Institutionalism Revisited

Explaining the Institutional Fragmentation of Global Environmental Governance

Dr. Fariborz Zelli,
Lund University

Copenhagen Business School, 20 November 2015

LUND UNIVERSITY

Main Arguments

1. Institutional fragmentation keeps increasing.
2. Institutional fragmentation lacks a deeper theoretical framework.
3. Institutional fragmentation can be built into tenets of different strands of institutionalism.

Outline

1. Introduction & Rationale
2. Taking Stock: the NAVIGOV Project
3. Theoretical Framework: Explaining Fragmentation and its Consequences

1 Introduction and Rationale

What is institutional fragmentation ?

= Diversity of international and transnational institutions

with different legal status, constituencies, spatial scopes or predominant subject matters,

which overlap in their mandates and functions for addressing a given issue area.

From regime...



… to regime complex …



Source: Keohane & Victor 2011

… to a fragmented governance architecture.



I: UN Climate Regime
(different working and contact groups)

II: Multilateral climate & energy partn.
(APP, GMI, CSLF, IPHE, ICAP, PPPs, etc.)

III: Other int. environmental institutions
(CBD, Montreal Protocol, UNCCD, CSD)

IV: Int. non-environmental institutions
(WTO, WHO, UN Security Council, G8)

Source: Biermann et al. 2009

The actors of the play…



Source: Abbot 2012

… and the plot



Figure 12 Full network

Source: Widerberg 2014 (conference paper)

Global Climate Finance Architecture (Nakhooda et al. 2013)



State of the art: conceptual fragmentation

- *Institutional fragmentation*
- *Regime complexes*
- *Polycentric governance*
- *Polyarchic governance*

- *Orchestration*
- *Bandwagoning*
- *Governance experiments*
- *Institutional diffusion*

Normative divide…?



Institutional fragmentation is…

… a structural characteristic of today‘s global governance architectures.

2 Taking Stock

The NAVIGOV project

Aim: ***To generate new insights into the shape, causes and consequences of institutional complexity of global climate governance***

1. **Mapping** the institutional complexity in three key policy domains
2. **Explaining** varying levels of institutional complexity
3. Analysing the **consequences** for legitimacy, effectiveness and for specific groups of actors

Three focus areas in CC policy



+ potential overlaps on …

2a REDD

Institutional arrangements on forests -> evolution over time



Institutional arrangements on forests – adding the regional level



2b Short-lived Climate Pollutants

Types of SLCPs

	Black carbon	Tropospheric ozone	Methane	HFCs	Sources
Main anthropogenic emission sources	Resident biofuel and coal cooking and heating; Diesel engines; Open biomass burning	Not directly emitted, but a result of a reaction between ozone precursors	Fossil fuel extraction; Agriculture; Sewage and waste	Air conditioning and refrigeration; Mobile air conditioning; Foam agents; Aerosols; Fire extinguishers and solvents	CCAC 2014; UNEP 2011a; UNEP and WMO 2011
Atmospheric lifetime	3-8 days	4-18 days	9.1 years	1.5-222 years, depending on the type of HFC; 15 years average	CCAC 2014; Hartmann et al. 2013
Near-term climate impacts of mitigation action	Measures can reduce warming by 0.19°C by 2050	--	Measures can reduce warming by 0.28°C by 2050	0.1°C by 2050	Shindell et al. 2012; Xu et al. 2013
Longer-term climate impacts of mitigation action	- Under a 2°C scenario: 0.1°C - Under a "no mitigation" scenario: <0.05°C	--	- Under a 2°C scenario: 0.7°C - Under a "no mitigation" scenario: <0.4°C	- Under a 2°C scenario: 0.2°C - Under a "no mitigation" scenario: 0.1°C	Rogelj et al. 2014
Non-climate benefits of mitigation action	Human health improvements; Enhanced crop yields	Human health improvements; Enhanced crop yields	See tropospheric ozone (with methane being the main precursor)	--	Shindell et al. 2012; UNEP and WMO 2011

Institutions Governing SLCPs

Institution	Year	Membership	Scope	Legal status	Public/ private	Objective	Governance functions
Montreal Protocol	1987	197 parties	Global	Legally binding instrument	Public	Protect the ozone layer	Financing; Goal setting; Information sharing; Rule development
LRTAP Convention (Gothenburg Protocol)	1979 (1999)	51 parties	Regional	Legally binding instrument	Public	Protect the environment against air pollution	Information sharing; Rule development
IMO	1948	171 members		Employs legally binding instruments	Public	Ensure safety and security of shipping; prevent marine pollution by ships	Information sharing; Rule development
Arctic Council	1996	8 Arctic states (plus 12 non-Arctic states as observers)	Regional	Not legally binding	Public	Discuss Arctic issues (mainly related to environment/ sustainable development)	Agenda-setting; Information sharing
CCAC	2012		Global	Not legally binding	Public-private	Promote action to address SLCPs	Agenda-setting; Information sharing; Implementation
GMI	2004 (as Methane to Markets)	42 countries (plus the European Commission), and 1300+ non-state actors	Global	Not legally binding	Public-private	Reduce methane emissions; enhance methane recovery; use methane as clean energy resource	Information sharing; Financing; Implementation
UNFCCC	1992	196 parties	Global		Public	Avoid dangerous climate change	Financing; Information sharing; Rule development

2c Climate Engineering

Types of Climate Engineering



Institutions Governing Climate Engineering

LC&P
LONDON CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL

ENMOD
Convention

CBD

FORUM for CLIMATE ENGINEERING ASSESSMENT

SRMGI
Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative

OXFORD MARTIN SCHOOL
JAMES MARTIN 21ST CENTURY SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
Oxford Geoengineering Programme

CLIMOS

EuTRACE

Mapping - Comparison

Commonalities

- lack of an institutional core
- strong overlaps between environmental institutions of different domains

Differences

- number and importance of public international institutions
- level of institutional integration

Mapping – Next Steps

Use Social Network Analysis (SNA) to assess fragmentation and visualize the institutional architecture of different policy areas



Mapping – Next Steps

Compare cases using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

→ Between different policy areas in Climate Change governance



$$A + B \cdot C$$

3 Theoretical Framework

Fragmentation as an intervening variable



The degree of institutional fragmentation in a given issue area depends upon…

- **…** the preferences of powerful actors *(instrumental multilateralism / hegemonic stability theory);*

The degree of institutional fragmentation in a given issue area depends upon…

- **…** the preferences of powerful actors *(instrumental multilateralism / hegemonic stability theory);*
- **…** the asymmetry of preferences of different actors *(neoliberal institutionalism / situation-structural approach);*

REDD in Peru (Zelli et al., fc.)



Exclusion across levels

The degree of institutional fragmentation in a given issue area depends upon…

- **…** the preferences of powerful actors *(instrumental multilateralism / hegemonic stability theory);*
- **…** the asymmetry of preferences *(neoliberal institutionalism / situation-structural approach);*
- … the degree of uncertainty and / or asymmetry of knowledge bases *(cognitivism / epistemic communities).*

The degree of institutional fragmentation in a given issue area depends upon …

- **…** the asymmetry / competition of norms *(sociological institutionalism);*

Globale governance of plant genetic resources

National sovereignty :

CBD

AU Model Law

Andean Community

OAS

Bilateral agreements on 'bioprospecting'

Bonn Guidelines (PIC)

Private / patents:

WIPO

WTO-TRIPS

bilateral 'TRIPS plus'-agreements

EU Directive on Patents in Biotechnology

The degree of institutional fragmentation in a given issue area depends upon …

- **…** the asymmetry / competition of norms *(sociological institutionalism);*
- **…** the asymmetry / competition of discourses *(discursive institutionalism);*

Global Forestry Governance: Centres of Gravity



Global Forestry Governance: Centres of Gravity



The degree of institutional fragmentation in a given issue area depends upon …

- **…** the asymmetry / competition of norms *(sociological institutionalism);*
- **…** the asymmetry / competition of discourses *(discursive institutionalism);*
- … the hegemony of (neo-)liberal values and logics *(critical international political economy; neo-Gramsciansim).*

Thank you for your attention

Fariborz.Zelli@svet.lu.se

Fariborz Zelli and Harro van Asselt (eds.). 2013: *The Institutional Fragmentation of Global Environmental Governance*. Special Issue of *Global Environmental Politics* vol. 13:3 (The MIT Press).

‘Navigating the institutional complexity of global climate governance’ (NAVIGOV) – Formas-funded research project (2014-17)