# COMPENSATION FOR THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY GOOGLE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN THE NATIONAL COURTS

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# **Enforcement of EU competition law**

Private Enforcement

Damages Injunction

Interim
relief

**Public Enforcement** 

### Pending damages lawsuits against Google across Europe

#### **Google Search (Shopping)**

- 2017 EC Decision
- Lawsuits pending in nearly every major European jurisdiction (GER, UK, FR, IT, NL, SE, PL, CZ)
- Single claimants or smaller groups
- 2025: First instance judgement in FR

#### **Google Search (other verticals)**

- Google Travel (FR)
- Weather Box (GER)
- Stand-alone cases (no decision)
- Both lawsuits partly based on DMA

#### **Google Android**

- 2018 EC Decision
- No damage claim by direct search competitor
- Two opt-out class actions in the UK (consumers and advertisers) based on price increase (only partly follow-on)

#### **AdTech**

- 2021 Decision by French Autorité de la Concurrence
- Lawsuits pending in FR, NL, UK
   GER
- Opt-out class actions (UK) and SPV claims (NL, GER)
- (2025 EC Decision)

# Litigation against Google

#### **JURISDICTION**

- Avoid defendant-friendly jurisdictions
- Costs
- Are courts experienced?
- Duration of the proceedings?
- Predictability
- Jurisdiction for all damages (cross-border damages)
- Applicability of claimant-friendly law
- Possibility of collective redress?
- Possible Google defendant entities:
  - Google LLC
  - Google Ireland Ltd.
  - National Google entities

### **Assertion of mass-claims**

- Relevant for claimants with individual small to midsized damage volume
- Usually supported by litigation funder
- Different national regimes in European jurisdictions

#### Joint claim

- Claimants remain parties
- Claimants control the lawsuit

#### **Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)**

- Assignment of the claims to the SPV acting as plaintiff
- SPV may have certain control over the claims (strategy, settlements, etc.)

#### **Class actions**

- Opt-in class actions
- Opt-out class actions

### **Jurisdiction**

#### **EU FRAMEWORK**

#### **Bruxelles Ia Regulation**

- Applicable on defendants domiciled (Art. 63) in the EU
  - → jurisdiction of US-based defendants determined under national law
- Art. 4(1): Court where the defendant is domiciled
- Art. 7(2): Court where the infringement took effect
  - place where the market was affected
  - "initial damage"

#### Art. 7(2): Cross-border damages

- ECJ, C-68/93 Sheville (1995):
   "Mosaic theory"
- ECJ, C-352/13 CDC (2015):
  - Claimant's registered office
  - possibility to assert total damage
- ECJ, C-27/17 *FlyLAL* (2018):
  - "Main market affected" =
     place where affected party
     conducts the main part of
     its sales activities

- ECJ, C-451/18 *Tibor-Trans* (2019):
  - market affected by the conduct
  - place where the damage occurred, provided it occurred in the affected market
- ECJ, C-30/20 *Volvo* (2021):
  - Trucks cartel: place where the affected contract was concluded
  - If several transactions lead to different jurisdictions (national context): claimant's place of domicile

### **Jurisdiction**

#### **EU FRAMEWORK – JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS**

#### **Bruxelles Ia Regulation**

- Art. 8(1): "anchor defendant"
  - Court of the domicile of one of the defendants
  - claims against the defendants are "closely connected"

#### ECJ, C-882/19 - Sumal (2021)

- Liability of the "single economic unit" for a cartel infringement: subsidiary can be directly sued for damage caused by the infringement
  - organisational link between responsible (parent) entity and subsidiary (e.g. 100% ownership)
  - specific link between economic activity of the subsidiary and the infringement (e.g. sales, marketing, production)
    - → back office?

#### **National Google entities**

- Google Netherlands B.V. (Google Shopping)
- Google Germany GmbH (Google Shopping)

### Jurisdiction and Applicable Law

#### LITIGATION AGAINST GOOGLE

- Single claimant
- Domicile of claimant located in market affected by the infringement

- Several claimants or claims joint through a SPV
- Claimed damages occurred in several markets

#### Google Ireland Ltd.

Art. 7(2) Bruxelles I bis

#### Google LLC

National jurisdiction rules

#### **National Google entity**

Art. 4 Bruxelles I bis

#### Google Ireland Ltd.

Art. 8(1) Bruxelles I bis

#### Google LLC

National jurisdiction rules

#### **Applicable law: Rome II Regulation**

- Art. 6(3)(a): Place where the market is affected
  - Cross-border damages: "Mosaic theory"
- Art. 6(3)(b): Choice of the <u>law of the</u> <u>seized court</u>

#### Single defendant:

- Court of the domicile of the defendant
- Market where the court is located must be affected by the infringement

#### Multiple defendants:

- Court has jurisdiction over all claims
- Market where the court is located must be affected by the infringement

# **Assertion of damages**

#### **FOLLOW-ON AND STAND-ALONE CLAIMS**

#### **Binding effect of Decisions**

- Key factual and legal findings of the competition authority's decision, i.e. findings that are essential to establish the abuse:
  - market definitions
  - market dominance
  - relevant conduct
  - theory of harm
  - period of infringement
  - parties involved
- <u>NOT:</u>
  - individual harm
  - causal link
  - "non-relevant" findings

#### **Binding effect on remedies?**

EC, AT.39740, Google Search (Shopping):

Article 1

The infringement is continuing [...] as at the date of adoption of this Decision.

→ Reversal of the burden of proof?

# **Assertion of damages**

#### **QUANTIFICATION**

#### **Damage estimation**

- Depends on the applicable national law (Art. 17 CDD)
- No statutory presumption of harm in abuse of dominance cases
- Claimant must establish a counterfactual: What would the claimant's situation have been without the infringement?
- Various economic models:
  - Before-after comparison
  - Market share analysis
  - Market comparison method



**Economic expert opinion** 

#### **Problems:**

- Long-term abuses
- Disruption of market structure
- Must the counterfactual be the defendant's "most opportune" scenario?

#### **Facilitations for claimants**

- 100% precision impossible and not required
- Courts usually have a certain discretion to estimate

#### German cartel damages law:

- Claimants may base damage calculation on the defendant's profits
- Defendant may not invoke the so-called "defense of alternative legal behaviour"
- Defendant may not invoke passing-on defense when unlikely that lower market level will assert damages

# **Timing**

#### STATUTE OF LIMITATION

#### **Cartel Damages Directive**

- 5 year limitation period
- Limitation only period starts:
  - behaviour has ended
  - Claimant has knowledge that the behaviour constitutes an infringement
  - Claimant has knowledge of the damage
  - Claimant has knowlede of the infringer
- Limitation period must be suspended/interrupted during investigation proceedings
- Transposition into national law:
   27 Dec 2016

#### **European Court of Justice: Claims before transposition of CDD**

- ECJ, C-605/21 Heureka:
- Effet utile: limitation period for damages claims related to Art. 101, 102 TFEU cannot begin before:
  - infringement has ended
  - Claimant has knowledge of the "information necessary for bringing its action for damages"
  - = infringement of competition law, the existence of harm, the causal link between that harm and that infringement, and the identity of the infringer

- ECJ, C-605/21 Heureka (2024): "publication of the summary of the Commission decision in the Official Journal of the European Union"
- ECJ, C-21/24 Nissan (2025):
  - decision must be final and information arising from the final decision must be public
  - In case of a decision of the Spanish Competition Authority: publication of the final judgment confirming the decision

### **THANK YOU**

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