

Immaculate defecation: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in organization theory

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Resumé

This chapter opens by situating the reception of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in organization theory, but does so by conceiving this reception as an instance of ‘abstract machines’ that territorialize ‘reception’ as a function that defines and confines a field of study to a territory, here a limited number of universities in the English-speaking world.

The chapter further expresses the (anti-)method of Deleuze and Guattari by trying to deploy the method itself: defocusing the problem in order to ‘produce the problematic’, straining to reach a language that stutters and breaks down, an affective writing, a ‘line of flight’ with infinite speed, and abstaining (perhaps specifically) from suicide by always experimenting not with the ultimate but with the ‘penultimate limit’. Despite rumours to the contrary, the writings of Deleuze and Guattari are most adequately characterized by the word *sobriety*. Language as such, however, is a slang, a machine that works by breaking down, moving intensely through dynamic states of crisis and equilibrium. This calls for a sober yet bloody style: ‘Write with blood,’ says Nietzsche, ‘and thou wilt find that blood is spirit’ (1969: 43).

Right into the heart of Organization Theory (and one wonders which *way* into the heart: the bowels, the veins? Through a taste for *camp* or really by way of an Outside?), Deleuze and Guattari release the dynamic double concept of the Plane of Organization and the Plane of Immanence. The organization – now construed as an ‘assemblage’ – is situated between these limits. As such, the assemblage is a multiplicity, but it is habitually botched or stratified, that is, reduced and simplified by the three great ‘strata’: the Organism, the Sign and the Subject. This brings the chapter to the concept itself, as it is composed as a multiplicity with the ability of counteractualizing our present, an often lamentable state of affairs. The concept also features the ability to produce the problematic of a given problem, instead of just solving it. The concept is, in particular, an event, and as such calls for an ethics by which one becomes worthy of the event. Becomes worthy of being present at the dawn of the world (Deleuze and Guattari, 1998: 280).

Reception-conception

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari are advocates of philosophy, to be sure, but it is both a certain type of philosophy as well as it is a certain use of it. They call their philosophy, among other things, *geophilosophy* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 85ff). In geophilosophy thinking takes place between the earth and a territory, thinking is a geographical matter-movement rather than a purely cognitive exercise. In fact, humans are only a smaller and historically conditioned part of this cosmic ecology, and via the concept of the assemblage Deleuze and Guattari manage to replace and reconfigure the staple sociological and philosophical concern, the relationship between the human and its world (Buchanan, 2000: 120). The assemblage consists of and relates bodies and signs. This makes organizations appear as *certain kinds* of assemblages, with certain kinds of problems and problematizations available to them. In any case, the assemblage is, as indicated, situated between the Plane of Organization and the Plane of Immanence (a.k.a. the Plane of Consistency or *the* body without organs).

When the assemblage comes more tied to the Plane of Organization, it becomes ordered to the limit of rigidification, much like a classroom of pupils is more ordered than a pack of hunters. This ordering is quite visible in what Deleuze and Guattari name the strata, comprised by man, language and the world as we know it (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 399ff). At the extreme limit of the Plane of Organization we should find, amongst other things, both fascism and anarchism, and psychosis. And, from time to time, we should find ourselves there. At the other extreme, on the Plane of Immanence, the assemblage returns to an intensively dynamic state of forming new connections everywhere and of transforming into completely new becomings: a state of cosmic revolution, ‘oceanic differences, of nomadic distributions and crowned anarchy’ (Deleuze, 1994: 265). Here Deleuze and Guattari find the nomads in the desert, and the organization is affirmed as a pure production of desire, the self is no longer a problem, and politics will equal nothing less than love: ‘Every love is an exercise in depersonalization on a body without organs yet to be formed’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 35). You certainly don’t need to be in love to form a line of flight towards this plane, but that particularly insane state gives a good hint to what Deleuze and Guattari have in mind.

Thinking as a practice, then, always establishes territories or fields, and, more interestingly, thinking is also able to change these fields, able to ‘de-territorialize’ these territories and set the known connections free in order to let them form new connections (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 174ff). The new net of connections, the ‘re-territorialization’, can either place things in an even worse situation, as when postmodernism returns only to haunt the social field with ‘interesting lifestyles’ and new commodities to long for. Or it can be ‘absolute’, as when Nelson Mandela’s line of flight accelerated millions of bodies (of multiple colours) during the South African liberation, eventually bringing reconciliation to the haunted country.

Organization Theory (here capitalized in an attempt to call into being) proves to be a key example of the dynamic of de- and re-territorialization, whether the question is of 'traditional' or 'mainstream' theory, or the *avant garde* version of it, like the book you are currently reading, it makes no difference. In general, an obligatory passage point of introductory chapters like the present one is a paragraph depicting the reception of the *oeuvre* in question: how has, in this case, the work of Deleuze and Guattari been perceived in Organization Theory? This does appear as an opening gesture, thus signalling a possible process of absolute deterritorialization, that is, an opening to what is outside Organization Theory and what promises to change it. Yet what happens – and the reader is urged to test this claim in the present book – is that the referential regime so released immediately draws a definite territory, a negative reterritorialization: it singles out a series of indexed points situated almost exclusively at a certain number of universities in Great Britain, supplemented with a few, very few, points in North America, and including, sometimes, Australia and New Zealand. This practice connects, as it were, the assemblage of organization theory – let's dispense with the capitalization – understood as a heterogeneous multiplicity of thinking and writing, with a finite territory, an indexed network of already signified striations, coagulations, and sedimentations. On repeat, this procedure will create, says the geophilosopher, a *stratum* (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 39ff).

'Splendid!' says the organization theorist: not only is organization theory being developed in a language that 'everybody speaks', but it has also, finally, established itself as a territory, that is, as a *field*, with all the associated opportunities to become stronger and to reach further with its messages of critique and deliberation (and the promises of permanent positions). 'No, not quite splendid,' say Deleuze and Guattari: as a language becomes *major* (English, white, rich, male), it loses its transformative power and becomes pure 'order word': 'Language is made not to be believed but to be obeyed, and to compel obedience' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 76). This goes, *mutatis mutandis*, also for organization theory: organization theory is not made to convey messages, neither about organizations nor about theory. It is made to give orders regarding the organization of bodies, and the diagrammatization of signs. It concerns the sayable and the visible, and prescribes this with a sense of prefigured order: slogans, passwords, and instructions. The very order of reception of French and German poststructuralism 'into' organization theory has, on the whole, not followed some evolutionary, let alone revolutionary, path, nor any discernable logic of reason: the logic of, first, Foucault, then Derrida and, finally, Deleuze and Guattari is nothing but the chronological order of their translation into English (stay tuned: Gabriel Tarde, Michel Serres and Peter Sloterdijk are on their way).

Organization theory is ordered, all right, be it only on a highly contingent ground. Behind the smooth wrapping of every theory of organization there is indeed a teacher, just as there is a priest behind every betrayal of desire: the teacher does not so much instruct as give orders, and the compulsory education machine does not communicate information, but imposes on the student a set

of semiotic coordinates (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 75). Overall, academics comprise the lowest part of this education machine, its rectum, where the last fluids of nutrition are extracted from the body material. This is the reason why most academics struggle with anal retentive character traits and a fear of youth, and why they enforce examinations in order to judge ‘go’ or ‘no go’ – and never ‘go with us’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 177).

Language is non-discursive, and on the whole subjected to circumstances: the seemingly important words ‘yes’ and ‘no’ work only as a function of the setting (an exam, a wedding, a courtroom). Every utterance becomes double binding: ‘The principal says “Here’s your diploma” (read: get a job, sucker)’ (Massumi, 1992: 31). So, the much celebrated ‘linguistic turn’ that has run through organization theory like a shot of oxygen these last thirty years might be just that: an overdose of a poisonous gas injected into a dying organism, causing it to flare up in a sudden, fatal spasm. ‘Language is not life; it gives life orders. Life does not speak; it listens and waits’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 76). This doesn’t save the great Other(s) of poststructural organization theory like transaction cost economy and similar functionalistic interventions from critique: what these abstract machines confirm is not how organizations and their inhabitants in fact *work*, but why, on the contrary, mathematics, too, must be understood as a slang, a *patois*, and how, historically, the social sciences have made a lasting contribution to the most profound betrayal of desire: by turning it into *interests*.

Organization Theory between interests and desire

The concept of ‘interest’ is the centre around which most motivation theory and HRM is build. Seen from the point of view of Deleuze and Guattari, interest is in itself a strategic and manageable reduction of desire, as it couples needs (stemming from a presumed ontological lack) with preferences (derived from a transcendent, stratified and organized hierarchy of being). The subject, who, of course, in capitalism is the consumer, who ‘needs’ this or that object, has been organized to suffer from this lack. Expressed in the form of wanting this and that as in the transaction cost calculus of preferences, desire has *already* been repressed and turned into interests (see Holland, 1999). But desire is not, in Deleuze and Guattari’s Spinozist variant of it, characterized by a lack or a need, but simply by what *connects*: desire is connections, to desire is to produce connections.

Stratification, the construction of the strata, is obtained exactly by turning desire into interests, by making the Oedipal, nuclear family the model of *all* social organization: the *Vaterland* becomes the territory of the enterprise, its ‘culture’ becomes the mother tongue of the subject, the ingenious R&D boys become the preferred and well paid sons, the HR squad becomes the nursing sisters, compassionate but powerless in front of the grand signifier. Also HRM and motivation theory is currently being deterritorialized, and Alexander Styhre has, for

instance, performed a well-wrought Deleuzoguattarian attack on this motivation discourse from the point of view of immanence and desire (Styhre, 2005).

As it goes, critical management studies should be a natural vista for an adequate 'reception' of Deleuze and Guattari in organization theory, but the latter's tenor *is* very different from Foucault's more tempered literary style, and only very slowly do Foucauldians find themselves sufficiently empowered to enter the Deleuzoguattarian bestiary of grotesque neologisms and hyper-complex analytical constructions. Moreover, while Deleuze and Guattari never ceased to be Marxists (Manuel Delanda shamelessly claims Marx to be Deleuze and Guattari's Oedipus!¹) they reject the central Marxian orthodox legacy, that a society is defined by its contradictions. Also contradictions must be conceived as multiplicities, as manifolds, and Deleuze and Guattari point to a third and decisive component: 'from the viewpoint of micropolitics, a society is defined by its lines of flight, which are molecular' (1988: 216). These lines of flight – asignifying ruptures, not signifying breaks – concern that surplus value of desiring production that is *not* captured by the market axiomatic, the corporate logic, or the well-fare State politics. Just as Foucault (1979), their great forerunner in social analysis, Deleuze and Guattari have a fetish for the fringes and the margins, which might explain that organizational studies on control (Rose, 2000; Power, 2004), fraud (Bayou and Reinstein, 2001), crime (Jones, 2000; Ronnie, 2001) and gangster rap (Rehn and Sköld, 2005) seem to thrive under the infectious appeal of their bestiary.²

Scholars dealing with gender first hesitated when faced with the seemingly conservative idea that women – and everyone else – should engage in 'becoming-woman' as a part of a micro-political strategy (as prescribed in Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 291ff). However, as Rosi Braidotti acknowledges, the point is 'to by-pass the parameters of phallogentric representation in order to create a new, more intensive image of the thinking subject' (2003: 48; see also Buchanan and Colebrook, 2000). Furthermore, as technology gets plugged in everywhere in our bodies, Dianne Currier (2003) experiments with letting the assemblage replace the charged notion of *the* body, just as Stephen Linstead replaces the no less charged notion of *the* organization with the Organization without Organs (Linstead, 2000, see also Kornberger, Rhodes and ten Bos, forthcoming).

Neither is the social body itself, the *socius* as Deleuze and Guattari name it in *Anti-Oedipus*, a nice, compartmentalised landscape of ordered citizens under a sovereign, led by a social contract for mutual benefit. There might be organizations everywhere, but the world is not an organization. It doesn't work that way: rather, it is *at* work everywhere:

It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks . . . Everywhere *it* is machines – real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984: 1)

The book you are trying to read just now is also a machine: it cuts up sentences, it sprouts with fits of desire that keep running through it and escaping it, and

it is probably also strapped down by a somewhat pretentious academic style. Maybe you Xeroxed it through another machine³ in order to save money, trying to bypass your subsumption as consumer under the giant capitalist machine which, on its side, constantly exchanges more and more of your labour time, of your desiring production, with more and more commodities.

While the assemblage is situated between the Plane of Organization and the Plane of Immanence, it is concretely operated by machines: it is the configuration of these machines that either stratifies it more harshly, or furthers its connections to the Plane of Immanence (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 510ff). On the one hand there are textbooks with stupid test questions and on the other hand books that painfully force you to think. Most generally, a machine is able to connect very diverse elements in flat, rhizome-like structures. Analytically, the abstract machines can be grouped under three aspects (see Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 47ff): singular and immanent machines that direct concrete assemblages, like a national transportation system or a teacher-student interaction, to mention two somewhat different machines. Secondly, there is *the* abstract machine that draws the Plane of Immanence itself: pure desire, pure anorganic life, love.

Thirdly, the abstract machines can be judged according to the extent to which they create new connections and deterritorializations: this is, specifically, the function of the *war machine*. An example of this is the release of the Gutenberg Bible, an event that suddenly emancipated knowledge and spiritual desire out of the Catholic mega machine. The abstract machines can also, naturally, be judged according to which degree they further stratifications by way of coding and territorializations. Finally, there are the apparatuses of capture, obeying and enforcing the Organic, the Signifying and the Subjectifying. This happens, for instance, when the knowledge and the spiritual desire set free by Gutenberg is reterritorialized under the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism (see Weber, 1985). Also this can be counteractualized, as demonstrated in both Martin Wood's and Silvia Gherardi's Deleuzoguattarian analyses of organizational knowledge as practices of 'folding' and 'desire' respectively (Wood, 2002; Gherardi, 2003).

But take a look around: all you see are actualized beings, the actual world is on the whole stratified and rigidly organized, the mission of the war machines we struggle to invent is to counteractualize this *actual* state of affairs into an intense, *virtual* sphere where everything again becomes possible, where thinking and living again becomes possible.

A scent of method: The problematic breakdown

Indeed, what in common sense theory appear to be quite concrete and pertinent problems, are as a rule squeezed and multiplied in the Deleuzoguattarian round-about. Not only is the problem apparently left to its own devices, it reappears multiplied and intensified. The problem reappears as a real multiplicity by being

produced as a *problematic*: the problem becomes an event. It is not just a suspicion. It is a method.

The notion of the problematic is already a central concern in Deleuze's own main works, *Difference and Repetition* and *Logic of Sense* (see also Buchanan, 2000). The problematic, argues Deleuze, must always be regarded as prior to the 'solution', which is a category of the already closed case. Solutions belong to the categories of being, truth and the real, in themselves markers of a certain history of philosophy and, we can safely add, the history of organization theory. These categories are, in Nietzsche's words, avatars of nihilism, mutilators of life, opposing life to life (see Nietzsche, 1969). This, says Deleuze, forces the solution to always have:

the truth it deserves according to the problem to which it is a response, and the problem always to have the solution it deserves in proportion to *its own* truth or falsity – in other words, in proportion to its sense. (1994: 159)

The solution is confined to the empirical, historical determinations of its actualization in concrete bodies and collective statements, and in a certain sense the solution is not interesting; it is not *inter-esse*, between being, but is already essence. The category one should, with Søren Kierkegaard, like to examine, the relevant category, 'is that of the *interesting*, a category that especially today (just because we live in *discrimine rerum* [at a turning-point in human affairs]) has acquired great importance, for really it is the category of crisis' (Kierkegaard, 1983: 109–110).

The crisis is the process of virtualization offered by the problematic: indeed, the problem of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari in organization theory calls for a virtualization of both the notion of reception as well as the notion of organization theory. So, at the same time as the solution is inscribed in the actual event of the problem, the relevant problem to which it 'is a solution', must be counteractualized into its *virtual* phase, in a perpetual state of becoming, that is, becoming *actualized*. In this construction, Deleuze and Guattari go in the reverse direction, from the given solution (surgical warfare, downsizing corporations, upgrading competencies), to the painful problems that gave rise to these solutions. The notion of crisis found in Kierkegaard – with whom Deleuze felt a striking familiarity – also features such a reversal of the common sense denigration of crisis and death, and it finds an adequate framing in the dynamic processes of actualization and virtualization. In the actual world, any crisis is a problem and will make you, for instance, cancel an interesting date. At the virtual Plane of Immanence, however, the crisis draws a line of flight that enables you to leave your neurotic Self (which, to be honest, even *you* didn't want to date). The crisis is the passage from the virtual to the actual and vice versa, and it produces the problematic.

Henri Bergson is the prime problematizer of the problem, and the inspiration for the method: 'stating the problem is not simply uncovering, it is invention' (Bergson, cited in Deleuze, 1988: 15). The sense of the problem, then, is the expression of the problem as event. The problematic thus conceived is some-

thing like a kick in the teeth of organization theory, just to see how it works, to see for yourself (on the practice of kicking teeth and losing face, see Sørensen, forthcoming; for more on method, see Yu, 2004). It is a rage against the abstract machines, a rage that pits the problem against the problem:

Not willing what happens, with that false will that complains, defends itself and loses itself in gesticulations, but taking the complaint and *rage to the point that they are turned against what happens* so as to set up the event, to isolate it, to extract in it the living concept. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 160, emphasis added)

The world is a mixture. The assemblage of being (which has a multiple and coexisting assemblage of *becoming*) is situated between the stratifications and the body without organs, or, cosmologically, between the Plane of Organization and the plane of all bodies without organs, the Plane of Immanence (for more on the body without organs in organizational analysis, see Thanem, 2004). A mixture between an actual state of affairs and a virtual multiplicity, which is a becoming. Organizations are not *per se* situated at the Plane of Organization, although this is where we find them actualized: the organization as a practice is in a perpetual becoming which moves between the planes, 'a bureaucratic perversion, a permanent inventiveness or creativity practiced even against administrative regulations' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 214). Consequently, creativity is rapidly becoming a theme in Deleuzoguattarian organization theory: Styhre and Sundgren (2003) perform an affirmative case study on rhizomatic innovation phases within the medical industry. Thomas Osborne (2003), reversely, opposes the idea that creativity 'as such' can be extracted from Deleuze's work and applied 'everywhere': this will only stratify creativity and create an 'image of thought'. In any case, the very notion of *the Organization*, as we know it from organization theory, is indeed an 'image of thought': that is Deleuze's expression for a common sense notion turned into a universal Truth (see Deleuze, 1994, especially Chapter 3). From an aesthetic point of view, Weiskopf attacks the iron-cage seen as another image of thought (Weiskopf, 2002). In reality, the organization is itself a mixture, despite the efforts organization theorists like Henry Mintzberg make in order to secure that all organizations resemble the human Organism, as they strikingly do in *Structures in Five* (Mintzberg, 1983).

Thinking itself is a practice that is able to produce the plane of immanence, just as art and science are (according, at least, to Deleuze and Guattari, 1994). The infinite movement of thought makes it capable of traversing vast distances and multiple flows in a single flash, and as a practice thinking draws a plane that maps these distances and these flows. In this way thinking draws the Plane of Immanence, which is composed of concepts. A practice of life is also able to produce the plane. So are you: moreover, you have now to follow that line of flight that will draw *your* body without organs. If you don't, you will be completely engulfed in the strata on the Plane of Organization, onto which organisms, signs and subjects are crafted. The Plane of Organization is folded and thickened into more stable layers; the Plane of Organization is stratified: Deleuze

and Guattari erect a social ontology, which is finally a geology. They are geophilosophers.

Organizational research, then, if it aims to be non-transcendent and immanent and hostile to any image of thought, must be a diagonal or transversal movement between an actualized history and the virtual problem-event, an event that is 'immaterial, incorporeal, unlivable: pure *reserve*' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 156). It is the concept itself that is able to bring the problem through its critical thresholds towards the problematic, where it will revolt. That is why the intuitive, critical method of creating concepts is so vital to Deleuze and Guattari (1994, Chapter 1). The problematic is realized in a milieu as a revolutionary becoming, implying that the crisis therefore designates a conjunction of philosophy, or of the concept, with the present milieu, in short, designates a *political philosophy* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 100). Social analysis seen from the point of view of the problematic is the analysis of the event as a multiplicity, or the analysis of the expressible and the visible and their interrelation.

This is a social analysis of perpetual breakdown, instantiating series of measured collapses by turning the problem into the problematic. 'Certainly it is valuable to a trained writer to crash in an aircraft which burns,' said Hemingway. 'He learns several important things very quickly' (Hemingway, 1986: 127). Since each and every single machine works by breaking down (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1984: 151, or think of thesis writing or sex), our breakdown must become isomorphic with the machines the analysis tries to express and map, we must ourselves produce small machines that can be put at work everywhere: 'Hence we are all handymen: each with his little machines' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984: 1). These machines are of diverse kinds: critical machines, literary machines, bachelor machines, fucking machines, micro-organizing machines, conservation machines, killing machines, creative machines of metamorphosis, affective machines that deterritorialize, decode, and transform. In one word: war machines.

Willing the war against past and future wars, the pangs of death against all deaths, and the wound against all scars, in the name of a becoming and not of the eternal: it is only in this sense that the concepts gather together. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 160)

As it turned out, postmodernism did not, in the final analysis, provide us with sufficiently strong weapons for dealing with the present situation: high capitalism with its global conjunctions of decoded and deterritorialized flows of labour and capital (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 33). Where postmodern organization theory excelled in the attack on signifiers and logocentrism, Deleuze and Guattari circumvent this very enterprise, thus reframing the problem of social analysis: it is precisely the global capitalist machine's *lack* of transcendent signifiers that makes it so strong and dangerous (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 97ff). Capitalism works through immanence (albeit a false one), and can readily accept 'ethnicity', 'gender', and 'faith', since these are instantly turned into commodi-

ties and life styles. The focus of the analysis should therefore be the practice by which our current conditions are preconfigured by the Market with the State as only an auxiliary apparatus: the latter captures our desires, and the former turns them into interests and cravings. Such analysis should recognise desire as a productive force, rather than as a Freudian/Lacanian lack, and should not just 'liberate' us as collectives of desiring machines, but should also draw a plane of consistency able to call forth a 'new earth' and a 'a people yet to come'. For sure a utopian thought for most contemporary organization theory, making precisely organization theory a suitable point of departure for a renewed theory of social change (see Bogard, 1998; Albertsen and Diken, forthcoming; Thanem and Linstead, forthcoming). This is a revolutionary utopia, but since historical revolutions as a rule only have supplanted one dominant discourse with another, the call is for another kind of revolution: 'The revolution that is needed is one of *thinking*' (Carter and Jackson, 2004: 121). It is a revolution that implies method as *style*: writing to the nth power. The uninhibited excretion of pigshit, ie, immaculate defecation: 'speaking will be fashioned out of eating and shitting, language and its univocity will be sculpted out of shit . . .' (Deleuze, 1990: 193). Dystopian as it is, organization theory suffers from the same disease as did Kant: an inability to write affectively, to turn the wound against all scars, to write in blood. Maybe we should all leave behind the fetish for organizing theory and 'go on to write some extraordinary pages. Entirely practical pages' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 27).

From organization towards the organizing refrain

While the assemblage and the territory are the two main components in the Deleuzoguattarian 'social ontology' (see Delanda, 2002; Sørensen, 2003), and while they criticize the noun organization for being an image of thought, they also offer 'positive' concepts for the process of organizing: the rhythm and the refrain. The assemblage becomes territorial on account of a mixture of chaos, organization and change, and 'these are not three successive moments in an evolution. They are three aspects of a single thing, the Refrain (*ritournelle*)' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 312).

The refrain orders the social world as well as it orders other systems like birds establishing territoriality in the forest by singing, or geological strata that slowly create sediments through a long span of years. In the long and rather complicated 11. plateau 'On the Refrain' in *A Thousand Plateaus*, the refrain is considered under three aspects: injection (indicating scattered attempts to organize), inscription (the actualization of the organization) and interception (the deterritorialization of the organization, a possible line of flight).

To make the refrain work, let us, finally, consider the organization of warfare. It is well documented that organization theory is a child of war, and had it *only* been a question of organization, Germany could very well have won WWII. The following example sketches the rise of the Nazi Party in pre-war Europe, and

points to a possible counteractualization, two organizing processes that *both* work by way of the refrain, if only in very different ways.

For our benefit, the German novelist and Nobel Laureate Günther Grass' novel *The Tin Drum* (trans. 1961) delivers convincing material in regard to this matter. In *The Tin Drum*, Oskar Matzarath, who was born when the Nazis were establishing the party in pre-WWII Germany and parts of Poland, decides at the age of three that he will not grow any more. Apart from being a sort of dwarf (a physical becoming-minor, see Deleuze and Guattari, 1986), you would recognize his extreme voice, with which he is able to break both windows and his teachers' glasses. Also, he carries a tin drum which he plays rhythmically almost without halt: against all demonic threats in a world going mad, Oskar plays his autonomous rhythms, which slowly develop into elaborated refrains. As a preliminary organizing force, this 'injection' is the initiation of a quasi-stable situation that connects Oskar's fragile assemblage (a dwarf among giants) temporarily to a territory following a local tactic of survival, just like a kid alone in the night starts chanting a little refrain, to get through the forest, to make it less uncanny.

But the refrain's capacity for injection is only its first characteristic. Its second characteristic is its capability of inscription. The inscription creates a more established territory as a geomorphic reality: folding the social stratum so as to create an inside and an outside, so as to create an organization. The inscription process is moving towards the stratified and the signified: it takes a more systematic effort and time to inscribe rather than just to inject. The Nazi rallies, as performed in Nuremberg, show the inscribing forces of a repetitive refrain when the Nazis built their frightening organization, the Party: the marches, the uniforms, the architecture. Here the refrain has become pure orderword. Organization as a noun is realized when the territorialization of a territory is taken to its limit, when the factor of territorialization is raised towards infinity, and in the end it will lose its creative movement. Via territorialization, inscription creates a home, *Heimat*, by drawing a circle and organizing a space with a firm inside/outside distinction: Arian/Jew, or, in more frequent or at least more mundane settings, member and non-member of the organization and the rhythm of the pay-check/the unemployment benefit.

But the refrain can *also* draw a line of flight, when it 'intercepts' and creates a way out. This happens when the territorial refrain (the organization) is deterritorialized by creative forces: music, art, philosophy, creative critique or simply *the outside*. The default situation, however, is the refrain's tendency to segmentize and rigidify, to become a habit, morphing into what is known as organizational culture.

In an early scene in *The Tin Drum*, the refrain as injection and as inscription is superseded by the creation of an interception, a complete and absolute deterritorialization. In Danzig,⁴ where Oskar lives, a great rally is to take place. Half of the city attends, and every citizen is in line and order in the German way, the military orchestra is playing marches, everybody goes *Heil Hitler!* The refrain proves, here in Danzig, to be an exceptionally strong uniting force, drawing the desires and the bodies of the masses into a unified Organization. Unexpectedly,

the tiny ten-year old Oskar hides under the grand, elevated scene, just beneath the microphones: here he starts drumming. Slowly, almost unconsciously, another rhythm spreads to the thousands of party members, and they begin moving around, leaving their lines and dropping down their hailing arms: *Oskar is drumming a waltz*. As the Nazi guest of honour arrives, everybody is dancing, smiling happily, the orderword has transformed into a love song and the Nazi rally has cancelled itself. The Germans have a word for such an event: *Mitfreude*, the joy, *Freude*, you have *mit einander*, together. In a proto-Deleuzian way, however, Oskar rejects to be a resistance fighter, as resistance is quite an exploited term. He is rather an eccentric, a singular event of difference that does not need an Other in order to produce difference.

To render the Nazi rally problematic and find the love inherent in the gathered crowd is to push the problem towards a liminal crisis between a deterritorialization and possible reterritorializations, that is, to push it into a critical passage. Organization theory should be exactly that: an elaborately developed question, rather than a resolution to a problem, an elaboration, *to the very end*, of the necessary implications of a formulated question (see Deleuze, 1991: 116).

We have all the time in the world, but we only have it *now*. It is time for you to enter into *your* crisis and find a problem worth problematizing. Usually, one starts off with a small thing. Realize that we are in a social formation. First see how it is stratified for us and in us and at the place where we are; then descend from the strata to the deeper assemblage. From here, you (and, perhaps, your pack of friends or wolves or colleagues) shall make the assemblage *pass over to the side of the Plane of Immanence*. You gently tip it; you don't use a sledgehammer, but a very fine file. Count the connections in the assemblage, find its rhythm, listen to its refrain, look for the detail where the refrain might become deterritorialized and connect anew with an outside. It is here, when you see the plane in the horizon that the body without organs reveals itself for what it is: connection of desires, conjunction of flows, continuum of intensities (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 161). It is here that you enter your becoming *together with the problem that you are problematizing*. It is a pure process or a movement with infinite speed, a molecular transmutation that goes from the subject towards a line of flight. Towards the crack in everything, which is where the light comes in (L. Cohen). This becoming goes from the established subject of enunciation to the infant; it is a becoming-speechless in the midst of a silent tremor. It is a becoming imperceptible: it questions the relation between the (anorganic) imperceptible, the (asignifying) indiscernible, and the (asubjective) impersonal (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 279). To become imperceptible means to be present at the dawn of the world.

Notes

1 Personal communication, 2004.

2 Gibson Burrell also takes interest in control and death from the point of view of Deleuze and Guattari, but he reads too many dichotomies out of Deleuze and Guattari to be convinced, in

the final analysis, that a nomadology will suffice in getting us beyond death, and he skips, finally, to the world of punk (Burrell, 1998: 150).

- 3 Xeroxing is also productive, as some sentences become cut off, some become unreadable, and some will end up signifying something completely different from the author's 'intentions'.
- 4 Danzig is the Polish city Gdansk, where 60% of the voters welcomed Nazism as a liberation in 1935. In 1927, Günter Grass was born in the city.

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