Seminar den 17. juni 2013

Patent Quality and the “Public Notice” Function of Patent Rights

Abstract
A patent fails to deliver public notice when it informs little about the patent boundary decision of the court. High quality of patent examination, i.e, less mistakes committed by the patent office, improves public notice, and facilitate private investments. This paper provides a framework of evaluating the benefit of public notice, and how its information value is affected by strategic investments, market structure, and the accumulation of patent rights.

Keywords: Convex Ordering, Fuzzy Patents, Public Notice.

JEL codes: K40, O33, O34.

Contact
Battista Severgnini, Associate Professor, bs.eco@cbs.dk
Cedric Schneider, Associate Professor, csc.eco@cbs.dk

Økonomisk Institut, Porcelænshaven 16A, 2.80