I do not like to evade a concept, but the circumstances of business economics offer a temptation to me to try to escape a concept like “event” totally. As you probably know, the concept of the event origins in the Latin word “eventum”, which is a translation from the Greek concept of “pragma”, a word with quite a lot of important references, indeed. In the Poetics of Aristotle it means “plot”, but in the overall, classical Greek tradition it is the word of action, of doing, the “praxis”. However, in the epistemology of Aristotle it means “an object”, and in the vocabulary of the Stoics, it means “the sense of that which happens”.

The “pragma” circumscribes the three fold sense of the capacity to happen: The necessary, the contingent, and that, of which we could claim the responsibility. Let us have this philosophical relation in mind, and after all keep, from sheer necessity, the concept of “event”.

The event, the “eventum”, appears in the context of managerial thinking as that which could be managed, i.e., planned, and controlled, either through model-theoretic prediction, or through methods of a mixture of situated and generalised intuition. This effort of management is thus both applied at the cognitive level through this very anticipation and prediction, and at the practical level, through the ability to enforce their implementation.

As an alternative to the concept of the event we have got firstly the occurrence, secondly, the incidence. I do not find that the concept of “situation” was ever an option here, because it presupposes the intellectual distance of the effort of reflection, and as such, it has been an important concept in the decisionist framework of Sartre’s existentialism. An occurrence, however, seems to relate to minor aspects of a greater process of happening,
or to something relatively unimportant. The incidence, on the other hand, offers a more serious alternative. The mental aspect of the incidence, “aliquid mihi incido in mentem”, “something comes to my mind”, and the physical process of prevention: “ nisi si quid inciderit”, “so that nothing shall happen”, are both of great impact to our lives.

Things happen to my mind and to my body. Things happen.

If philosophy shall insist on its own powers, it must not only be able to present us to a unique answer to the question “What did happen?”, thus coming dangerously close to the science of history, but it must above all be able to answer the question: “What does it mean to happen?”

The answer to both questions is “The fact of happening did happen”. If we accept this, we also accept the unique position of philosophy.

If we grant this to philosophy, we give it the right to be a privileged meta-language of the process of happening – I could be tempted to replace the concept of “taking place” for “happens”, because events so often are named after places, but I shall to deal with the issue of naming the event here.

Firstly, a primary philosophy (a proto philosophy) should be able to substantiate its own conceptional project. It would thus seem to be uninfluenced by its own process of happening. As an act of contemplation, thinking could be a venture beyond any influence of the incident. What ever happens, you would still think the same. Thinking is sameness, happening is otherness. This would mean that philosophy could move in a direction opposite to time. In thinking the incidence, we create the un-incidental. Or, if we let go of the claims of a primary philosophy, it would mean quite the contrary, namely that thinking itself as a process is caught inside the “endechomenon”, in that which could be otherwise – as you perhaps remember, Boëthius, who phrased the Latin word “contingere” for “chance”, translated two concepts from Aristotle, the “endechomenon”, “that which is possible without being necessary”, and the “symbainein”, “the throw”, “the facticity of happening”, so “contingency” means “the possibility which we make real by acting it out”. Thinking then would be an incident parallel to the event which it tries to catch through words and phrases, ever doomed to try to run up the present hurled behind its back into the past.
However, we must admit that thinking itself is an incident, and hence, not an event which could be controlled, even if it could be more or less carefully prepared, and more or less goal directed. There exists no place outside the event from where to give a priori definitions of eventing.

So it seems that we can neither escape the fact of being evented in the very process of thinking, nor the fate of being let out of this event. We cannot, but we can think the un- INCIDENTAL in the possibility of thinking the happening of that which happens.

The un- INCIDENTAL is synonymous to the concept of the moment.

The moment is a peculiar mixture of the a priori and the a posteriori. We cannot define time by hand of time. However, we seriously sense that time is more than the second, more than an empty passage from the future to the past.

From Plato, “to exaiphnes”, the sudden, but also the process of happening as a space in time, or before, or beyond time, has been different from “ho nun”, the point of the nano-second, the head of the needle, through which the future is transformed into the past, the “chainein”, the chasm, of Chronos. It has been closer to the “kairos”, “the right moment”, celebrated in Greek rhetoric tradition, as the “now” of happiness, the “fruit of the “kairé”, and even closer to “the pleroma” of St. Paul, “the fulfilled time”, “the union of the manifold in Christ”, carried on through Plotin and Sc. Augustine, seeking the place where eternity and time intersects, where the mind of God and the mind of man could touch on the inner side of being. Until it got its final dichotomic articulation in the scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages, who distinguished between “nunc permanens”, and “nunc stans”, between the moment of eternity filled with all time, and the moment of compressed, or condensed time, the “contractio” or “complicatio” (fold) of Nicolas Cusanus. Later on the “nunc stans” of Eckehart was developed into the moment of Pascal and of Kierkegaard, and in more modern philosophy in the quasi-profane dimension, inspired by evolutionary theory and by depth psychology, taken into possession by Bergson, Husserl, Benjamin, Heidegger and Deleuze. Here we have the concept of the moment as that which is lasting, as a flow, a streaming beyond time, or exactly on the edge of time neither depth nor surface, the duré, “duatio” in Latin; the “diastema” in the Greek comes close to this sense, or the “periferontes” of Epicurus. The moment is the crack between Being and The Being, the agent of the ontological difference, but also the
negation of this very difference, its breaking out of this very confinement as that which
denies the concept by hand of it. The moment is the pure gesture in which the Being
presents being through a reciprocal absorption, the un-instantiated, the unique.
The moment really has a peculiar position in relation to the event, because it both is its
background, its possibility, and the force which destructs it. If we conceive of the moment
as the shadow of the event, or as its screen, we position ourselves outside it, and this is of
course an aporia. We are always inside a moment, but a moment which both is inside an
event, and has got the event inside it.
If contemplation, “contemplatio” in Latin, “theoria” in Greek, should render a place
outside the event, it should equal the un-incidental, but of course thinking happens too, in
so far as it is performance, and in so far, as we are neither able, nor probably want to be
able, to control it.
Nevertheless, the non-incidental must exist, it must be more than a phantasm. This is the
lesson from Plato, especially from the dialogue “Parmenides”, and from all “healthy”
metaphysic: We cannot think the concepts of difference, Otherness, movement, manifold,
without having a concept of the One and the Same. We must be able to think the event as
having a dimension, a refuge, from where thinking could take off.
But how does it exist.
It would be a great fault to identify it with necessity. Necessity seen at a higher level is
equal to chance. Necessity is nothing but the inability to overlook the laws and causes of
that which happens as cosmic or macro incidents themselves.
The un-incidental is not a quality at the material level, however theoretical profound the
ascription is. The un-uncidential can only be due to a capacity of holding an attitude. It
must, then, be produced by our mind as an intentional object.
The un-incidental then, is similar to the process of being able to being able. I shall call
this the proto-capacity.
The proto-capacity is the capacity to create the event of being-able-to. Nicolaus Cusanus
named it “possess”, to be able to be, or, I am that I can. The program of Merleau-Ponty
sounds in this Latin neologism.
I am inclined to claim that the capacity of being able to being able is similar to a state of
mind, and hence to an attitude. At state of mind has an intrinsic relation to the moment in
two dimensions: They last in a way beyond chronological time. And they cannot be reduced in any way, i.e. they are immune to reflectivity, or, they work through a positive self-reference.

Here the difference between incident and event presents itself immediately: We can relate to an event as a function of the cooperation between the moment and our state of mind, hence we can receive the event, with the very same gesture through which we create it; but we cannot create the incidence, we can only suffer it. However, we can be prepared for both.

The event and incident coincide in one important aspect: This proto-capacity opens the door to our being able to being able to let the incident be through its transformation into an event. This is a being turned onto itself; the capacity to let the ability to be be. But to let the capacity of letting being be itself, be, is the same as a certain way of doing.

It seems that we can do philosophy. Doing philosophy is letting being be.

2.

Well, the leadership of the event is the proto-capacity to let being be as an event. This might sound like Heidegger, but the reference is Hellenistic philosophy – from which also Heidegger inherited important aspects of his way of thinking.

Epicurus says in his famous letter to Menoeceus, as quoted by Diogenes Laertius:

“Destiny, which some introduce as sovereign over all things, he laughs to scorn, affirming rather that some things happen of necessity, others by chance, others through our own agency. For he sees that necessity destroys responsibility and that chance or fortune is inconstant; whereas our own actions are free, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach”\(^1\)

Now, the things which happen through our own agency are things which are inside the range of our own power. The Greek concept is “\(\text{ta ef’ hemin}\)”, “in nostra potestate”.

Aristotle also refers to this important line of demarcation in the first book of his “Art of Rhetoric”, when he develops the concept of the deliberative speech. He says:

\(^1\) Diog.Laert. Lifes of Eminent Philosophers, Vol II, 133.
“We must first ascertain about what kind of good or bad things the deliberative orator advises, since he cannot do so about everything, but only about things which may possibly happen or not (endechetai kai genésthai kai mé). Everything which of necessity either is or will be, or which cannot possibly be or come to pass, is outside the scope of deliberation. Indeed, even in the case of things that are possible advice is not universally appropriate; for they include certain advantages, natural and accidental (fúsei enia kai apo túches), about which it is not worth while to offer advice. But it is clear that advice is limited to those subjects about which we take counsel; and such are those which can naturally be referred to ourselves and the first cause of whose origination is in our power (he arche tes genéseos ef’ hemin estin); for our examination is limited to finding out whether such things are possible or impossible for us to perform (dunata e adúnata praxai).”

The ability to let being be deals with the capacity to distinguish between that which is in our power, that which we can produce, prevent, or change, and that which is not. Necessity and chance are realms outside our power.

To lead the event be by co-creating it, means to be able base our practise on this distinction.

Incidents, hence, are, like accidents, intensities in the flow of happening, which are not inside our own power. The event is that which we are able to influence. Here we can sense an ethos of the event, because we can transform an incident into an event by letting being be. If we anticipate – the “parascheué” of Epictetus – the incident, and confront that which occurs, as if it were exactly what we had wished for, we are able to transform the incident into an event.

This is, however, not a mental attitude which must produce defaitism. Because it demands an effort of the intellect to be able to draw the demarcation line between that

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which is in our power, and which is not. This means that we must learn to play a greater part.

The more we know about the laws of action, about the economic and social structures, and about history, the more we are able to push this demarcation line in our favour. Even if our methods of describing necessity in the domains of science, and pseudo-science, and our practises of planning and prediction, might produce new frontiers of powerlessness, we cannot renounce on knowledge. Even if our attempts to cope with chaos might seem disastrous some times, we could at least learn from them. “This is the place from which we start: Men shall know commonwealth again from bitter searching of the heart” – to quote Frank Scott and Leonard Cohen, we must “rise to play a greater part.”

If the leadership of the event means to let being be, it also demands that we confront the way in which being manifests itself in the regional ontologies, which Husserls spoke about. Or put otherwise, in order to let being be, we have to develop the “krinein”, the critical attitude in relation to the being of being. But “krinein”, the “kritiké” of the intellect, in its special mixture between socially and historically mediated capacity and universal force, cannot do without some non-subjective cornerstones of orientation. We have to navigate in relation to norms about the Good, the Just and the True.

The alternative would have the consequence that this capacity to let being be would develop into a cult of authenticity. The cult of authenticity represses the fact that being is mediated through language, and that language always belongs to the others. Language is the effect of a never ending combat between objects and bodies, and the relations among them, of minds, on the one side, and situated - or shall we say “evented” - consciousness on the other.

A pure, reflective attitude towards that which happens focused on developing one self into an individual in total command of its own affections, would produce a sort of ethical or even of metaphysical narcissism, the Stoic ideal of the “katorthoma”, the ultimate, wise man, which Pascal scorned for its lack of realism, and of humility, in his “Pensées”.

Put in another way: The leadership of the event can never be based on the transcendent or self sufficient ego. We must realise that the being of being is produced by Otherness. This means that the being of being is always alienated. But alienation could be a positive concept, however.
The event could be seen as the arena of a productive alienation. Productive alienation means that we can only speak about that which is in our power. It is a question of the character of the We and, hence, of the Us.

I once gave positive alienation a name, I called it the principle of translocutionarity. The principle of translocutionarity says:

I do not know what I mean until I hear what I myself am saying.
I do not know what I do until I experience myself doing it.
I do not know what I can until we experience ourselves performing it.

This means that the event is the place in which I recognise myself in the capacity of another - to quote Paul Ricoeur.

To transform the incident into an event, and, hence, to develop the platform of the leadership of the event, is to be able to let being be as the being of the Other. I have named this attitude heteroenticity in opposition to authenticity. It means to relate to oneself through the Other, “heteros”, in the Greek, and through Otherness.

So, the leadership of the event must mean the ability to create a balance between my own intentionality and the foreign intentionality of both the others and of the event itself. I am addressed, summoned, called for, and I am obliged to answer.

Real leadership of the event is about being able to receive, the concealed content of the word “capacity”, because “capacitas” in Latin is a translation of the Greek term “dechomai”, “to take”, but also “to receive”, “to recognise”, “to accept a gift,” to host”. “Dechomai” is also translated into the Latin concepts of “recipio” and “suscipio”, and what is “receptiveness” and “susceptibility” but “letting being be”? This attitude contains a dialectics of taking and giving, a dialectics which forms the core of heteroenticity. To speak and to listen, to listen and to speak, the chiastic bond of another presence, a presence always alienated, but anyhow always pure; a presence on behalf of otherness. I hope that you have noticed how I have slowly moved into the realm of rhetoric.
Aristotle distinguishes in his “Art of Rhetoric” between three modes of speech, which are also, and this is often forgotten, modes of listening too, even if Aristotle says, that these modes “correspond to three kinds of hearers” (“akroatai” in the Greek) - and please remember that “akróasis”, “to be able to listen” - but also “to obey” - , was a virtue in the Stoic universe.

The three modes are “genos symbouleutikón”, the “genos dikanikón”, and the “genos epideiktitikón”, the deliberative, the forensic, and the epideictic modes.

Any leader of private or public enterprises will use these three modes all the time and woven into each other. The deliberative mode is about given advice. It deals with the future, with exhortation, and with prevention, “the end of the deliberative speaker is the expedient or harmful.”³ The forensic mode deals with the character of acts done, whether they can be justified or not, “The end of the forensic speaker is the just or the unjust;” The epideictic mode deals with the norms or values of action. “The end of those who praise or blame is the honourable or disgraceful;”⁴

In the narrative all these modes constantly lead by turns.

To lead the event is to be able to receive the incident in the right way by creating the right moment through choosing the right mode.

Through these vertical level of modes of speaking and of listening the most powerful instruments of speech intersect, the example and the proof, the “paradeigma” and the “apodeixis” “the accepted beliefs”.

In case that employees shall question the reality and seriousness of the values of an enterprise, the leader might answer through the Platonic method of diairesis. He could chose to analyse these values, and to justify organisational behaviour, and chosen strategies, through a logical deduction which testifies to the consistency and internal coherence of their interpretation. But he might also answer with either a fictive example, or with a narrative from the firm’s past. Of course, he could involve himself in dialogues challenging the employees to try to substitute their own values, but this is a more risky business.

³ Art of Rhet. I. iii, 5.
⁴ Ibid.
But the very best way to answer, is the ability to refer to his own behaviour as the incarnation of these values, i.e., through the fundamental capacity which the Greeks named “ethos”, the moral integrity. Moral integrity is a silent answer to any question concerning the area of responsibility of firm behaviour. It refers to a lived practise of interpretation and of performance. In this way it reminds us of the unique style, which makes us able to distinguish the master musician.

To the modes of speech, and to the methods of speaking, there respond three substances or matters of speaking, the “logos”, the pathos” and the “ethos”.

The logos relates to the matter of which is spoken. It designates the objective domain of causes and effects, of means and their techniques, of professionalism, but also the realm of functionalism and pragmatics, of goals and ends. The pathos designates the passion. It deals with the ability of the speaker to make the hearer take ownership of his conviction, of his attitudes, of his norms and values. This is, of course, also the realm of seduction, and hence of totalitarianism, and of the micro-fascism of the obvious, but it is the domain of the capacity of personal authority, too, because one does not need to be allured by the promises of enthusiasm, and hence, to deposit one’s freedom – as Immanuel Kant once put it. Finally there is the ethos, the moral integrity, the personal equity of the speaker, ascriptions, which compel us to believe in his words.

These three dimensions of speech form a three dimensional matrix. They also create the pragmatic basis of the leadership of the event.

If the leader is able to harmonise the deliberative, the forensic and the epideictic modes of speech; if he is able to use argument and example with due respect to the kairos, to the right moment; and if he is able to unite logos, pathos and ethos; then, in letting being be, he can obtain excellence.

When Aristotle describes the deliberative mode of speaking, the mode related to counselling and consulting, he uses a special word, “protrepon”, “giving advise” or “exhortating”. The “protrepon” relates to the future, whilst the forensic mode relates to the past, and the epideictic mode relates to the present.

This concept, the “protreptikos”, is very important, because it relates to the role of philosophy in society. This role is to give the ruler advice. In Plato, in the great dialogue,

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5 Art of Rhet. 1358b, I, iii, 4-6.
“The Republic”, there is a concept that distinguishes the leader, it is “euboulia”, “to be well advised”. The leader is well advised who is able to receive protreptikon, to let him self be exhorted by some chosen persons – I hope not by spin doctors – and at the same time by that which happens to him, and by his own experience. Two issues of learning really matters to the ruler, Isocrates, the most famous rhetor of classical Greek, claimed: To be able to learn from his experience, and from history, on the one hand, and from norms or values, on the other. Cicero used to say that from the school of Isocrates more rulers of city states did appear than Greeks from the Trojan horse. And for sure, even Aristotle boasted with the rulers which he had advised. It was his luck that he did not live long enough to experience the “success” of his most famous pupil, a certain Alexander.

Now, I shall claim, that the core of the protreptikon is the ability of the pupil, or client, as we would say, to be able to let being be.

Let us now look at the substance of the protreptikon as it could be developed in relation to the modern leader, he, who is supposed to be the real leader of the event.

4.

I would call the protreptic practise the unfolding of heteroenticity.
In the Greek the “protrepo” means “to confront with (gently but insisting)”, “to urge”. The subject of its result, the presumed conversion, this mental turning around, is our innermost norms, ideals, attitudes, notions, thoughts, and practises, items worthy of aspiring, in relation to the leader’s ethical development, and for the sake of the community.

Protreptikon is an art. It is a calling for philosophy, a license to think, both with the intellect, and with the heart.

The protreptikon does not orientate itself – contrary to therapy, mostly – in relation to a “naturalistic conception”, in relation to an idea about how a person, a leader, a group or an organisation ought to be, or act. It aims at a balance between pleasure and insight, to refer to the dialogue “Philebus” by Plato, between strategic instrumentality and normativity. It seeks a canon beyond maxims, and an attitude immune to pragmatics. The goal of the protreptikon is to enable the leader to articulate the principles of individual and collective freedom.
The assumption of the protreptikon is that man and the organisation are shaped in the image of each other, and that it is possible to create an unambiguous reason for individual and organisational behaviour based on the ideal of the Good and the Just.

The protreptikon claims that there does exist an existential code through which the differences and contradictions of interests between members of a community, and hence, of an organisation, can be reconciled. But the protreptikon knows that there is a price.

The protreptikon shows a way to discover the face of the Other. The intentional attitude of this discovery is one of respect. The respect of the face of the Other does delimit the right to project motives and attitudes onto the other person.

The protreptikon re-discovers the ability to listen to the voice of the other, whether it is silent or loud. As far as the voice is naked, we must cover it with modesty, and even with shyness. We must guard the secret of the Other.

The protreptikon has got its methods, but not any dogmatic ones:

They are:

1. The ability to put into words the existential attitudes to life and work, to individual rights and duties, to personal expectations at all levels of life, and to a balanced relation between competencies and professionalism.

2. To create a consciousness about notions, prejudices, prototypical projections and intentional anticipations which block personal development and the responsible integration into the community.

3. The development and strengthening of a fundamental, critical sense.

4. The full consciousness of the fundamental importance of the event to every little movement in our lives, and hence, of the line of demarcation between that, which is in our power, and that, which is not.
5. The ability to adhere to a personal ideal of the creation of an inner harmony through ethical development.

6. The surmounting of psychological reductionism, and the development of a creative empathy: To be able to experience through substantiated scepticism, through just indignation, through trust and generosity.

7. The strengthening of an ethical imagination.

8. The replacement of strategic communication directed at persuasion, seduction, and the control of attitudes, with the respect of the singularity and autonomy of the other person: Leadership as a never ending discovery. The humour and irony of the private detective must replace the obstinate seriousness of the superintendent: Together we must discover our common cause, the core of the process of organising.

9. The development of a concept of personal formation as the basis of the loops of learning, and not the least of the strategies of forgetting; to be able to unite professionalism, passion, and will, through an ideal of the transformation of functions, tasks, procedures, domains of responsibilities, and criteria of excellence.

10. The lack of any firm institutional frame. The protreptikon can take place everywhere, between everybody, and all the time. It is direct, quiet, sober, sensitive, serious, and not without humour.

These methodical principles of the protreptikon could be conceived of as modes of heteroenticity, of modes of being on behalf of otherness. In opposition to the “existentials” of Martin Heidegger, I shall call them eventuals, modes of letting being be, as the eventing of the event.

There are five eventuals:
The first eventual is the positive powerlessness. It is the ability to distinguish between that which is in our power, and that which is not, with the consequence to be able to act properly. This is the zone of practise.

The second eventual is the capacity to assent to the sense of the event through free acceptance. This is the zone of autonomy, and of the critical attitude, the “krinein”. It is the anti-naturalist, post-ontological, attitude towards the event, the way of guarding its identity; it is the ability to enforce a distinction between word and concept, the will not to accept sense-making at any price.

The third eventual is the opening in space rendered to us by force, a force manifested through the freedom inherent in the bodies of the others. It is the will to want the essence of space and of place as the freedom of others, and to experience one’s own body as a place: The pampas of the skin.

The fourth eventual is the capacity to receive time from the others. It is the invocation of an emotional, or organic, logistic. It is the ability to receive the layers of time grown into the foreigners through their cultures. It is the belief in a fertile abundance, in the beautiful untimeliness of the event.

The fifth eventual is the force of being able to be “evented” by the Good, to be a part of a process of eventing which is dedicated to normative perfection. It is the will to conquer oneself without defeating sameness.

5.
Now I only lack to point to some issues of the leadership of the event in relation to art.
This is due to the fact that art manifests the principle of translocutionarity, that art is a special way, in all its dimensions, through which the event is created by the ability to receive it. In art attitude, experience and performance, unite into one proto-capacity.

In relation to the different genres of art we can create a laboratory of the leadership of the event:

In relation to the mode of musical performance:

a. It is possible to enlighten through the experience of musical leadership; to promote the consciousness and development of ourselves through the option to practise musical leadership. This can be done through the setting in which leaders at all levels are given the opportunity to direct musical ensembles through very simple codes. What we meet here is a rehearsal of the phenomenon of event. This is the concept of Peter Hanke. Besides the experience of the event in – to speak – a naked state, some important event-related capacities are made tangible, among others ones own talent for synchronising, for timing, for dynamical precision, for thematic variation, and for the sensitivity to intonation, to the balance between different voices. These are aspects of a readiness easy to transfer symbolically to other domains of leadership.

b. But musical performance does also contribute to the ability of the “leader on trial” to call forth, and to release, the powers of the group to lead itself in the light of excellence. The intimacy of music with the dimensions of bodily experience opens to a new leadership through other practises of being conscious. When the result of this experience with the musical group, whether a choir or a string quartet, is articulated through the guidance of a skilled counsellor, we might be able to contribute to a new language, a new code, in relation to the broad outlines of leadership; in relation to its way to guide thematic issues; in relation to its refinements and to its subtleties; in relation to its inner centres of harmonic balance. The special tune of the leader might de revealed, an important aspect of the secret of his style. Because even the most bodily being has to be released from its, often even happy, existence beyond the realm of words, through the right
wording. Speech drives out the demon – as Kierkegaard said. But it does not necessarily have to kill him. Art postpones dialogue, making its basis and its credibility more strong, but it never totally abandons it. Thus, the song is a hope with a direction, a voyage into space until the echo brings the sound back; and the solo is a call, if not a prayer, for co-sounding. It is this co-sounding, in the capacity of co-passion, which protreptics must make evident, and not at least through art.

In relation to the visual arts:

c. The capacity to visualise creates the event of interpretation through a guided sensing. The picture, or the sculpture confronts us with a simultaneity in experiencing, both directing our eyes to an immovable totality, and leading it through patterns of seeing without the linear flow of music and writing. We are given the opportunity to practise omnipotence, the dream of leadership. In the picture, and in the sculpture, knowledge of forms and colours, of movements, and of the relation between foreground and background, is displayed through the transformation into immediate subjects of experience. By receiving this experience we reproduce the inherent knowledge in a new way.

d. By setting up meetings and dialogues between artists and leaders we are able to create events in which the relation between attitudes and creativity is made a reflective subject. Art does neither create simulations of mini-worlds, nor artefacts of scenes to come, it does not implement, it develops. It opens the door into a fata morgana, in which the things and processes vaguely discerned for our inner eye, are met as answers to the united craving. Art can help protreptics, not by promising shamanism or magic, but by conjuring up a sensual soberness. The mysticism met with here is clear as the day.

In relation to the theatre:
e. The drama was probably the first laboratory of the event. Of course epic is too, but it does not contribute with a direct, physical setting of the event. As a spectator of, a participator in, and a developer of, dramatic events and courses, the leader can learn about the entrails of the event. The drama is the inner side of protreptics, because it enforces us to do two things: To be serious about our own consciousness, and to partake through empathy in the fate of the other person. These two attitudes have a common core: love. This thin worn concept testifies to the possibility of a total other way to relate to living. When the symphony finally reaches its point of departure, and when the form in the plastic art yields all that life which, during other circumstances, would have seeped away in the experience-machines of time and movement, art accomplished an emotion close to the one which should be the subject of “love”. When the narrative eternally postpones the end until the arrival of the last, truthful reader, then we confront another type of will, the one whose essence is a loyalty enriched by gentleness. The real attitude towards the event is gentleness. This fact answers to the task of guarding the secret of the event, and at the same time keeping it for ever young by recreating it. Gentleness is also the capacity of doing protreptics, and when it, at the same time, is directed towards the other person, and towards ourselves, then its green fingers shall make another knowledge grow, through the intensity and richness of experience, something which otherwise would have been neglected and leaved out. We are then able to act with a mimetic precision, which can be seen as steps in a count-down, the climax of which is the freedom earned through the insight into necessity. The true art of protreptics is to be able to exemplify the possibility to guard the balance between freedom and necessity.

In relation to the epic:

f. The epic is the attempt to inscribe the event into a contextual course, its mark is teleology, finality. The epic has an energy which comes from its wish to connect events in a way which constitutes a course which satisfies understanding. Epic always try to answer, or even to anticipate, the question, “Why did it happen?”,
“Why did it happen just like this?” However, the power of good epic is to be able not to sacrifice the equivocal in the very heart of the event explained. The confrontation with skilled writers, excellent stories, in the media of texts and pictures, could be a lesson of the event, because the event is always inscribed into the context of epic contexts. The logic of epic frames is shaped through four figures of speech:

The “I wanted, was able to, did, this thing, because…” The “This happened like this, because…” The “He/she wanted, were able, did, like this, because…” And the “We wanted, were able, did, like this, because…”

The myths inherent in powerful epic are able to put forward claims to territory, to launch the justice of causes, to legitimise the getting hold of allies, and to create the sense of purpose and of community.

Epic does not differ from the drama by having one voice only, often it consists of dialogues too, but it has an imaginary voice, a voice behind the voices, which manifests itself more salient than the voice of the playwright, through an omnipresence - in the film this voice is mixed with a way of seeing, or even with a silent language of tacit gestures, cultivated in the silent movie to a level of mimetic drama far beyond the pantomime. However, this background voice, this hidden way of seeing, these codes of silent gestures, always call for justice.

Protreptics, attempting at the realisation of legitimisation in the very core of the inner capillars of life, has got this epic identity. It summons the one who has taken permission of telling the truth of our lives. It challenges this authority, and this patent. It creates the advent of freedom in the event.

In relation to dance:

g. Dance is the essence of performance. It mimes participation. Dancers in residence could act out a carnival, be congresses, kind competitors, and brave consultants, dancing hand in hand. A ballet, a pavane, a chaconne, a gigue, a reel, transforming reality into a moveable feast. The concept of the ritual, with its air of buzz word, can appear from the depths of organisational reason, dressed in the vestiges of an
old, both Apollonean and Dionysian cosmogony, challenging the terrible tread of the organisation: Banality, boredom, and triviality. Dance is able to reenchant through a transparent massiveness in bodies acting, moving, drawing bonds, and loosing them again, invoking a chthonic laughter, and an Olympic humour. Because we always want spirits to enforce, art to enchant, if our ending should not be despair.

Protreptics is the power to deny the temptation of both the amor fati, and the escapism of the phantasm. "We must know commonwealth again from bitter searching of the heart, we must rise to play a greater part".