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An­ette Boom

Associate Professor

Subjects
Microeconomics Economics Energy Analysis Green transition Infrastructure

Primary research areas

In­dus­tri­al Eco­nom­ics
The­or­et­ic­al mod­el­ling of all kinds of mar­kets with less than per­fect com­pet­i­tion in or­der to draw con­clu­sions how com­pet­i­tion policy or oth­er reg­u­lat­ory in­ter­ven­tions might im­prove or de­teri­or­ate so­cial wel­fare.
Elec­tri­city Mar­kets
Elec­tri­city Mar­kets need to be bal­anced at each point in time and are prone to ex­tern­al­it­ies via the elec­tri­city net­works between dif­fer­ent pro­du­cers and con­sumers. There­fore care­ful mar­ket design on the whole­sale and the re­tail level are very im­port­ant. My re­search fo­cuses on how, for ex­ample, more re­new­able en­ergy use to gen­er­ate elec­tri­city, or more com­pet­i­tion in elec­tri­city gen­er­a­tion or ver­tic­al in­teg­ra­tion of gen­er­a­tion and re­tail firms changes mar­ket out­comes and so­cial wel­fare.
Mar­kets with Asym­met­ric In­form­a­tion
Asym­met­ric in­form­a­tion changes the con­duct of firms in mar­kets. Firms might, for ex­ample, be in­flu­enced by the ob­serv­able be­ha­viour of com­pet­ing firms which might sig­nal im­port­ant in­form­a­tion about these com­pet­ing firms. Such be­ha­viour could be build­ing large ca­pa­cit­ies, lit­ig­at­ing oth­er firms that might in­fringe their pat­ents, etc., in or­der to in­flu­ence the entry de­cision of the firms ob­serving this be­ha­viour. The ques­tion is again wheth­er con­vey­ing in­form­a­tion via such be­ha­viour in­creases or de­creases so­cial wel­fare.

My re­search helps to design and reg­u­late mar­kets in ways that be­ne­fits so­cial wel­fare

I am an applied theoretical Industrial Economist who uses theoretical models to analyze markets with less than perfect competition. With the help of these models I try to forecast how currently relevant technological changes, new policies or regulations change market outcomes in these markets. The results help, on the one hand, actors in the market to form realistic expectations about future developments. On the other hand, they also help regulators and political decision makers to implement regulations or policies which improve the efficiency and/or the social welfare of the considered imperfect markets. 

I address questions such as: 

Does an increase in competition increase investments in generation capacities in electricity markets? 

Does vertical integration of electricity generating firms into the retail sector increase or decrease their incentive to invest in generation capacity? 

Do heterogenous retail consumers who are risk averse have an incentive to sign electricity contracts with real time pricing in situation where fixed price contracts are also available? 

Which mechanism, strategic reserves or capacity markets, is better in ensuring security of supply in electricity markets where the supply becomes more uncertain due to an increased share of electricity being produced with renewable energy? 

Can patent litigation signal the value of markets and influence the entry decisions of rivals into these markets? 

While I am working mainly with theoretical models, I try to generate testable results with these models. If possible, I am happy to cooperate with other researchers who are either interested in similar questions or who are interested in empirically testing my theoretical results. 

February 2024

Signalling the Value of an Innovation by (not) Litigating Patent Infringers

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20 June 2023

Etårige kandidatuddannelser truer forskningsmiljøer og konkurrencekraft

Philip John Binning

Rikke Buhl

David Lundbek Egholm

Henrik Halkier

Sisse Finken

Linda Lundgaard Andersen

Per Krogh Hansen

Anet­te Boom, Associate Professor

Claus Pedersen

Arbejdsgruppen vedr. forskeruddannelse null

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December 2021

Is Real-time Pricing Smart for Consumers?

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Outside activities

Mem­ber and later Chair , 2014 - 2021

Dan­ish Bib­li­o­met­ric Com­mit­tee for Eco­nom­ic Re­search (BFI, fag­gruppe 24) , which was in charge of rat­ing aca­dem­ic journ­als in the field of Eco­nom­ics. Pub­lic re­search fund­ing of Dan­ish Uni­ver­sit­ies at the time was partly de­pend­ent on these rat­ings of the journ­als in which their re­search­ers pub­lished.
https://ufm.dk/forskning-og-innovation/statistik-og-analyser/bfi-afviklet