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CURRENT POSITION

Copenhagen Business School 2024 - (2026)
Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of International Economics, Government and Business

PAST AFFILIATIONS

Paris School of Economics, PhD Candidate 2020 - 2024
Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University, PhD Candidate 2020 - 2024
Sciences Po, Department of Economics, Teaching and Research Fellow 2023 - 2024
University of California, Berkeley, Department of Economics, Visiting Scholar 2022 - 2023

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, *Paris School of Economics & Paris 1 University* 2024
Thesis supervisor: Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline (*PSE, Paris 1*)
Thesis reviewers: Frederico Finan (*UC Berkeley*), Emeric Henry (*Sciences Po*)
Thesis jury: Katrin Millock (*CNRS, PSE*), Fabien Prieur (*U. of Montpellier*)
M.Sc. in Economics, *PSE & Paris 1 University* 2020
B.Sc. in Economics, *Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University* (Magistère d'économie) 2017

RESEARCH FIELDS

Political Economy, Comparative Politics, Political Methodology, European Studies

WORKING PAPERS (Abstracts are on the last page)

[Does Access Mean Success? Political Connections and Influence](#) (*Job Market Paper*)
[In and Out of the Public Sector: The Impact of Revolving Doors in the EU](#) *with J. Bomare*
[Choosing Legislative Capacity: A Theoretical Model](#) *with D. Fortunato and F. Hollenbach*
[Strategic Complementarity in NGO Advocacy: Evidence from the European Commission](#)

SELECTED WORK IN PROGRESS

Legislative Capacity Across OECD Member States *with D. Fortunato and F. Hollenbach*
Fragmented Voices: The City of London and Post-Brexit Financial Negotiations, *with J Grittersova*
Who lays down the law? Informational lobbying in the French assembly *with C. Gras*

REFERENCES

Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline
Paris School of Economics
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Frederico Finan
University of California, Berkeley
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David Fortunato
University of California, San Diego
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Florian Hollenbach
Copenhagen Business School
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PLACEMENT OFFICER: Angelo Secchi, Paris School of Economics, angelo.secchi@psemail.eu

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Refereeing

European Association of Young Economists (2024, 2025), *Revue française d'administration publique* (RFAP)

Administrative activities

PhD student representative, PSE	2022 - 2024
Organizing assistant, REM Seminar, PSE	2021 - 2022
Administrative assistant, PSE Summer Schools	2021
Treasurer, PSE Student Association	2019 - 2020
"Le Printemps de l'Économie" (outreach event)	2017 - 2018

Policy dialogue & Outreach

National Advisory Group member, Transparency International France	2023 -
Roundtable on lobbying regulation in France	2024
org. by the EU Network Against Corruption & the European Commission representation in France	
"Analyze, measure, prevent: interdisciplinary perspectives on corruption and favoritism"	2024
Sciences Po & Paris-Nanterre University. [Link]	
"Qatargate: understanding the origins of the scandal and the challenges for a new lobbying framework", GIS EURO-LAB. [Link]	2023

AWARDS AND GRANTS

Awards

PhD Thesis Prize, Nominated by Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University (3 nominees)	2025
prize to be awarded by the <i>Chancellerie des Universités de Paris</i>	
Research Award, CBS and Danish Society for Education and Business	2025
joint with the Money in Politics research group	

Grants

Research Grant, <i>Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR)</i> , 500,000€	2025
"Industries and Lobbies Delaying or Driving the Energy Transition", coord. by M. Chiroleu-Assouline	
Research Grant, PSE and French National Research Agency (ANR), 1,500€	2023
"Revolving Doors in the European Union", joint with J. Bomare	
Research Grant, PSE and French National Research Agency (ANR), 1,300€	2022
International Mobility Grant, Paris School of Economics (PSE), 5,500€	2022
Mobility Grant, College of Doctoral Schools, Paris 1 University, 3,000€	2022
Full Doctoral Scholarship, French Ministry of Research, 75,000€	2020 - 2023

TEACHING

Copenhagen Business School

Academic support for students with psychological or neurological disabilities	Spring 2025
Certification "From how we learn to how we teach: building the bridge between learning sciences and teaching practices"	2024

Sciences Po

Teaching assistant, <i>Econometrics 2</i> (Graduate level)	Spring 2024
Teaching assistant, <i>Trade and International Finance</i> (Undergraduate level)	Fall 2023

Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University

Guest Lecturer, <i>Lobbying over Environmental Issues</i> (Graduate level)	Spring 2022
Teaching assistant, <i>Introduction to Econometrics</i> (Undergraduate level)	Spring 2022
Teaching assistant, <i>Microeconomics</i> (Undergraduate level)	Fall 2020, Spring 2021, Fall 2021

Paris Cité University

TA, <i>Mathematics and Statistics for Economics</i> (Undergraduate)	Fall 2018, Spring, Fall 2019
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CONFERENCE AND SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS

2025: DPSA (*scheduled*); Paris School of Economics; CBS Econ Brown Bag Seminar; APSA; pre-APSA Political Economy of Europe; EEA; AOM; EPSA; pre-EPSA Political Connections; CBS-Princeton Money in Politics Conference; CefES; CBS Business & Democracy Seminar; AFSE; EAYE; Enquêter sur la démocratie au sein de l'UE : approches disciplinaires, GIS Eurolab (*invited*); AERE OSWEET Seminar; UC Berkeley GSIPE Conference; UC Riverside Political Economy Seminar (*invited*); UC San Diego Political Economy Seminar, School of Global Policy and Strategy (*invited*); AEA.

2024: Workshop on the Political Economy of Climate Change, Sciences Po (*invited*); Copenhagen Business School EGB Research Seminar; DPSA; EEA-ESEM; EAERE; EAYE; COMPTTEXT; Junior Research Day, Collège de France; DevPEC, Stanford University; EDDY Conference; EPCS; Paris Nanterre University Law, Institutions and Economics Seminar, EconomiX (*invited*); University Paris-Dauphine Public Governance working group (*invited*); Paris School of Economics Applied Economics Lunch Seminar.

2023: EuroWEPS; CESifo Workshop on Political Economy; Applied Young Economist Webinar AI/Text-as-Data; Sciences Po Friday Lunch Seminar, Department of Economics; FAERE; PSE-CEPR Policy Forum; CBS Money in Politics Conference; AMSE Summer School on Political Economy; UC Berkeley IRLE Visiting Scholar Seminar; UC Berkeley Political Economy Research Lab.

2022: UC Berkeley Political Economy Research Lab; AEA CSWEP Mentoring Workshop; Columbia University Interdisciplinary Ph.D. Workshop in Sustainable Development.

2021: Public Policy Theory and Evaluation conference; FAERE; EAERE; Augustin Cournot Doctoral Days; PSE Regulation, Environment and Market Seminar; PSE PhD Students Seminar.

2019: Séminaire économie et environnement, French Ministry of Environment (*invited*).

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Economist intern, French Ministry of Environment (CGDD) 2018 - 2019
Participation in the *Comité pour l'Économie Verte* (CEV), jointly directed with the Treasury

Research assistant, MINES ParisTech - Centre for Industrial Economics (CERNA) 2018

NON ACADEMIC WRITING

“Trajectoires vers l'objectif zéro artificialisation nette. Éléments de méthode (Paths to net zero land take. Methodology)”, *CGDD*, 2019, with A. Baïz, C. Claron and G. Ducos. [[PDF](#)]

Press coverage: [Les Échos](#).

“Objectif zéro artificialisation nette: quels leviers pour protéger les sols? (Net zero land take objective: what levers for soil protection?)”, 2019, *France Stratégie*. [[PDF](#)]

Press coverage: [Le Monde](#).

OTHER INFORMATION

IT skills: R, Python, STATA, \LaTeX , WolframAlpha (Mathematica)

Languages: French (native), English (fluent), Spanish (intermediate)

Citizenship: French

Does Access Mean Success? Political Connections and Influence

Job Market Paper, Solo-authored

[Link to full paper](#)

This paper studies how access to policymakers shapes lobbying success and the role political connections play, using evidence from European Commission regulations. I compile a new dataset of public comments on draft regulations and apply natural language processing tools to detect stakeholders' influence on final regulations. Combined with data on meetings with Commission members to capture access, I show that access significantly increases the probability of success, especially for organizations with more frequent interactions. Exploiting both changes in officeholders and within-organization variation in active connections, I find that information transmission or institutional knowledge cannot explain the effect: political connections are the key driver of success through access.

In and Out of the Public Sector: The Impact of Revolving Doors in the EU

with J. Bomare

[Link to full paper](#)

This paper studies the impact of employee mobility between the European Union (EU) public sector and non-EU organizations on access to EU policymakers and EU funding. We use data from the professional network LinkedIn to identify moves across all EU hierarchy levels, both in the direction of entering and exiting the EU public sector. Using a dynamic difference-in-differences estimator accounting for multiple treatments, we find that hiring EU staff increases the probability of obtaining EU procurement contracts or EU grants. Moves in the opposite direction have no effect on access to EU funding, suggesting that benefits of the hire come from acquiring insider knowledge. Additionally, moves from and to the EU Commission staff significantly boost engagement with the Commission, but these effects are short-lived. The symmetry and timing of these results suggest that they are driven by the network gained through these moves.

Choosing Legislative Capacity: A Theoretical Model

with D. Fortunato and F. Hollenbach

[Link to full paper](#)

In democracies, elected representatives in legislatures compete with unelected bureaucrats for influence over policy outcomes. A determining factor in this competition is the legislature's procedural organization and endowment of tangible resources for legislative work, both of which shape its overall capacity for policy design and oversight. Importantly, nearly every democratic legislature is empowered to choose its organizational rules and resource endowment, creating a fascinating strategic choice at the heart of each democratic system: how much capacity will the legislature grant itself? We present a theoretical model of this choice in light of the legislative majority's present and expected orientation toward the bureaucracy, its preferential dissimilarity from the opposition, and its expectations for deselection. The model is parsimonious but rich, allowing us to better understand the historical development of legislatures as well as recent institutional changes.

Strategic Complementarity in NGO Advocacy: Evidence from the European Commission

Solo-authored

[Link to full paper](#)

This article analyzes the advocacy strategies of environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs). I develop a model in which NGOs can engage in costly advocacy activities to foster pro-environmental policy changes on different dimensions. The model gives insights on their optimal advocacy strategies, and their reaction functions to lobbying from other actors. Combining data on meetings with European Commission members and textual analysis to measure lobbying efforts on different topics, I find support for strategic complementarity of NGOs efforts. NGOs also seem to drive the lobbying agenda of the business sector on environmental topics.