

## Figuring out the Englishisation of Europe

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### Robert Phillipson

The major language policy challenges in Europe that need exploring, in theory and practice, are three inter-related topics:

- how to devise and implement proactive language policies to ensure that all languages remain viable, which entails ensuring that English is appropriated in ways that are compatible with a balanced ecology of languages,
- how to clarify and elaborate criteria to promote democratic principles and equality in communication in European institutions and activities, which implies policies for multilingualism in transnational networks,
- how to strengthen the language rights of speakers of all groups, including minorities, in education and public and professional domains, for which visionary and realistic policies for multilingualism in education are needed.

These presuppose open constructive dialogue between grassroots constituencies, policy-makers, and ‘experts’ on language matters.

To achieve this in the evolving global and European linguistic market, including ongoing Englishisation in states forming a neo-federal supranational EU, is a tall order, not least because, as a pioneer in the field of language policy and planning (LPP), Joseph Lo Bianco, writes (2002):

Unhappily for those who have sought to devise a “science” of LPP there are no protocols for doing or designing LPP that can be induced from practice, abstracted, tested and refined into procedures and then transferred across contexts and applied in diverse settings. (...) What I think is relatively portable, at least from my own experience, are *processes for the formulation of policy*, i.e., collaborative negotiated and discursive arrangements for formulating inter-subjective agreements among parties in contest with each other. (...) the field is too dependent on the descriptive traditions of linguistics from which it derives, and insufficiently in communication with policy analysis sciences, with political science, with sociology and with critical schools of thought.

The complexity of an EU of 25 member states multiplies the hurdles in policy formation and implementation. If applied linguistics is to pursue the target of inter-subjective agreements nationally and in supranational EU affairs, there have to be solid empirical and conceptual foundations on which to build. At present there are plenty of building blocks, but all rather uneven, and there are definitely no standardised products and no master builders. How Englishisation in particular, its forms and functions, might be integrated into LPP is also a largely unmet challenge, even though some charting of it is taking place. The need to get a grip on ‘English’ is being expressed at national and supranational levels. Discourses range from bland celebrations of linguistic diversity, through far from subtle advocacy of English as the open sesame to all the glories of globalisation, to extreme concern that English is imposing an alien monoculture.

LPP and language rights are being analysed in many specialised fields, in political science (Kymlicka & Patten 2003, Ives 2004), cultural history (Wright 2000), international law (de Varennes 2000), minority affairs and education (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000), economics and multilingual governance (Grin 2004). Among scholars in critical theory, Habermas (2001) is strongly committed to building European political unity, which presupposes a Europe-wide public sphere, a shared political culture, in which processes of identification would be fundamentally different at the European and national levels. Many of us academics probably have a strong European identity, our individual perceptions being grounded in certain types of network, professional and personal, and in the kinds of cultural and linguistic diversity that nomadism, cosmopolitanism, and the technologies of globalisation generate. Unfortunately Habermas devotes little attention to language issues, apart from endorsing the major symbolic significance of support for all EU official languages and the emergence of English as the default language, building on its status in small EU countries as what he refers to as a ‘second “first” language’ (ibid., 19). There is a clear gap for applied linguistics and LPP to fill here.

How then can sociolinguistically informed applied linguistics and language pedagogy contribute to ongoing activities (Lo Bianco’s processes) and open up new ones in order to figure out and influence the constellation of languages in contemporary Europe? One major hurdle is to achieve understanding between people of different linguistic and cultural backgrounds, since such basic terms as language and dialect mean different things in each country (Barbour 2000). Our cosmologies differ. As a historical starting-point for our quest for the perfect language policy, it is useful to recall that ‘Europe first appears as a Babel of new languages. Only afterwards was it a mosaic of nations’ (Eco 1997, 18). Nations and nationalism preceded the consolidation of national languages. The emergence of a considerable number of states and languages of national power coincided with several languages serving trans-national purposes as Latin was phased out. It was primarily these languages that were learned as foreign languages in the twentieth century.

The sovereign power of states and of national languages is currently under massive pressure. A recent book by a French political scientist that explores how European integration impacts on sovereignty claims that ‘the only genuine “idiom of Europe” ... is the practice of translation’, and suggests that language policies should be pushed in two directions: by mainstreaming the languages of recent immigrants (Arabic, Turkish, Urdu, ...), and by ‘stretching the idea of “translation” from the merely linguistic to the broader cultural level. This is a decisive but still enigmatic task ...’ (Balibar 2004, 230). Balibar is articulating a need for languages to be seen as more than merely instrumental, and for LPP to include the demographically and culturally significant under-class of non-citizens speaking marginalised languages.

European citizenship, within the limits of the currently existing union, is not conceived as a recognition of the rights and contributions of *all* the communities present upon European soil, but as a postcolonial isolation of ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ populations ... a true *European apartheid*, advancing concurrently with the formal institutions of European citizenship and, in the long term, constituting an essential element of the *blockage* of European unification as a democratic construction. (Balibar 2004, 170)

In other words the democratic deficit is not merely the gap between the citizen in 25 countries and a remote bureaucratic apparatus, but also a profoundly unjust, and ultimately self-defeating social structure in each country. Political and social apartheid is reinforced by linguistic apartheid. Within each state this can only be circumvented by the 'non-natives' yielding to the assimilationist pressure of the dominant group. At the supranational level, proficiency in English is increasingly expected, even when this puts many at a disadvantage. The draft Constitution enshrines neoliberal market forces as well as some human rights. The Europeanisation process suffers from major legitimacy deficits at both the national and supranational levels, and consolidates a hierarchy of languages.

In continental Europe, English interacts with local languages, with new media products, new patterns of cultural and scholarly consumption, new military engagements, and new forms of European integration, all of which bring new forms of communication into existence. For large numbers of continental Europeans, a degree of bilingualism is a reality, but we are reminded by Steiner (1998, xii), that 'translation is formally and pragmatically implicit in every act of communication, in the emission and reception of each and every mode of meaning, be it in the widest semiotic sense or in more specifically verbal exchanges. To understand is to decipher. To hear significance is to translate.'

All of us who operate in several languages know how demanding it is to square the circle of semantic equivalence between languages. In many European contexts, English has a comparative advantage, which raises the issue of justice, as well as exploding the myth of English being universally appropriate. For Bourdieu (2001), Englishisation is symbolic imperialism and linguistic hegemony. He accuses speakers of the dominant language (currently English, and earlier French and German) of behaving as though their symbolic forms and values are universal. Englishisation is integral to globalisation (see Phillipson 2003), reflecting broader processes of Americanisation. The language serves instrumental purposes but also constitutes new hybrid cultures. The challenge Bourdieu formulates (*ibid.*) is to answer the question: 'how can one go along with the use of English without exposing oneself to the risk of being anglicised in one's mental structures, without being brainwashed by the linguistic routines'?

For applied linguistics to embrace a multilingual habitus requires unifying the constituent elements of LPP in a critical language policy paradigm – since justice and cultural vitality are at stake. How English linguistic routines operate is not merely a matter of choice for the individual language user, since we are all constrained by wider structural and ideological forces. A recent incident in the European Parliament exemplifies this. MEPs have a paramount right to use their own language, and in theory twenty languages have equal rights. But *Le Monde* reported on 17 February 2004 that three French MEPs tabled a motion on a financial topic not in French but in English: 'We had to shift to English in order to be heard'. Specifically the issue was the words 'standard' (in French = normal) and 'normal'. 'The problem could only be solved by resorting to English.' If even speakers of French cannot always use their mother tongue, you can imagine what the pressure is like on the speakers of the other 18 EU languages.

The notion that EU official documents 'mean' the same in countries with different languages and histories, different legal and education systems *et al* is a convenient, but untenable fiction. One language size does not fit all. The flippant idea that Eurotexts are thinly disguised French in

nineteen other languages is not completely off the mark, as there are historical reasons for this, and is confirmed in work in linguistic pragmatics that compares the form and reception of texts in French and Danish (Lundquist and Gabrielsen 2004). In language policy and practice in EU institutions, matters of form and function, of cultural universe and voice, of language and power are inextricably interwoven. We therefore have to make sure that our analytical efforts can capture this complexity.

When exploring the functions English is serving in Europe, we need to clarify what 'English' is and whose norms are in force. Is Bourdieu (2001) right to claim that so far as continental Europe is concerned, English is not the language of England but of the American economic and cultural empire? Or House (2003) that English as a Lingua Franca is neither Anglo nor American, nor a restricted language for special purposes, but a hybrid negotiable additional language?

Unfortunately a lot of dubious claims about Englishisation are being made. This is so when the EU spuriously claims that 'half of Europe is multilingual' (see Phillipson 2003, 8). This EU 'data' misled Graddol (2004) into stating that in Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, nearly 80% of the population claim fluency in English. In fact the self-report survey asked whether informants could 'take part in a conversation in a language other than the mother tongue'. In Denmark at least 20% of the population know no English (Preisler 1999), and the 2003 OECD study of school achievement (the PISA comparative studies of 40 countries) found that 17% of 15-16-year-old Danes were functionally illiterate. Good data on L2 proficiency is simply non-existent. Chaudenson (2003, 292) regards French L2 proficiency figures as fraudulent: 'demographic linguistics can be like the yeti or the Loch Ness monster, a being I have never found and whose existence remains problematical until proven otherwise'.

Graddol also writes (2004) that 'Swedish, like many smaller European languages, is now positioned more as a local language of solidarity than one for science, university education, or European communication.' This is incorrect. More has been done by Swedish scholars and officialdom than in any other state in Europe to explore whether the national language is threatened by English or not, and to engage in LPP. Sweden's official goals are:

- to maintain Swedish as the primary language for all in Sweden,
- to ensure that Swedish is a 'complete' language and 'correct',
- to respect the rights of speakers of minority languages,
- to promote parallel competence in English and Swedish for elites in universities, business, politics, the media etc, and also ensure that there are some with good competence in other languages,
- to strengthen the infrastructure for language policy, in dialogue with many stake-holders.

The position of the Danish government is similar. Universities are being encouraged to make multilingual language policy goals and means explicit.

There are various types of documentation of ongoing processes of Englishisation:

- There has been a paradigm shift from a concern with loan words (Étiemble 1964), to books appearing with titles like *L'Europe parlera-t-elle anglais demain?* (Chaudenson 2001),

*Lingua franca communication* (Knapp & Meierkord 2002), and *Globalization and the future of German* (Gardt & Hüppauf 2004).

- The increased use of English in EU institutions and practices has been analysed (Phillipson 2003).
- There are studies of the Englishisation of academia in several countries (Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas 1999, Wilson 2002, on Ammon 2001 see Phillipson 2002), and of the reception of English at all levels of society in Denmark (Preisler 1999).
- A Danish researcher (Hjarvad 2003) analyses medialects, the new variants of language and cultural form - computer games, email and internet interaction, SMSs, television programmes (whether transmitted in the original language or the local one), advertising, etc – which are creatively adapted from Anglo-American origins in continental Europe. The medialects consolidate the position of English, while excluding other international languages, and open up for ‘linguistic differentiation and innovation’. Englishisation affects the form and content of other languages.
- Surveys in all the Nordic countries of the increasing use of English in scholarship and technology, in higher education, the business world and media, suggest that there are strong risks of domain loss in local languages (Høglin 2002), leading to less efficiency in thought, expression, and communication as well as lower prestige for the national language (Melander 2001).
- A study of Nordic medical doctors reading an article either in English or in a translation into Danish, Swedish or Norwegian revealed that doctors reading the text (from the *Journal of Trauma!*), whether in a paper version or on a screen, took in more when reading in their mother tongue. Open-ended questions testing comprehension revealed that 25% more information was grasped in L1 (Höglin 2002, 32).
- Study of the key national journal, *Ekonomisk Tidskrift*, from 1965 the *Swedish Journal of Economics*, and from 1976 the *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* (with Blackwell since 1986), documents a fundamental shift in authorship: 90% Swedish in the 1960s, under 20% since 1990 (and 30+% US authorship) (Sandelin & Ranki 1997). Related studies show that databases used for ‘international’ comparisons are biased, since continental Europeans also publish in other languages (Sandelin & Sarafogkou 2004). The expectation that continental academics publish in English influences topics, paradigms, L1 competence, and careers.
- Researchers tend to read one foreign language, rather than several. Figures for translation show that in Sweden a century ago an approximately equal number of titles were translated from French, German, and English. Now most translation is from English (Melander 2001).

Although the data is sporadic and uneven, it can shed light on whether the shift to English and Anglo-American norms represents a threat to cultural diversity and linguistic vitality. Few question the need to use English in the modern world. The issue is whether it is learned and used additively. Whereas standardised national languages and imperial languages, even when polycentric, had the weight of states behind them, the expansion of the use of English throughout continental Europe is different in kind, although some of the structural and ideological forces behind English are comparable (see Phillipson 2003, chapter 3). Many push and pull factors propel English forward in specific domains, for instance research, the global media, advertising, and youth culture. Englishisation is inextricably linked to globalisation and americanisation

(which some see as neo-imperialism or hyperimperialism, or merely empire, Hardt & Negri 2000) and to europeanisation.

There are many paradoxes in language policy in Europe. The European Union (EU) is fundamentally a Franco-German project, with the French and Germans setting the pace for integration, but the French and German languages are on the defensive both at home and abroad. English is increasingly the dominant language both in EU affairs and in some societal domains in continental European countries. However, the economic and monetary union of Europe has been a US foreign policy goal since 1945, including the spread of English (Rothkopf 1997), as part of the corporate globalisation grand design ([www.newamericancentury.org](http://www.newamericancentury.org)). Within this

Britain's role remains an essentially imperial one: to act as junior partner to US global power; to help organise the global economy to benefit western corporations; and to maximise Britain's (that is British elites') independent political standing in the world and thus remain a 'great power'. (Curtis 2003)

This directly impacts on the academic world because of 'the corporate takeover of Britain' where business 'stands as a guard dog at the gates of perception.' (Monbiot 2000, 301). Pilger (2003) charges the likes of ourselves with complicity in western state terrorism, since 'humanities departments – the engine rooms of ideas and criticism -are close to moribund'. Can any of us be certain that our efforts are not contributing to this, in a world where all are told that they are either with 'us' or with 'the terrorists'? A world in which, as Arundhati Roy puts it ([www.smh.com.au/articles/2004](http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004)), 'the doctrine of Free Speech has been substituted by the doctrine of Free if You Agree Speech'.

The second European paradox is that multilingualism may be synonymous with more English (de Swaan 2001, Chaudenson 2003). There is a fundamental contradiction between the affirmation in the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (October 2004, Article I-3) that the Union shall respect 'its rich cultural and linguistic diversity' and the fact that English is increasingly occupying space that earlier was the prerogative of other national languages. The EU linguistic hierarchy can be seen on the Commission website, where all texts are available in English, most in French, and very little in other languages, except for documents with the force of law in member states. Changes in the management of interpretation and translation after enlargement in 2004 are reinforcing the linguistic hierarchy. The ways in which language policy in the supranational EU institutions is being worked through is a complex issue, requiring book-length treatment (Phillipson 2003), but EU LPP is politically sensitive (there is 'a conspiracy of silence', Wright 2000) and there are strong forces behind assigning a special role to English. Romano Prodi stated to a journalist from *Newsweek* (31 May 2004) in answer to the question:

A unified Europe in which English, as it turns out, is the universal language?

Prodi: It will be broken English, but it will be English.

Neil Kinnock, Vice-President of the Commission led by Prodi, and known for his monolingualism, became head of the British Council after returning to the UK in 2004. He has switched from furthering European interests (and more English?) to promoting Britain and English.

Many factors account for paralysis in language policy formation

- different cosmologies in national linguistic cultures
- confusions of terminology (e.g. lingua franca, multilingualism, working language) in discourse (politics, media, business etc) and in distinct academic disciplines
- linguistic human rights are a recent development in international law
- criteria for guiding equitable supranational language policy are under-explored
- limited dialogue between scholars, interest groups, and policy-makers
- overall responsibility for language policy in the EU is fragmented (Council of Ministers, separate Directorates General for Education & Culture, Translation, Research, ...), and ultimately (inter-) governmental
- alternatives to market forces and linguistic nationalism (e.g. Esperanto) are unexplored.

In the light of such paradoxes and *laissez faire* paralysis, it is not surprising that there is considerable fluidity in language policy in Europe:

- an unresolved tension between linguistic nationalism (monolingualism) and EU institutional multilingualism
- competing agendas at the European, state (national), and sub-statal levels
- an increase in grassroots and elite bilingualism
- a largely uncritical adoption of englishisation, the lingua economica/Americana
- a rhetoric of language rights, and some national and supranational implementation.

Do these fluid norms also apply to the forms of English? Some appear to endorse this:

How English develops in the world is no business whatever of native speakers in England, the United States, or anywhere else. They have no say in the matter, no right to intervene or pass judgement. They are irrelevant. The very fact that English is an international language means that no nation can have custody over it. (Widdowson 2003, 43)

However liberal that might sound, we live in a neoliberal world order. The position is disingenuous when the demand for native speaker models globally is a reality (though in many parts of Europe this relates to pedagogical norms and materials, and not to actual teachers), when the power of English in former colonies is greater than ever, and when English is of major importance for the British economy. The British Council recently warned that the UK economy is at risk if it doesn't invest in international education. The UK economy benefits by £11 billion p.a. directly, and a further £12 billion indirectly, from international education. The goal is 8 per cent annual growth across the sector, and to double the present number of 35,000 research graduates contributing to the UK's knowledge economy by 2020. In addition over 500,000 attend language learning courses each year ([www.britishcouncil.org/mediacentre/apr04/vision\\_2020\\_press\\_notice.doc](http://www.britishcouncil.org/mediacentre/apr04/vision_2020_press_notice.doc)).

It is false to disconnect English from the power and powers behind it:

English being disembodied from national cultures can never mean that it floats culture-free (... or) is culturally neutral. The point may be simple, but it is often elided; and this elision constitutes a politics of English as a global language which precisely conceals the cultural work which that model of language is in fact performing. (Kayman 2004, 17)

Kayman also makes the intriguing point that the prophets and proponents of English as a global language can be compared to Europeans occupying other continents that were falsely seen as *terra nullius*. Contemporary linguists who proclaim the neutrality of English treat the language as a cultural *terra nullius* (ibid., 18)

There is an influential tradition in writings on Global English in this spirit (Crystal 1997, Brutt-Griffler 2002, reviewed in Phillipson 2004), ignoring warnings from LPP pioneers like Einar Haugen that it is a delusion to consider that English can ever be seen as purely instrumental (see Phillipson 1992, 287). If applied linguists are attempting to determine whether L2 English communication is *sui generis*, they need to specify what sort of genus or species of language it is. This presupposes identifying whether its paradigmatic parentage is Saussure or Dell Hymes, Halliday or Kachru, Bakhtin, Mufwene or Bourdieu. Debates about the 'ownership' of English tend to be less concerned with theories of language, philosophy, or culture, and more with pedagogical issues. Seidlhofer (2004, a magisterial survey) argues convincingly that there is a clash between recognition of world Englishes as being exonormatively governed and the insistence on native speaker norms. Jenkins (2002, 2004) significantly links phonology to ideology, attitudes, and context. But I do not yet see sociolinguistics of this kind engaging with the socially anchored functions that English performs, which discourses, in what domains, with what degree of success, and with what impact on hierarchies of language and the language ecology.

A pioneer study of Englishisation such as House (2003) presents some empirical studies and reflections on the nature of English as a 'lingua franca' (ELF) in Europe. In the table below I report the characteristics she attributes to ELF, alongside which are my reservations about the analysis.

<b><i>House 2003 characteristics of ELF</i></b>	<b><i>Critique</i></b>
functional flexibility, openness to integration of forms from other languages	it is false to claim that such traits are specific to ELF
not restricted or for special purposes	how is this claim compatible with there being diglossic 'pockets of expertise'?
negotiable norms	it is <i>use</i> of the code rather than the code itself that is negotiable
bereft of collective cultural capital	the global utility of English, often diglossically High, is significant linguistic capital
similar to English diversity in postcolonial countries	here English equals power, and there is no codification of local forms
non-identificational	English connotes cosmopolitanism, and in Germany had positive connotations of liberation from the Nazi past
non-native ownership	a concern of the analyst, not the user

When House argues that English is a language for communication rather than a language for identification, there are echoes of a pioneer in ELT: ‘The foreigner is learning English to express ideas rather than emotion; for his (sic) emotional expression he has the mother-tongue. English is a rather unemotional language...’. (West 1953, x).

The identification/communication pair is tempting, as a way of separating English as a national language from English as an instrument for international communication that is less culturally shaped. However, the distinction is seen by Blommaert (2003, 620) as deriving from a functionalist-referential ideology and an ideological perception that results in uses of language being seen as ‘instrumental’, and as ‘a metapragmatic dichotomisation that allocates specific indexicalities to particular speech varieties. (...) matters are considerably more complex’. Hüllen advocated the binary distinction in a less simplistic way, his initial analysis addressing the social functions of English, the risk of a monoculture, and acknowledging that competence in foreign languages can lead to identification with them (1992, 313-5). In more recent work, Hüllen (2002) considers that to see English as neutral, with ‘nothing to do with the cultural identity of speakers’, is problematical. He distances himself from the dichotomy, since we are in an age

with the United States as a kind of new empire. This makes it difficult to believe in the hypothesis that English as a national language and English as an international language are two separate systems, the latter being equidistant to all other languages and cultures. (Hüllen 2003, 121)

House 2003 presents three types of empirical ELF data. The first is an analysis of how far *textual features of English are carried over into German*, thereby corrupting a German way of marshalling and presenting information in written texts. The empirical data show that this was not the case. But I cannot see how the written language of professionals translating texts from English into German, of publications originally written by native speakers, can be considered suitable as ELF data.

The second study involved setting up *ELF interactions with 4 ‘international’ students*, followed up by retrospective interviews, on the basis of which the following conclusions are drawn:

- there are few misunderstandings, and the conversation was characterised by Asian participants’ ‘single-minded pursuance of ... [their] individual script’.
- Participants ‘re-present’ or ‘echo’ information, possibly indicating Asian politeness, or an urge to reach consensus.
- Participants are supportive and evince EFL user solidarity, visible in collaborative discourse production. This was truer of Asians than of a German informant, who failed to elicit argumentative talk. It is unclear from the article how much negotiation of meaning took place.

House concludes by hypothesizing that ‘ELF users’ native culture-conditioned ways of interacting are “alive” in the medium of the English language.... ELF appears to be a useful communicative tool’, with an active component of strategic competence (op.cit., 570).

The third project dealt with the phenomenon of English being used as *a medium of instruction at German universities*, with international students otherwise in a German-speaking environment. The limited information provided presents English as a transitional language, for international students

needing to become confident enough to study in German, and teachers using English as a 'supranational, auxiliary means of communication' (op.cit., 571). There is no clarification of the forms or functions of English, for instance of whether the German teachers' ELF may have created communication problems for the students, or alternatively whether sensitive ELF users, in the domain of English for specific academic purposes, might be more comprehensible than native speakers.

House calls for a new paradigm, building on a multilingual habitus. She distances herself from any notion of a stable speech community, preferring to think of ELF as a community of practice: 'mutual engagement, a joint negotiated enterprise, and a shared repertoire of negotiable resources' (op.cit. 572). She endorses the desirability of identifying ELF norms that are not identical with native speaker norms but rather show expertise in ELF, this being a hybrid, intercultural language. What would need clarification is whether the paradigm shift she endorses can be achieved by analysis of the three types of data presented. In the first case, the issue is whether German is affected by English, not vice versa. In the second, it is evident that cultural norms decisively influence the ELF forms. In the third, the ELF of German university lecturers is presumably influenced by L1 features of phonology, syntax, lexis, and discourse. This makes a rejection of interlanguage, or even of contrastive factors, less than persuasive. And if the goal in such contexts is to prepare learners for a switch to German, perhaps the more German-affected the ELF is the better? Presumably the variant of English used is English for academic and professional purposes, where the relevant terminology and procedures of a scholarly field must be non-negotiable.

House's earlier work (1996) in cross-cultural pragmatics seems to imply that L1-specific ELF traits are a defining feature of ELF rather than negotiable, making the empirical base for ELF infinitely varied and rich.

It seems fair to conclude that such ELF research is exploratory and that the links between empiricist activity and theoretical solidity are fragile, even when exploring micro-sociolinguistic questions. As yet, there is only a fragmentary anchoring of ELF in (socio-?) linguistic theory. The focus on consensus, negotiation, and diversity resonates with heteroglossia, Bakhtinian dialogue, and a Gramscian rejection of Saussurian formalism and of detachment from historical, material context. However, the essential thrust, as in Seidlhofer and Jenkins's work, is counter-hegemonic: it is about challenging native speakers norms and control, though probably only with a focus on corpus planning, and potentially on acquisition planning. To link up with status planning requires connecting with analyses of language and power, linguistic hierarchies, and linguicism, where the existing research concentrates on different issues, in particular choice between different languages, and the minorisation of subaltern forms vis-a-vis prestige 'standard' normative forms.

Hegemony is invariably resisted. While some see the current dominance of English in Germany is seen as a 'self-inflicted tragedy' (Meyer 2004, Gawlitta & Vilmar 2002), one that has to be accepted (Ammon 2004), others are much more optimistic (Gardt and Hüppauf 2004). One German LPP activist is reaching a wider public through a novel set in the year 2010 in which the central theme is the introduction of English as a co-official language with German (Gawlitta 2004).

There is also a call to resistance to the advance of English in many Council of Europe recommendations, and in the EU Commission policy document *Promoting language learning and linguistic diversity: An Action Plan 2004-2006*, of 24 July 2003, which encourages member states to create a 'language-friendly environment'. It also states that 'learning one lingua franca alone is not enough (...) English alone is not enough (...) In non-anglophone countries recent trends to provide teaching in English may have unforeseen consequences on the vitality of the national language.' Anxiety about English as an invasive language has passed from the national level (France, Sweden, Denmark) to the supra-national level.

Another symptom of resistance is the evidence of imbalance in LPP costs. Grin (2004) has calculated that the US economy saves \$19 billion p.a. by not needing to spend time and effort in formal schooling on learning foreign languages. To counteract such injustice, some scholars have started elaborating scenarios for a more equitable Europe. Van Parijs has suggested that 'whenever a language is the object of asymmetric bilingualism, the linguistic group whose mother tongue it is must pay half the cost of this learning, in a comprehensive sense that should cover both the explicit cost of language tuition and the huge implicit opportunity cost of having to learn a language rather than devoting one's (children's and own) time to other activities' (2003, 167).

A major effort is needed to counteract the falsity of much of the legitimation of the current pre-eminence of English. There is much self-deception in the marketing of English as the solution to all of Europe's communication problems:

- in *political discourse*: 'English is the world's lingua franca' Lord Renton, House of Lords, 14.10.2002 (since three-quarters of humanity have no command of this language, they are evidently not regarded as needing a lingua franca);
- in *academic discourse*: 'English is the lingua franca of the European Union', Abram de Swaan (2001, 174), a political scientist who cannot be unaware that there are many lingua francas in the EU; 'the language of the proto-European state', Laitin and Reich (2003, 98), two US political scientists specialising in language policy (for critique of this 'liberal' position, see Skutnabb-Kangas 2003);
- in *international cultural diplomacy*: 'English no longer belongs to the English-speaking nations but to everyone', a recurrent British Council mantra, a claim that conveniently ignores British benefits, political, economic and cultural, when its language also happens to be the language of the only super-power in the contemporary world;
- in *applied linguistics*, 'The ascendancy of English is merely the outcome of the coincidence of accidental forces', Bob Kaplan of the US (2001, 19), whose wisdom and insights into LPP are disseminated in a string of books.

When the Director of the British Council in Germany (cited in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of 26 February 2002) declares that English should be the sole official language of the European Union, this smacks of traditional linguistic imperialism and incredible ignorance of how the EU operates.

All the more reason for us to work to create conceptual clarity and ensure that the terms we use are unambiguous. *Lingua franca* is a slippery concept: it is a misleading term for what is often

asymmetrical communication between first language and foreign/second language speakers. There also seems to be an underlying assumption that a lingua franca is culturally neutral, and detached from dominant global or regional forces and their 'special purposes'. The term derives from the Arabic *lisan alfiranj* referring to the language of the Franks, who were seen as representing the crusaders from all over Europe who were out to recover Jerusalem and wipe Islam off the face of the known earth. There is a depressing historical continuity here, since English is now the lingua franca of the modern crusaders with a mission of 'freedom, democracy, and market liberalisation'. The American dog also has a flag-waving British tail: in post-communist countries in the 1990s, English was energetically marketed in tandem with the 'free' market and human rights by the British government.

I would suggest that in whatever specific contexts we meet the term lingua franca, we ask whether it might not be more appropriately labelled as a

*lingua economica* (the globalisation imperative)

*lingua cultura* (the specific values and norms of a society, country, group or class, needing exploration in foreign language teaching)

*lingua academica* (an instrument for international collaboration in higher education)

*lingua emotiva* (the pull of Hollywood, the global advertising and PR giants, pop culture, and how such grassroots identification with English ties in with top-down promotion of the language)

*lingua tyrannosaura* (Swales 1997, the language that gobbles up others, linguistic cannibalism)

*lingua bellica* (the language of military conquest).

We therefore, in my view, need a new term for the English of people for whom it is a second or foreign language (which Seidlhofer and House refer to as English as a Lingua Franca). The world in which they operate is one where linguistic neo-imperialism maintains inequalities between speakers of English and other languages, within a framework of exploitative dominance, through penetration, fragmentation, marginalisation, and supremacist ideologies in discourse, much as in earlier linguistic imperialism. These phenomena need to be explored in the information society of corporate globalisation and multiple networks, analysing how power is inequitably created through linguistic hierarchies. We need to debunk myths of 'choice', of English as 'neutral'. In education and English Language Teaching, anglocentricity (the forms of English, hegemonic symbols) and the disconnection from power hierarchies (functions) need to be counteracted. Within this framework, counter-hegemonic discourses can thrive (and it is a truism that *any* language can be used for good or evil purposes), but there remain major political and ethical challenges in seeking to establish language policies that ensure linguistic equality and enable all to exercise their linguistic human rights.

Hardt and Negri's influential book on empire sees power in deterritorialised networks (2000, 32-33) and stresses that

Language, as it communicates, produces commodities but moreover produces subjectivities, puts them in relation, and orders them. The communications industries integrate the imaginary and the symbolic within the biopolitical fabric, not merely putting them at the service of power but actually integrating them into its very functioning.

Their analysis reveals why it has been so important for the corporate world not only to dominate the media but also education, which is increasingly run to service the economy, and produce consumers rather than critical citizens. English contributes to the imperial production of subjectivities, through communicative networks, creating a synergy that integrates structural and ideological elements in the new world 'order'. The key networks are identifiable, and their language policies can be empirically verified. This 'order' is upheld through English at the global level, and through other languages in pyramidal structures. This symbolic violence is invariably contested but is widely, uncritically internalised.

A recent survey by Rainer Enrique Hamel of 'Language empires, linguistic imperialism, and the future of global languages' concludes as follows in relation to English as the contemporary imperial language:

Neither the number of speakers, nor the number of countries, nor the density of its population makes the difference. Rather, we have to consider economic power, military strength, the ranking in scientific and technological development, the role in international organizations and the cultural industries of those countries and international corporations that back a given language and are determined to operate through it in order to establish the real power and ranking of a language as international (Pennycook 1994), global (Crystal 1997) or imperialist (Phillipson 1992). Certainly agency is relevant, but we will have to extend our view of agency to include all activities propelled by a given habitus, in Bourdieu's sense, not only planned and conscious action. And second, we need to consider the agency of all those who, from subaltern positions and a second language status, help to strengthen the dominant role of a language which in turn contributes to maintain and increase imperial and imperialist power relations. (...) the forces that maintain control over English are clearly rooted in a small number of sovereign states (Hamel, 2003, 34)

Applied linguists are in the business of control, of language and content. Linguicism, like racism, sexism, and militarism, is not only a question of attitudes or awareness. The exploration of the Englishisation of Europe is still in its infancy. The final chapter of my *English-only Europe? Challenging language policy* (Phillipson 2003) contains worst- and best-case scenarios for LPP in Europe, and 45 specific recommendations for what is needed to strengthen national and supranational LPP infrastructure, for EU institutions, language learning and teaching, and research. The final two sentences of the book read:

If inaction on language policy continues, at the supranational and national levels, we may be heading for an American English-only Europe. Is that really what the citizens and leaders of Europe want?

In my view, users of English, whether as L1 or L2, can and must contribute to the critical analysis of Englishisation and to the maintenance and equality of other languages. We could start by listening to this sample of Iroquois wisdom, adding 'linguistic' before each occurrence of 'peace':

Peace is not only the opposite of war, it is not only the time between wars. Peace is more. Peace is the law of human life. Peace is when we do right and when there is justice between every human and every nation.

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