

# DDF Project Description · DFF-projektbeskrivelse

## Rewards at the top

Lene Holm Pedersen, CBS

### Introduction

What type and level of rewards do people and politicians prefer, and what rewards do politicians actually obtain? The study of the rewards of high public office (RHPO) is not merely a question about politicians' pay and pensions, but rather a study of one of the core questions in political science; namely, the contract between the politicians and the people. The aim of this project is to study both sides of the coin: The rewards citizens are willing to accord to politicians and the strategies and actual rewards linked to holding high public office (HPO). Work package 1 investigates *the preferences stated* for different types and levels of rewards among people and politicians. Work package 2 investigates how *politicians are actually rewarded* by examining the size of different types of RHPO politicians obtain at different times. The knowledge produced in the two work packages forms the foundation for assessing and discussing the cleavages between the preferences stated by the people and the politicians and the actual positive and negative rewards earned.

The rewards secured by those in HPO continue to be a central concern in democratic societies (Brans & Peters 2012; Hood & Peters 1994), and anyone following the media cannot fail to understand their political importance. But RHPO is not just a topic for the tabloid press. It concerns the core of the politicians–people contract. Seen from the perspective of the public, high rewards may be regarded as the abuse of the decision-making power with which politicians are entrusted. Seen from the perspective of the politicians, serving in HPO is a tough job (Damgaard 1979; Jensen 1993; Weinberg et al. 1999; Weinberg & Cooper 2003), and like any occupational group, politicians expect to be compensated for their efforts. RHPO are of utmost importance because they might affect recruitment (Fisman et al., 2012; Harmon et al., 2015; Lazear & Gibbs 2009; Lundqvist 2011). Thus, classical political thinkers put RHPO at the center of their thoughts on good government. The importance of adequate compensation to lift the public service was a central concern for Hegel (c.f. Avineri 1972:159-60), while Bentham (1962[1843]) placed pay and rewards at the center of his utilitarian philosophy of government, paying attention to keeping public salaries as low as possible. In contrast, Tocqueville (1949:143-6) feared that lower formal rewards would fall to the point where only the rich could afford to participate. Today, the same arguments are applied when discussing good governance. If HPO is undercompensated, a political system is likely to become corrupt, inefficient or turn into a *de facto* aristocracy; at the same time, however, it is important that the politicians 'live like common people' (Dekker 2013). In sum, the central focus

is on the contract between the public and the politicians; that is, what preferences do the citizens have? What preferences do the politicians have? And what do politicians actually receive when it comes to rewards, encompassing both costs and benefits, pecuniary as well as non-pecuniary rewards, and rewards in the short as well as long term?

### **State of the art, contribution to state of the art and the research question**

The typology (see table 1) developed by Hood and Peters (1994) has been applied to study country level compensation patterns (Brans 1994; Christensen 1994; Derlien 1994; Hood 1994; King & Peters 1994; Klöti 1994; Lægreid 1994; Rouban 1994; Sjölund 1994), and progress has been made by updating and including more country studies (Hood et al. 2007; Brans & Peters 2012).

Acknowledging the contributions made by rich and contextualized country studies, we attempt to take the field one step further and study the individual-level preferences for compensation, which is essentially the individual-level underpinnings in the country level studies. Combining insights from political science with methods from personnel economics, we conduct stated preference experiments on RHPO. First, we study which RHPOs are legitimate to the public and acceptable for politicians by asking: *What are the preferences of the public and politicians toward different levels and types of RHPO?* Recent scholarship has pulled the focus back to the effect that the size of the rewards politicians reap by occupying political office has on political recruitment based on strong research designs (Eggers & Hainmueller 2009; Fisman et al. 2014; Lenz & Lim 2009; Lundqvist 2011; Peichl et al. 2013; Querubin & Snyder 2011). While the non-pecuniary rewards are often discussed, they are also acknowledged to be under-researched (Fisman et al. 2012; Geys & Mause 2013:83). The project therefore contributes to the state of the art by focusing on pecuniary rewards (e.g. salary, pensions, severance pay) as well as non-pecuniary costs and benefits, such as power, health and well-being, stress and work-life balance, public exposure and harassment. We contribute with unique and novel data by utilizing the Danish register data and a unique elite survey supplemented with qualitative interviews focusing on the differences in different types of rewards during the time in office and after holding office. Second, we ask *what pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards do politicians obtain from HPO, both during and after holding office?*

### **Theory and concepts**

A theoretical framework for studying such rewards is laid down, where RHPO is constructed as a social contract problem, see Table 1 (Hood & Peters 1994:9; Brans & Peters 2012). In a rational approach, assuming that HPOs prefer higher rather than lower RHPO and that citizens prefer lower rather than higher RHPO, the developments are likely to have a tragic bias towards cell IV. The politicians can choose an 'open' strategy, where rewards are transparent, or a 'devious' approach to rewards, where they are made less visible. On their side, citizens may choose between 'trustful' and 'distrustful' approaches. Assuming that citizens remain trusting, politicians are better off becoming

devious and raising the less visible and higher rewards, moving to cell II. Assuming that HPOs maintain an open strategy, citizens are better off becoming cynical, so it pays for them to move from cell I to cell III. Less transparent rewards might possibly provoke a sense that HPOs are ripping of the system, and citizens might consequently become distrustful. Hence, a combination of opportunism, self-interest and myopia may push developments in the direction of cell IV. This typology is a highly simplified heuristic, which serves as a starting point for analyzing the preferences of citizens and politicians towards rewards. When studying rewards, it is key that we both have to study the overall size of the rewards (high/low) and type of rewards (visible/less visible) (Hood & Lambert 1994). Furthermore, political trust is seen as a key variable regarding the willingness of citizens to compensate politicians.

**Table 1: The politicians’ dilemma (see Brans & Peters 2012; Hood & Peters 1994)**

Strategy	Open	Devious
Trusting	I: RHPO: visible, moderate Legitimacy: High	II: RHPO: less visible and higher Legitimacy: high
Distrusting	III: RHPO: visible and lower Legitimacy: low	IV: RHPO: less visible and higher Legitimacy: low

The theoretical framework lacks the incorporation of institutions, political ideologies and so forth, but little theoretical development has taken place since the original work. The project therefore aims to contribute to the theoretical development in terms of how institutional settings, political trust and political ideologies influence preferences for RHPO. An important theoretical point noted in the literature is that the rewards of HPO are not limited to the period of time in which the individual is actually holding office (Diermeier et al. 2005; Eggers & Hainmueller 2009; Lundqvist 2011:24). The revolving door metaphor has been used to describe the movement from HPO to private sector jobs (Cohen 1986; Freitag 1975; Gormley 1979), the central point here being that the rewards linked to holding HPO may be earned at a later point in time and possibly strongly linked to the personal networks established while holding HPO. This is found to be the case for lobbyists in the US (Blanes in Vidal et al. 2012), but empirical results regarding the post-career earnings of British politicians show that very few obtain positions and rewards in corporate boardrooms, but that there is an important heterogeneity linked to a few elite departments, such as defense and finance (González-Bailon et al. 2013). Thus, there is reason to pay attention to the rewards both while and after holding office (after de-recruitment), as well as the heterogeneity among politicians.

**WPI: Preferences for RHPO—expectations, method and data**

WPI contains two inter-related studies focusing on 1) Public preferences regarding politician rewards, 2) Politician preferences for rewards. A number of expectations can be raised following Table 1. Firstly, we expect individuals to be more willing to grant higher rewards to politicians they trust (e.g. national politicians over EU parliamentarians) and individuals who are trusting towards

politicians to grant higher rewards than less trusting individuals. Second, politicians prefer higher rewards as part of a devious strategy in which rewards are less open. Combining the groups, the match between rewards preferences among politicians and the people comes into focus, and ‘the politicians’ dilemma’ forms the third expectation; namely, that politicians have a stronger preference for less visible rewards than the public.

*Study 1A: Political trust and citizens’ preferences for the rewards of political office at the local, national and EU levels*

The first study focuses on the citizen’s perspective. Respondents in Epinion’s web panel stratified to be as representative of the Danish population as possible (citizens aged 18 and older) are asked to evaluate compensation packages for politicians at the local, national and EU levels.

Methodologically, we use a discrete choice experimental approach, which is widely used within a wide range of scientific fields but has only recently been introduced to the field of political science (Hainmueller & Hopkins 2015; Hainmueller et al. 2014; Hansen et al. forthcoming). This approach allows us to estimate the value ascribed by citizens to the different attributes of a compensation package (Eriksson & Kristensen 2014; Andersen et al. 2012). Each respondent is randomly presented with packages, each comprising a series of attributes and asked to choose between the packages, which will vary according to the relative weight given to specific elements, including actual pay vs severance benefits, actual pay vs pensions, and actual pay vs fringe benefits. The random assignment of package characteristics assures the internal validity of the experiments, and the design therefore provides good causal estimates of the utility assigned by citizens to compensation levels and characteristics. As regards the external validity, Hainmueller et al. (2014) shows how the method closely matches the behavioral benchmark from a natural experiment based on a real referendum. A key theoretical variable is political trust, and we include a range of questions about the trust in politicians at different levels of government (Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006; European Social Survey 2012), as well as variables such as age, gender, education, political ideology and political interest. The collected data allows us to examine and publish three international articles on 1A.1) the relationship between political trust and the willingness to pay politicians, 1A.2) the willingness of citizens to pay politicians, where the focus is on variations in the type and level of rewards, and 1A.3) the willingness of citizens to pay politicians, where the focus is on variations in the level of government.

*Study 1B (Ph.D. project): Attracting politicians to political office—compensation packages*

The aim of this study is to investigate politicians’ preferences for rewards. The method and approach are in line with study 1A. We collect data ourselves via two web-based surveys using SurveyXact of a) local councilors (see Dahlggaard et al. 2009; Pedersen et al. 2013 for experience with response rate from this group), b) members of the party youth organizations. As the number of

parliament members is relatively low, a survey of this group could lead to a problem of low n for this part of the analysis. We therefore choose to survey party youth organization members. This group is particularly interesting, because they potentially can be attracted to different political careers—already having selected in to the target group of potential politicians, as they have demonstrated their willingness to become party members. In line with study 1A, local councilors and youth politicians are asked to evaluate compensation packages at the local, national and EU levels. The online questionnaires are sent to the official e-mail addresses. The objective is, firstly, to test the expectation that politicians prefer higher rewards than the public and substitute from visible to less visible rewards in their attempts to fulfill this goal (see Table 1). Second, it is possible to use compensation packages as a tool to analyze how rewards should be designed in order to attract individuals to political office and variations in the individuals who are attracted by different pay schemes. Three international articles will be based on this: 1B.1) How do compensation packages influence attraction to high political office? 1B.2) Who prefers which types and levels of rewards (variations across individual and party characteristics)? 1B.3) Junior politicians and political recruitment. Finally, a fourth article will be written based on IA and IB: 1AB.1) Is there a mismatch between the politicians' expectations regarding compensation and the willingness of the public to pay them?

**WP II: Pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards while holding HPOs and afterwards—  
expectations, method and data**

WP II contains two interrelated studies employing two different sources of data: 1) register data on elected politicians at the national and local levels and 2) survey and qualitative data on the political and administrative elite in HPO at the national and local levels. In accordance with the theoretical focus on the revolving door, we pay special attention for all outcomes to the temporal dimension, specifically as to whether rewards rise or fall after de-recruitment. The central expectation is that, while holding office, rewards are discounted in return for rewards obtained after de-recruitment. *Study 2A (Post doc.): Register study of time variation and heterogeneity in positive and negative rewards linked to HPO* In this study, Danish public register data containing data on a broader range of life outcomes than income and wealth (Eggers & Hainmueller 2009; Lundqvist 2011) is linked to data provided by Statistics Denmark (in anonymous form) on individuals running for office in Danish municipalities in 1993-2013 elections and in the Danish national parliament in 1990-2015. The data does not allow us to make a strong causal design—such as a regression discontinuity design—as identification of the individuals elected on the margin is not allowed in the Danish registers. The matching design employed is the second best but contributes substantially with detailed description of the rewards earned, including more types of rewards over a lengthy time horizon. When describing rewards, we use within-party matching where elected politicians are

matched with individuals running for office but not elected. It is possible to create relevant groups for comparison due to the precision of the socio-demographical information in the registers. Pecuniary rewards have been studied in detail, also employing strong causal designs (Eggers & Hainmuller 2009; Lundqvist 2011). Thus, the contribution of this study is to expand the scope of the outcomes studied also to non-pecuniary rewards and to describe pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards during the time in office as well as after de-recruitment. First, we examine whether those in HPO differ in their labor market outcomes, such as income, unemployment and employment sector, compared to those not elected comparing the periods before, during and after holding office. Second, we examine private outcomes such as divorce, mobility and fertility (no. of children). A question of special interest is whether the private costs or benefits are disproportionately relevant for female councilors relative to male councilors, since findings from the private labor market imply that this is the case for leadership positions in general. Thirdly, we look at a range of health outcomes, such as visits to the family doctor, hospital admissions and prescription drug use (especially anti-depressants and other stress-related medication) (see Bhatti et al. 2015). The literature on legislator health is very scarce but indicates that serving may be associated with stress (Weinberg et al. 1999; Weinberg & Cooper 2003), which in turn may influence objective health outcomes. Three international articles will be based on this study: 2A.1) Rewards from high public office, 2A.2) gender differences in private life outcomes for local politicians and 2A.3) health rewards for local politicians while in office and after derecruitment.

#### *Study 2B: The political and administrative elite*

While study 2A is based on register data, 2B is based on a unique elite survey and qualitative elite interviews, 16 of which were carried out in 2015, covering ministers, party group chairmen, secretary generals, mayors and city managers (Bhatti et al. 2015a; 2015b). The response rate of the 2015 survey was above 70%, as the analysis was commissioned by the *Folketing*, for instance, 19 out of 20 ministers participated. The survey contained the detailed registration of working hours together with items on work–life balance, public exposure and harassment. The present project will analyze the data for academic purposes and carry out follow-up qualitative interviews in 2018 with those who participated in the 2015 survey (after the 2015 national elections and 2017 local elections) to study the effects of de-recruitment on RHPO. We carry out 16 interviews with former ministers and 16 interviews with former mayors, which will be transcribed and analyzed in Nvivo. The interviews vary in a two-by-two according to age (labor market active vs non-labor market active) and voluntary vs non-voluntary exit from politics. Four interviews are carried out in each cell. The original data allow us to study RHPO in the form of working conditions across office types (ministers vs. mayors) and across politicians and civil servants. Furthermore, the original data in combination with the follow-up interviews will allow us to investigate qualitatively whether

working conditions are specific to the positions in questions or continue after de-recruitment. Thus, the study will allow us to examine the psychological impact of being de-recruited from some of the highest offices in the country; that is, if there are ‘phantom pains’ in relation to no longer being close to the power center. Thus, the qualitative interviews also aim to uncover the negative political rewards linked to losing HPO. Two international articles will be based on this study: 2B.1) The work life of HPOs, 2B.2) the afterlife: What happens when elites are derecruited?

### **Project management, working responsibilities of Ph.d./P.D. and international cooperation**

Lene Holm Pedersen (LHP), CBS will be the principal investigator. Yosef Bhatti (YP) and Nicolai Kristensen (NK) are senior researchers, and Jens Olav Dahlgard (JOD) has been selected as the post-doc. due to his aptitude and experience working with stated preferences, register data and survey data. Please see the attached CV for details. The Ph.D. is NN, as international recruitment procedures will be applied. The Ph.D. project is to undertake the studies of preferences stated in WPI.b. and writing articles no. 1B.1 + 1B.2 and co-authoring 1AB.1. The P.D. is to undertake the matching studies in WPII writing articles no. 2A.1 + 2A.2 and co-authoring 2A.3. An advisory panel will be formed (see the attached declarations of interest in participation, co-publication and raising additional funding) consisting of ‘the founding fathers’ C. Hood, B.Guy Peters, J.G. Christensen as well as younger scholars e.g. Jostein Askim. Additionally, participation and involvement in international conferences secure both the contribution to the international research community and the internal synergies in the project; please see the plan below for details.

**Table 2: Milestones, criteria of success, division of work and work plan**

Milest.	Criteria of success: a) renewal of the international research agenda and network on RHPO, b) publication of 10 in high ranking journals such as JPART, BJPS, PA, EJPR, Governance c) Spillover to the democratic debate on RHPO.	Completed by
<i>WPI criteria of success a) education of Ph.D. undertaking WPIb, b) five international articles</i>		
1	Recruitment of Ph.D.	01.02.17
2	6 Surveys to citizens, councilors and members of political youth parties, data analysis	01.01.18
3	Conference papers presented at PMRA, IRSPM, APSA	01.01.19
4	Ph.D. (art. no 1B.1 + 1B.2 + 1B.3 and 1AB.1 with NK, YB, LHP, JOD co-auth.	01.02.20
5	Submission of articles no 1A.1 + 1A.2 + 1A.3 (co-authored by NK, YB, LHP)	01.02.20
<i>WPII criteria of success a) education of P.D. undertaking WPIIa, b) five international articles</i>		
1	Recruitment of P.D.	01.02.17
2	Register data set established, derecruitment interviews with ministers	01.01.18
3	Derecruitment interviews with mayors	01.08.18
4	Conference papers presented at PMRA, IRSPM, ECPR, APSA	01.08.19
5	Submission of 2A.1+2A.2(JOD), 2A.3.(YB, JOD, LHP) and 2B.1+2B.2 (YB, LHP)	01.02.20

## References

- Andersen LB, T Eriksson, N Kristensen & LH Pedersen. 2012. Attracting Public Service Motivated Employees: How to Design Compensation Packages. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 78(4):615-41.
- Avineri S. 1972. *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bentham J. 1962[1843]. The Works of Jeremy Bentham (ed. J Bowring), *Book II: The Rationale of Reward*. New York: Russell & Russell.
- Bhatti Y, M Gørtz & LH Pedersen. 2015. The Causal Effect of Profound Organizational Change When Job Insecurity Is Low—A Quasi-experiment Analyzing Municipal Mergers. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*. 25 (4):1185-1220
- Bhatti Y, U Hjelmær & LH Pedersen. 2015a. Arbejdsvilkår for fuldtidspolitikere. Rapport udarbejdet for Vederlagskommissionen. Copenhagen: Kora.
- Bhatti, Y, U Hjelmær & LH Pedersen. 2015b. Arbejdsvilkår for offentlige topledere. Notat udarbejdet for Vederlagskommissionen. Copenhagen: Kora. Blanes, J in MD Vidal & C Fons-Rosen. 2012. Revolving Door Lobbyists. *The American Economic Review*: 102(7): 3731-48.
- Brans M. 1994. Belgium: Public Office and Private Rewards. In C Hood & BG Peters. *Rewards at the Top: A Comparative Study of High Public Office*, London: Sage
- Brans M & BG Peters. 2012. *Rewards for High Public Office in Europe and North America* London: Routledge.
- Christensen JG. 1994. Denmark: Institutional Constraint and the Advancement of Individual Self-Interest in HPO. In C Hood & BG Peters (eds), *Rewards at the Top: A Comparative Study of High Public Office*, London: Sage
- Cohen JE. 1986. The Dynamics of the 'Revolving Door' on the FCC. *American Journal of Political Science* 30(4):689-708. Derlien 1994: The Structure and dynamics of the Rewards system for Bureaucratic and Political Elites in Hood, Christopher and B. Guy Peters. 1994. "Rewards at the Top." *A Comparative Study of High Public Office*, London: Sage
- Dahlgaard JO, U Hjelmær, A Olsen & LH Pedersen. 2009. Kommunalpolitikeres rolle og råderum. Copenhagen: AKF [Now KORA].
- Damgaard E. 1979. *Folketingsmedlemmer på arbejde*. Aarhus: Politica.
- Dekker T. 2013. *Paying Our High Public Officials: Evaluating the Political Justifications of Top Wages in the Public Sector*. Vol. 5. New York: Routledge.

- Diermeier D, M Keane & A Merlo. 2005. A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers. *American Economic Review* 95(1):347-73.
- Dietz G & DN Den Hartog. 2006. Measuring Trust inside Organisations. *Personnel Review* 35(5):557-88. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/00483480610682299>
- Eggers AC & J Hainmueller. 2009. MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics. *American Political Science Review* 103(04):513-33.
- Eriksson T & N Kristensen. 2014. Wages or Fringes? Some Evidence on Trade-Offs and Sorting. *Journal of Labor Economics* 32(4):899-928.
- European Social Survey: ESS Round 6: European Social Survey Round 6 Data. 2012. Data file edition 2.1. Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway—Data Archive and distributor of ESS data.
- Fisman R, F Schultz & V Vig. 2012. Private Returns to Public Office. NBER working paper series.
- Freitag P. 1975. Cabinet and Big Business: A Study of Interlocks. *Social Problems* 23(2):137-52.
- Geys B & K Mause. 2013. Moonlighting Politicians: A Survey and Research Agenda. *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 19(1):76-97.
- González-Bailon S, W Jennings & M Lodge. 2013. Politics in the Boardroom: Corporate Pay, Networks and Recruitment of Former Parliamentarians, Ministers and Civil Servants in Britain. *Political Studies* 61(4):850-73.
- Gormley WT Jr. 1979. A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC. *American Journal of Political Science* 23(4):665-83.
- Hainmueller J, D Hangartner & T Yamamoto. 2015. Validating Vignette and Conjoint Survey Experiments against Real-World Behavior. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 112(8):2395-400.
- Hainmueller J & DJ Hopkins. 2015. The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes toward Immigrants. *American Journal of Political Science* 59(3):529-48.
- Hainmueller J, DJ Hopkins & T Yamamoto. 2014. Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference Experiments. *Political Analysis* 22(1):1-30.

- Hansen KM, AL Olsen & M Bech. forthcoming. Cross-National Yardstick Comparisons: A Choice Experiment on a Forgotten Voter Heuristic. *Political Behavior*, online early access.
- Harmon NA, R Fisman, E Kamenica & I Munk. 2015. Labor Supply of Politicians. *Journal of the European Economic Association*.
- Hood C. 1994. The UK. In C Hood & BG Peters, *Rewards at the Top: A Comparative Study of High Public Office*. London: Sage.
- Hood C & S Lambert with associate authors. 1994. Mountain Tops or Iceberg Tips? Some comparative data on RHPOs. In C Hood and BG Peters. *Rewards at the Top: A Comparative Study of High Public Office*. London: Sage.
- Hood C & BG Peters. 1994. *Rewards at the Top: A Comparative Study of High Public Office*. London: Sage.
- Hood C, BG Peters & GOM Lee. 2003. *Reward for High Public Office*. London: Routledge.
- Jensen TK. 1993. *Politik i praksis*. Copenhagen: Samfundslitteratur.
- King D & BG Peters 1994. The United States. In C Hood & BG Peters. *Rewards at the Top: A Comparative Study of High Public Office*. London: Sage.
- Klöti, U. 1994. Switzerland: Serving the State and Maximizing Income. In C Hood and BG Peters. *Rewards at the Top: A Comparative Study of High Public Office*. London: Sage.
- Lazear EP & M Gibbs. 2014. *Personnel Economics in Practice*. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons.
- Lenz G & K Lim. 2009. Getting Rich(er) in Office? Corruption and Wealth Accumulation in Congress. APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1450077>
- Lundqvist H. 2011. Empirical Essays in Political and Public Economics. Doctoral dissertation, Department of Economics, Uppsala University.
- Læg Reid P. 1994. Norway. In C Hood & BG Peters. *Rewards at the Top: A Comparative Study of High Public Office*. London Ua.
- Mause K. 2014. Self-Serving Legislators? An Analysis of the Salary-Setting Institutions of 27 EU Parliaments. *Constitutional Political Economy* 25(2):154-76.
- Pedersen LH, K Houlberg, SW Hansen, AL Olsen & MJ Bordacconi. 2013. *Lokalpolitikeres rolle og råderum*. Copenhagen: KORA.

- Peichl A, N Pestel & S Siegloch. 2013. The Politicians' Wage Gap: Insights from German Members of Parliament. *Public Choice* 156(3-4):653-76.
- Querubin P & JM Snyder Jr. 2011. *The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis: Wealth Accumulation by US Congressmen, 1850-1880*. No. w17634. National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Rouban L. 1994. France: Political Argumentation and Institutional Change. In C Hood & BG Peters (eds), *Rewards at the Top: A Comparative Study of High Public Office*. London: Sage.
- Sjölund 1994 in C Hood & BG Peters. 1994. *Rewards at the Top: A Comparative Study of High Public Office*, London: Sage.
- Tocqueville 1949 *Democracy in America*, London: Oxford University Press.
- Weinberg A. 2013. A Longitudinal Study of the Impact of Changes in the Job and the Expenses Scandal on UK National Politicians' Experiences of Work, Stress and the Home-Work Interface. *Parliamentary Affairs* 68(2):248-71.
- Weinberg A. & CL Cooper. 2003. Stress among National Politicians Elected to the Parliament for the First Time. *Stress and Health* 19(2):111-17.
- Weinberg A, CL Cooper & A Weinberg. 1999. Workload, Stress and Family Life in British Members of Parliament and the Psychological Impact of Reforms to their Working Hours. *Stress Medicine*, 15:79-87.