account from time t to $t+1$ are given by $G_{T,t} = 1 + r_t^S (1 - \tau_g)$ and $G_{R,t} = 1 + r_t^S$, respectively.

In addition to the stock market, individuals can invest into a risk-free asset paying a constant pre-tax interest rate of r . When τ denotes the income tax rate applicable to labor income, including interest earned in the taxable account, the gross returns on investments into the risk-free asset in the taxable and tax-deferred account are given by $R_T = 1 + r (1 - \tau)$ and $R_R = 1 + r$, respectively. Since profits are taxed on a nominal basis, it is important to explicitly account for inflation. We assume a constant inflation rate, which we denote by i .

Homeowners can use their home as a collateral and borrow up to a share, $\delta \in [0, 1]$, of its value, whereas renters are barred from this borrowing opportunity. When B_t denotes the amount invested risk-free ($B_t \geq 0$) or borrowed ($B_t < 0$), it holds that:

$$-B_t \leq \delta h_t Q_t H_t. \quad (7)$$

To avoid tax arbitrage opportunities by deducting mortgage interest expenses, while simultaneously earning interest in a retirement account tax free, we assume that borrowers face an interest rate margin, i.e., the after-tax interest burden from borrowing exceeds the after-tax interest earned on investments in the risk-free asset. When R_D denotes the gross after-tax borrowing rate after accounting for the tax deductibility of mortgage interest expenses, it thus holds that $R_D > R_R$.

2.4 Optimization problem

In our model, in every period, t , individuals must simultaneously make seven interrelated decisions: 1) how much to spend on nondurable consumption; 2) how much to contribute to (or, after attaining retirement age, withdraw from) their retirement account, Z_t ; 3) the share of retirement savings invested in stocks, $\alpha_{R,t}$; 4) the size of the home they want to live in, Q_t ; 5) their homeownership status, h_t ; 6) how much of their taxable wealth to invest

in stocks, S_t ; and, finally, 7) the amount of wealth to invest in bonds or the size of their mortgage, B_t .

In setting up the individual's optimization problem, $f(t)$ denotes the individual's survival probability from time t to $t + 1$ and β denotes its time preference factor. The terminal period in our model is denoted by N . $W_{T,t}$ is the amount of wealth in the regular taxable account at time t . Retirement savings at time t before (after) contributions/withdrawals are denoted by $W_{R,t-}$ ($W_{R,t+}$). Total wealth, W_t , that effectively belongs to the individual after accounting for the fact that savings in the tax-deferred account are still subject to taxation upon withdrawal can be expressed as:

$$W_t = W_{R,t-} (1 - \tau) + W_{T,t} + h_{t-1} Q_{t-1} H_t. \quad (8)$$

The individual's optimization problem is then:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{C_t, Z_t, \alpha_{R,t}, Q_t, h_t, S_t, B_t\}} V_t(X_t) = \\ \left((1 - \beta) \left(\left(\frac{C_t}{(1+i)^t} \right)^{1-\theta} (Q_t (1 + \zeta h_t))^{\theta} \right)^{1-\frac{1}{\psi}} + \beta (f(t) \mathbb{E}_t [V_{t+1} (X_{t+1})^{1-\gamma}])^{\frac{1-\frac{1}{\psi}}{1-\gamma}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\psi}}}, \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

subject to

$$W_{R,t-} = W_{R,(t-1)+} (\alpha_{R,t-1} G_{R,t-1} + (1 - \alpha_{R,t-1}) R_R) \quad (10)$$

$$W_{R,t+} = W_{R,t-} + Z_t \quad (11)$$

$$\begin{aligned} W_{T,t} &= (1 - \tau) L_t + S_{t-1} G_{T,t-1} + B_{t-1} (\chi_{\{B_{t-1} \geq 0\}} R_T + \chi_{\{B_{t-1} < 0\}} R_D) \\ &= C_t + S_t + B_t + m(h_t) Q_t H_t + n(Q_t, h_t, h_{t-1}) + h_t Q_t H_t - h_{t-1} Q_{t-1} H_t + Z_t (1 - \tau) \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

$$C_t, Q_t > 0, S_t \geq 0, \alpha_{R,t} \in [0, 1], W_{R,t+} \geq 0, \quad (13)$$

and Equations (3) to (7), where $X_t = [t, W_{R,t-}, W_{T,t}, L_t, Q_{t-1}, h_{t-1}]$ is the vector of state variables for this optimization problem. Depending on whether or not we are investigating the optimal consumption-investment strategy with mandatory contributions to the retirement account, the individual's optimization problem is solved subject to the constraint given in Equations (1) or (2). Appendix A explains the more technical details on how we simplify and solve the optimization problem.

2.5 Calibration

This section summarizes the calibration of our model. Individuals enter the life cycle at age 20 ($t = 1$), work until age 65, are retired at age 66 ($t_{ret} = 47$), and die at the latest at age 100. Therefore, the accumulation period is 46 years, and the maximum investment horizon is $N = 81$ years. We let one period correspond to one year. Prior to age 100, we use the life table published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Arias and Xu (2018)) to determine the survival probabilities for men for another year.

We compare two different settings: in one setting, individuals must contribute at least $\xi = 12.4\%$ of their labor income, the current contribution rate to the U.S. Social Security system, to a retirement account, while in the other, individuals do not face any mandatory contribution requirements for a retirement account, i.e., $\xi = 0\%$. The upper bound for contributions to the retirement account is set to $\phi = 100\%$ of labor income in both settings.

The pre-tax risk-free rate is set to $r = 3.7\%$, the average one-month Treasury Bill rate between 1946 and 2019. The expected annual pre-tax return on the S&P 500 between 1946 and 2019 was 12.4% and its standard deviation $\sigma_S = 16.9\%$. While the historical equity premium was quite high (Mehra and Prescott (1985); Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002)), there are doubts as to whether such a high level will also apply in future periods. As a result, we follow the current consensus, which is around three to four percentage points (Claus and Thomas (2001)) and set the expected return of stocks to $\mu_S = 7.8\%$, implying an equity premium of around four percentage points. Inflation is set to its average value between 1946 and 2019, i.e., $i = 3.7\%$.

The tax rate on interest income, labor income, and regular withdrawals from the retirement account is set to $\tau = 35\%$ and the tax rate on capital gains is set to $\tau_g = 20\%$, roughly corresponding to the top tax rates in the U.S.

Following Yao and Zhang (2005), we set the housing preference parameter to $\theta = 0.2$, the maximum borrowing rate to $\delta = 80\%$, the annual maintenance rate to $m_o = 1.5\%$, and the transaction costs when acquiring a new owner-occupied home to $f_p = 6\%$. The annual rent rate is $m_r = 6.7\%$, the empirical estimate of Fischer and Stamos (2013). We set the individual's preference for owning over renting to $\zeta = 10\%$, which is in the order of magnitudes chosen in Kiyotaki, Michaelides, and Nikolov (2011) and Fischer and Khorunzhina (2019).

Using the U.S. S&P's CoreLogic Case-Shiller Home Price Index, we estimated the expected nominal return on housing from 1946 to 2019, μ_H , to be 4.6% and its standard deviation, σ_H , to be 5.2%. Price changes in individual homes are far from perfectly correlated, implying that the House Price Index underestimates the volatility of individual house

prices. Case and Shiller (1989) argue that the volatility of individual house prices should be around 15%. Bourassa, Haurin, Haurin, Hoesli, and Sun (2009) provide empirical support. We therefore set the standard deviation of individual homes to $\sigma_H = 15\%$.

To avoid tax arbitrage opportunities, as in Marekwica, Schaefer, and Sebastian (2013), the borrowing rate is set to $r_D = 6.2\%$, corresponding to an after-tax borrowing rate of $(1 - \tau)r_D = 4.03\%$, thus exceeding the after-tax risk-free rate in the retirement account of $r = 3.7\%$. Correlation between stock returns and labor income is set to $\rho_{S,L} = 0.047$, correlation between housing return and labor income to $\rho_{H,L} = 0.55$, and correlation between housing and stock returns to $\rho_{H,S} = 0$, which are the empirical estimates from Cocco (2005).

To determine the individual's labor income during working age, we use the Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) labor income process estimated for high school graduates. As the goal of our work is to contribute to a better understanding of how contributions to pension systems are best implemented, we require individuals to fully fund their retirement benefits through their own savings. As a result, we do not allow for retirement benefits from other sources and set the replacement ratio to zero, implying that individuals do not receive other income during retirement age besides from their accumulated savings.

Preference parameters are chosen to match empirically observed wealth at retirement age for individuals facing minimum contribution requirements. The degree of risk aversion and the time preference factor are therefore set to $\gamma = 3$ and $\beta = 0.96$, respectively. We set the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to $\psi = 0.15$, which is in the range of estimates in Pakoš (2011), Cashin and Unayama (2016), and Gayle and Khorunzhina (2018). Table 1 summarizes our base case parameter choice.

3 Results

3.1 Model predictions

It is important to ensure that our simulated model predictions are able to match key features in the data, which is why we begin the presentation of our results by comparing wealth in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data with model-predicted wealth. The data sample used in examining the model fit covers the years 2011 to 2019. A comparison between model predictions and the data is challenging, because Social Security benefits are not part of wealth reported in the data, and there is an extremely high degree of dispersion of wealth in the PSID data. To address these two issues, we proceed as follows.

We add the present value of Social Security benefits to PSID wealth to allow for a

Description	Symbol	Value	Source
<i>Preference parameters</i>			
Degree of risk aversion	γ	3.00	Own choice
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution	ψ	0.15	Own choice
Time preference factor	β	0.96	Own choice
<i>Financial markets</i>			
Expected nominal return on equity	μ_S	7.8%	Historical estimate
Standard deviation of return on equity	σ_S	16.9%	Historical estimate
Inflation	i	3.7%	Historical estimate
Nominal risk-free rate	r	3.7%	Historical estimate
<i>Housing market</i>			
Housing preference parameter	θ	0.2	Yao and Zhang (2005)
Maximum borrowing rate	δ	80.0%	Yao and Zhang (2005)
Risk-free borrowing rate	r_D	6.2%	Yao and Zhang (2005)
Annual rent rate	m_r	6.7%	Fischer and Stamos (2013)
Annual maintenance rate	m_o	1.5%	Yao and Zhang (2005)
Transaction costs for purchasing home	f_p	6.0%	Yao and Zhang (2005)
Expected nominal return on housing	μ_H	4.6%	Historical estimate
Standard deviation of return on housing	σ_H	15.0%	Case and Shiller (1989)
Preference for owning over renting	ζ	10.0%	Kiyotaki et al. (2011)
<i>Taxes</i>			
Tax rate on capital gains	τ_g	20%	Own choice
Tax rate on other income	τ	35%	Own choice
<i>Correlations</i>			
Stock returns and labor income	$\rho_{S,L}$	0.047	Cocco (2005)
Housing return and labor income	$\rho_{H,L}$	0.550	Cocco (2005)
Housing and stock return	$\rho_{H,S}$	0.000	Cocco (2005)

Table 1: This table summarizes the base-case calibration used in our model.

meaningful comparison between model predictions and the data. We calculate the present value of Social Security benefits in two steps. First, we calculate the monthly Social Security benefits individuals can expect when retiring at age 65 by following the calculation procedure provided on the U.S. Social Security Administration website.³ Second, we calculate the present value of the expected benefits with basic actuarial formulas accounting for mortality rates, as provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for 2015 and using our base-case interest rate of $r = 3.7\%$. Appendix B outlines the data selection process and the computation of the present value of the Social Security benefits in more detail.

We use median wealth in the data, which reflects that mean wealth is heavily biased upwards by a few outliers. In the data, self-reported median wealth at age 20 is USD 10,000 and grows to USD 110,000 at age 65. The median present value of Social Security benefits at age 65 is USD 250,035.70, implying a total wealth at age 65 of USD 360,035.70. Hence, total wealth grows by a factor of about 36.0 from age 20 to 65 in the PSID data. Preference parameters in our model are chosen to achieve a comparable growth of wealth. Specifically, with the choice of parameters introduced in Section 2.5, the growth of average wealth in our model from age 20 to 65 is 35.33, thus matching the growth of wealth in the data very well.

3.2 Implications of minimum contribution requirements

In this section, we explore the implications of mandatory minimum contributions for the evolution of the wealth of individuals, W_t , and retirement savings, housing market entry, and loan-to-value ratios. Intuitively, mandatory contributions to retirement accounts should affect not only the individuals' accumulation of wealth and the location of their savings between regular and retirement accounts, but they should also affect the rent-versus-own decision and the timing of housing market entry through two counteracting channels. On the one hand, mandatory contributions reduce the individuals' liquid wealth, thus deferring the age at which individuals have accumulated enough savings for a down payment. Hence, from this liquidity channel, mandatory contributions should defer housing market entry. On the other hand, mandatory contributions should lead to a faster overall accumulation of wealth, enabling individuals to bear possible losses on potential housing investments more easily, without running the risk of retirement poverty. Via this wealth channel, mandatory contributions could prepone housing market entry. In this section, we explore which of these two counteracting channels dominates.

Figure 1 summarizes our results. Panel A depicts the evolution of wealth over the life

³<https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/Benefits.html>

cycle and Panel B of retirement savings. Panel C depicts the distribution of first-time housing market entry, while Panel D compares the evolution of loan-to-value ratios over the life cycle. The solid lines report results for individuals facing a minimum contribution requirement, while the dashed lines report no minimum requirement. All results are averages from 10,000 simulated paths.


From Panel A, mandatory contributions have the expected effect of causing individuals to accumulate more wealth. As to be expected, from Panel B, this effect is mainly channeled through retirement savings. Whereas individuals not facing minimum contribution requirements significantly postpone building up retirement savings until their liquidity constraint is less binding, minimum contributions prepose contributions to retirement accounts and lead to a higher total amount of retirement savings. While higher retirement savings alone are desirable, as they help in obtaining financial retirement security, they are accompanied by undesirable side effects. Specifically, from Panel C, mandatory minimum contribution requirements lead to deferred housing market entry. With mandatory minimum contributions, the average individual entering the housing market is 2.2 years older than without minimum contributions. That is, our results indicate that the liquidity channel dominates.⁴

Simultaneously, from Panel D, mandatory minimum contributions lead to higher loan-to-value ratios. Without mandatory minimum contributions, individuals can finance their home with a higher share of equity, thus avoiding the relatively high borrowing rate. Individuals facing minimum contribution requirements, on the other hand, are forced to borrow more for a comparable home. That is, these individuals invest at a relatively low rate in their retirement accounts and simultaneously borrow at a relatively high rate. In essence, these individuals incur the cost of the interest margin by borrowing their own money. From the individual's perspective, it may therefore be more desirable to first repay the relatively expensive mortgage before accumulating savings in retirement accounts.⁵

⁴For individuals with the set of preferences studied in our work, housing market entry are concentrated between the age of 30 to 40. Vestman (2019) documents that heterogeneity in preferences leads to higher dispersion in housing decisions.

⁵Some pension systems around the world, including the German and the Swiss pension system, allow early withdrawals from retirement accounts, if they are used to support the acquisition of a home. Even though the exact conditions under which such early withdrawals escape penalty taxation vary between national tax laws, the general consensus is that only acquisitions of owner-occupied homes qualify. We also explored a setting, in which individuals are allowed to withdraw from their retirement accounts prior to retirement age when acquiring an owner-occupied home. In line with economic intuition, the opportunity of early withdrawals leads to earlier homeownership. However, unlike the pension system with mandatory contributions, the pension system with early withdrawals does not guarantee that individuals are able to build up sufficient retirement savings, because (levered) housing investments are subject to substantial volatility. Not ensuring sufficient retirement savings not only renders a direct comparison difficult, it is also undesirable from a

Figure 1
Base case results



This figure depicts the base case results of our model. Panel A depicts the evolution of wealth over the life cycle and Panel B of retirement savings. Panel C depicts the distribution of first-time housing market entry, Panel D compares the evolution of loan-to-value ratios over the life cycle. The solid lines report results for individuals facing a minimum contribution requirement, while the dashed lines report no minimum requirement. All results are averages from 10,000 simulated paths.

Via deferred housing market entry, constraints on the consumption opportunities of young adults, and by forcing them into higher loan-to-value ratios, mandatory contribution requirements are associated with significant welfare costs. A 20-year old facing mandatory minimum contributions needs to be endowed with a 7.7% higher level of present wealth and lifetime labor income to attain the same level of expected presently discounted lifetime utility as an individual not facing minimum contribution requirements.

4 A flexible retirement saving scheme

In this section, we propose a flexible retirement saving scheme. This scheme alleviates unintended side effects of mandatory minimum contributions while simultaneously ensuring that individuals save enough for retirement. Our flexible retirement saving scheme builds on the intuition that it does not matter whether individuals build up savings for retirement age in retirement accounts, specifically labeled as pension savings, or via other means of saving, if they build up sufficient savings. Under our flexible retirement saving scheme, individuals are only required to contribute to retirement accounts, if they have not built up sufficient savings. More specifically, the contribution to the retirement account during working age has to fulfill:

$$Z_t \geq \max(l_t - l_{t,BM}, 0) \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{100} (t_{ret} - t)\right), \quad t < t_{ret}, \quad (14)$$

in which l_t is the labor-to-wealth ratio at time t , and $l_{t,BM}$ is the average labor-to-wealth ratio at time t from our 10,000 simulated paths with mandatory minimum contributions as explored in Figure 1, Panel A.

From the first factor in Equation (14), minimum contributions only have to be made if the labor-to-wealth ratio exceeds that of the average individual facing minimum contribution requirements. That is, only individuals whose savings are small relative to their labor income are required to make catch-up contributions. Small savings relative to current labor income indicate that the individual is in danger of not being able to sustain the consumption level that the individual can afford from its present labor income stream. Hence, the individual has to build up more savings. By comparing realized labor-to-wealth ratios, l_t , under our flexible retirement saving scheme with average labor-to-wealth ratios from the case with mandatory minimum contributions, $l_{t,BM}$, we are deliberately on the conservative side.

legislative perspective, because it may trigger a need for transfer income. As a result, we do not advocate pursuing such early withdrawals.

From the second factor in Equation (14), catch-up contributions increase with age. The closer individuals are to retirement age, the higher the minimum contributions, they have to make to ensure that they will still attain the required level of savings for retirement. The required catch-up contribution increases by one percentage point for every year the individual gets closer to retirement age


Figure 2, in a similar fashion as Figure 1, depicts the implications of our flexible retirement saving scheme relative to the case with mandatory retirement savings on the evolution of wealth (Panel A), retirement savings (Panel B), first-time housing market entry (Panel C), and loan-to-value ratios (Panel D) over the life cycle. More technically, for the flexible retirement saving scheme, the minimum contribution constraint from Equation (1) is replaced with that from Equation (14).

Overall, the results in Figure 2 show that our flexible retirement saving scheme leads to an evolution of wealth and retirement savings very similar to that of the pension system with mandatory contributions. Under our flexible retirement saving scheme, savings may be slightly lower than under the pension system with mandatory contributions as the age-dependent catch-up contributions from Equation (14) do not require our individuals to fully close the savings gap instantly. Nevertheless, our flexible retirement saving scheme ensures that individuals build up sufficient savings for retirement age.

Panel C shows that our flexible retirement saving scheme does not much alter first-time housing market entry relative to the system with mandatory retirement contributions. The average preponement is only 0.1 years. However, Panel D shows our flexible retirement saving scheme allows our individuals to repay their relatively expensive mortgages at a faster rate. After all, repaying the relatively expensive mortgage before saving in risk-free assets in the tax-deferred account is an obvious arbitrage opportunity that our flexible retirement saving scheme allows individuals to exploit more efficiently than under the pension system with mandatory contributions.

The opportunities available for more flexible contribution requirements and lower loan-to-value ratios also lead to positive welfare effects. Compared to the base case setting with mandatory minimum contributions, welfare increases by 2.5%. That is, a 20-year old obliged to make contributions under the minimum contribution pension scheme needs to be endowed with a 2.5% higher level of initial wealth and lifetime labor income, to attain the same level of expected presently discounted lifetime utility as an individual trading under our flexible retirement saving scheme.

Figure 2
Flexible retirement saving scheme results



This figure compares results under our flexible retirement saving scheme (dashed line) with results under a pension system with mandatory minimum contributions (solid line). Panel A depicts the evolution of wealth over the life cycle and Panel B of retirement savings. Panel C depicts the distribution of first-time housing market entry, while Panel D compares the evolution of loan-to-value ratios over the life cycle. All results are averages from 10,000 simulated paths.

5 Conclusion

In this study, we explore the implications of minimum contribution requirements for retirement accounts found in many countries around the world in a realistically calibrated life cycle model. Our results show that minimum contribution requirements have the unintended side effect of delaying housing market entry and of forcing individuals to sustain higher loan-to-value ratios. That is, individuals are forced to pay the higher borrowing rate on their debt, while simultaneously investing at a lower rate in the retirement account. In other words, individuals essentially borrow their own money and face the cost of the interest margin. Overall the unintended side effects of mandatory contributions lead to substantial welfare costs. A 20-year old facing mandatory minimum contribution requirements of 12.4% of labor income, corresponding to the current U.S. Social Security payroll tax, needs to be endowed with a 7.7% higher level of initial wealth and lifetime labor income than an individual not facing any constraints.

We therefore propose a new flexible retirement saving scheme, which ensures that individuals build up sufficient savings. Intuitively, it should not matter whether individuals build up savings in retirement accounts, regular accounts, or through home equity, if they build up sufficient total savings. Our flexible retirement saving scheme builds on this intuition and only forces individuals to contribute to retirement accounts, if they have not built up sufficient savings. Compared to the system with mandatory minimum contributions, the flexible retirement saving scheme leads to a similar evolution of wealth, but lower loan-to-value ratios, and an increase in welfare by 2.5%.

In a nutshell, the widespread institutional constraint requiring individuals to contribute a minimum fixed fraction of their income to a pension savings account throughout their working life induces a suboptimal consumption profile over the life cycle and forces homeowners into accepting high loan-to-value ratios. Our flexible retirement saving scheme is an attempt to mitigate these issues. Further investigations of the design of optimal pension plans is a fruitful subject for future research.

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Appendix A: Solution of optimization problem

We simplify our optimization by normalizing with aggregate wealth, W_t , that effectively belongs to the individual and does not fall to tax authorities upon withdrawal from the retirement account. Hence, in the normalized optimization problem, $c_t = \frac{C_t}{W_t}$ and $q_t = \frac{Q_t H_t}{W_t}$ are the decision variables that affect utility from immediate consumption of both non-durable and durable consumption. Defining $V_t(X_t) = v_t(x_t) \frac{W_t/(1+i)^t}{(H_t/(1+i)^t)^\theta}$, the individual’s

optimization problem can be rewritten as:

$$\max_{\{c_t, z_t, s_t, b_t, \alpha_{R,t}, q_t, h_t\}} v_t(x_t) = \\ \left((1 - \beta) \left(c_t^{1-\theta} (q_t (1 + \zeta h_t))^{\theta} \right)^{1-\frac{1}{\psi}} + \beta \left(f(t) \mathbb{E}_t \left[\left(v_{t+1}(x_{t+1}) \frac{\frac{W_{t+1}}{W_t(1+i)}}{\left(\frac{H_{t+1}}{H_t(1+i)} \right)^{\theta}} \right)^{1-\gamma} \right] \right)^{\frac{1-\frac{1}{\psi}}{1-\gamma}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\psi}}}, \quad (\text{A.1})$$

subject to

$$w_{R,t-} = w_{R,(t-1)+} (\alpha_{R,t-1} G_{R,t-1} + (1 - \alpha_{R,t-1}) R_R) \quad (\text{A.2})$$

$$w_{R,t+} = w_{R,t-} + z_t \quad (\text{A.3})$$

$$\begin{aligned} w_{T,t} &= 1 - w_{R,t-} - (1 - \delta) h_{t-1} \frac{Q_{t-1} H_t}{W_t}, \\ &= c_t + s_t + b_t + m(h_t) q_t + f_p q_t \left(h_t (1 - h_t) + h_t h_{t-1} \chi_{\left\{ \frac{Q_{t-1} H_t}{W_t} \neq q_t \right\}} \right) + h_t q_t \\ &\quad - h_{t-1} \frac{Q_{t-1} H_t}{W_t} + z_t (1 - \tau) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.4})$$

$$c_t, q_t > 0, s_t \geq 0, \alpha_{R,t-1} \in [0, 1], w_{R,t+} \geq 0, \quad (\text{A.5})$$

in which $w_{R,t-} = \frac{W_{R,t-}}{W_t}$, $w_{R,t+} = \frac{W_{R,t+}}{W_t}$, $w_{T,t} = \frac{W_{T,t}}{W_t}$, $z_t = \frac{Z_t}{W_t}$, $b_t = \frac{B_t}{W_t}$, and $s_t = \frac{S_t}{W_t}$. The new vector of state variables is

$$x_t = \left[t, w_{R,t-}, \frac{L_t}{W_t}, \frac{Q_{t-1} H_t}{W_t}, h_{t-1} \right]. \quad (\text{A.6})$$

We discretize the continuous state variables. The expectation in Equation (A.1) is computed using Gaussian quadrature. Parallel computing is used to expedite our computations.

Appendix B: PSID data and present value of Social Security benefits

This appendix explains in more detail, which PSID data we use in our study and how we calculate the present value of Social Security payments (SSP), individuals can expect to make when working until the age of 65, and being retired at the age of 66.

For our data analyses, we use the biannually available PSID data after the financial crisis from 2011 to 2019, i.e., PSID data from 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019. We only consider heads of households (henceforth, individuals) who are high-school graduates to ensure that we only use the wealth of the same individuals whose labor income process we consider. Furthermore, we adjust total wealth and labor income for inflation with an annual rate of 3.7% as in our model.

To calculate the growth of median wealth, we proceed as follows: first, we restrict the inflation-adjusted total wealth of individuals to be positive. Second, we construct two subsamples, one containing all individuals aged 20 and one containing all individuals aged 65. Third, we calculate the median wealth of the total wealth of individuals for the respective subsamples. We find that the median wealth of individuals aged 20 is USD 10,000 and for those aged 65 it is USD 110,000.

To calculate the present value of Social Security benefits for individuals working until the age of 65 and being retired at age 66 we proceed as follows: first, we use inflation-adjusted labor income to calculate the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). We obtain AIME by calculating the median earnings for each age from 26 to 60, taking the mean of the median earnings, and dividing this value by 12. Our result is USD 3,291.45.

Second, we determine the basic Social Security retirement benefit when retiring at age 62, the earliest age at which an individual is generally eligible for Social Security retirement benefits, by calculating the so-called primary insurance account (PIA): for 2019, the PIA is the sum of 90% of the first USD 926 of the AIME, 32% of the AIME exceeding USD 926 but below or equal to USD 5,785, and 15% of the AIME exceeding USD 5,785. Therefore, our PIA is USD 1,590.34.

Third, as the individuals in our model are retired at age 66 and not already at age 62, we consider cost-of-living adjustments (COLA). We assume the annual COLA to be 1.69%, which is the mean of all COLAs between 2011 and 2019. When taking COLA into account, the PIA for individuals retired at age 66 is USD 1,700.61. Based on these values, we compute a replacement ratio in the data of: $\frac{1,700.61}{3,291.45} = 51.7\%$.

Fourth, to calculate the present value of SSP, PV_{SSP} , we assume an interest rate of 3.7% (the same as in our model) and use the following formula:

$$PV_{SSP} = \text{average labor income} \cdot \text{replacement ratio} \cdot \sum_{i=0}^{\omega-66} v^{i-1} \cdot_i p_{66}, \quad (A.7)$$

in which ω denotes the technical maximum life time assumed in the life table (100 years), v

the discount factor, and ip_{66} the probability that a person aged 66 survives the next i years. Our result for the present value of the annuity is USD 250,035.70. We do not consider any taxes as Social Security income is (up to certain limits) tax free in the U.S. When adding up the individual's median total wealth right before retirement, i.e., for individuals aged 65, and the present value of SSP, we observe that median total wealth grows by a factor of 36.